De 1945 à 1966, l’évolution de l’armée de l’air française dépend en grande partie des innovations technologiques. L’objet de la présente thèse est d’expliquer comment elle a été capable, technologiquement et structurellement, de passer d’une situation où elle est jugée désuète à une situation dans laquelle elle se tient en tête du dispositif de défense nationale et se positionne comme la troisième force aérienne mondiale. Nous identifions trois périodes essentielles dans la mutation de son expertise technologique. De 1945 à 1950, elle relève plusieurs défis, à l’image de l’intensification des transferts technologiques, de l’aviation à réaction, dans le contexte naissant de la guerre froide. Pour la période 1951-1958, elle suit un cycle de modernisation accélérée malgré les guerres coloniales, sous l’impulsion de l’aide aide américaine, à l’image du développement de programmes aéronautiques et de l’utilisation de missiles. Enfin, de 1959 à 1966, l’armée de l’air s’adapte aux stratégies et aux armes nouvelles dont le nucléaire. Cette période clé aboutit à l’entrée en service du système d’armes stratégique piloté Mirage IV, dans un environnement marqué par de multiples mutations structurelles et par la sortie du commandement militaire intégré de l’OTAN. / From 1945 to 1966, the evolution of the French Air Force largely depends on technological innovations. The aim of this thesis is to analyze how it became able – both technologically and structurally – to pass from a situation in which it was considered as an old-fashioned entity to the head of the national defense system, thus establishing itself as the third Air Force power. To do so, we identify three essential periods, which illustrate its shift to develop progressively its technological expertise. From 1945 to 1950, it meets several challenges such as technological transfers and jet-powered planes in the early years of the Cold War. From 1951 until 1958, it follows a fast modernization trend in spite of the Colonial Wars, as depicted through the development of aeronautical programs and the use of missiles, in a context of American Help. From 1959 to 1966, the French Air Force then adapts to both nuclear-based weapons and strategies, such as piloted strategic armament systems Mirage IV and structural transfers taken out of the military command integrated by NATO.

Nous avons d’abord entrepris de tracer un tableau de la Norvège en nous reportant à des ouvrages d’auteurs tels Raymond Aron (1905-1983) et son « Guerre et paix entre nations », de Francis Fukuyama (1952-) avec son étude « The Origins of Political Order » [Les origines de l’ordre politique], de Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1929-), auteur de « Norsk utakt » [La Norvège qui marche à contretemps], d’Henrik Ibsen (1828-1906) et son « Peer Gynt », et de nombreux écrits d’Olav Riste (1933-) et d’autres auteurs.A la fin de cette première partie notre analyse a permis d’identifier l’isolationnisme traditionnel et défensif des Norvégiens que nous désignons comme étant du premier degré, puis une seconde forme d’isolationnisme appelé organique et du second degré, car intériorisé et ainsi occulté.Nos sources principales ont été les Comptes rendus de réunions du Comité des Affaires étrangères et de la Constitution au Storting (Parlement) à Oslo.La deuxième partie de cette thèse traite la période de 1940 à 1949 qui se termine par l’adhésion de la Norvège au Pacte atlantique et l’OTAN en 1949, car le pays n’avait tout simplement pas d’autre choix. En troisième partie nous suivons la Norvège dans une phase d’internationalisation profonde de 1950 à 1972 où le pays adhère, de nouveau sous la contrainte, d’abord à l’Association européenne de libre échange puis cherche à se joindre à la Communauté économique européenne. L’échec au référendum sur l’Europe en 1972 est à imputer en très grande partie à son isolationnisme que nous qualifions d’extraordinaire. / We start by building up a portrait of Norway by referring to works by authors such as Raymond Aron (1905-1983) and his «War and peace between nations» [Guerre et paix entre nations], Francis Fukuyama (1952-) with his study of « The Origins of Political Order », Hans Magnus Enzensberger(1929-), author of « Out-of-step Norway » [Norsk utakt], Henrik Ibsen and his « Peer Gynt» as well as numerous writings by Olav Riste (1933-) and other contributors.At the end of this first part our analysis has uncovered the traditional and defensive isolationism of the Norwegians which we qualify as being of the first degree, then a second degree isolationism, organic in character, since it is interiorised and hence hidden.Our main sources are accounts of meetings of the “Committee for Foreign affairs and of the Constitution” at the Storting (Parliament) in Oslo.The second part of this thesis deals with the period from 1940 to 1949 where Norway joined the Atlantic pact and NATO in 1949, quite simply because the country had no other choice. In the third part we look at Norway during her period of opening up to the international community from 1950 to 1972 where the country joins, again because she was forced to, first the European Free Trade area (EFTA), then is a candidate for membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). The loss at the referendum on Europe in 1972 is mostly due to her isolationism that we in the end shall qualify as being extraordinary.

A Diplomacia Pública trata da comunicação dos temas de política externa de um país para participar na discussão do tema no país, apresentando como objetivo verificar como as características da cultura organizacional do Itamaraty impactam no papel da Assessoria de Imprensa do Gabinete do Ministério das Relações Exteriores no desenvolvimento da Diplomacia Pública. A análise foi realizada em comparação aos princípios elaborados por James Grunig (2002) na Teoria da Excelência em Relações Públicas. Os dados selecionados para análise de conteúdo foram recolhidos por meio de entrevistas com diplomatas ligados à Assessoria de Imprensa do Gabinete, diplomatas externos à Assessoria do Gabinete e jornalistas com experiência na cobertura de temas internacionais. A pesquisa foi complementada com dados extraídos da análise do site do Itamaraty e de suas redes sociais oficiais: Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Flickr, SoundCloud e Instagram. O estudo revelou que as características organizacionais do Itamaraty como bacharelismo, formalismo, espírito de corpo e elitismo estão presentes na Assessoria de Imprensa do Gabinete, de maneira a impactar nas atividades de Diplomacia Pública, distanciando-as dos princípios da Teoria da Excelência de Grunig (2002). / Public Diplomacy addresses the communication of a country\'s foreign policy to the international public opinion. Considered to be an interdi sci pl i nary theme between Communication and International Relations, the Public Diplomacy a theme scarcely researched in Brazil. This dissertation intends to participate in the discussion of the subject in the country, aiming to verify how the characteristics of Itamaraty\'s organizational culture impact on the role of the Press Office of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the development of Public Diplomacy. The analysis was carried out in comparison to the principles elaborated by James Grunig (2002) i n the Theory of Excellence i n Public Relations. The data selected for the analysis were col I ected through interviews with diplomats I inked to the Press Office of the Cabi net, diplomats outside the Press Office and journalists with experience in the coverage of international issues. The research was complemented with data extracted from the analysis of the Itamaraty\'s website and official social networks: Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Flickr, SoundCloud and Instagram. The study revealed that the organizational characteristics of Itamaraty as bachelorism, formalism, esprit de corps, and elitism are present in the Press Office of the Cabinet, in a manner that it impacts the activities of Public Diplomacy, distancing them from the principles of Grunig\'s Theory of Excellence (2002).

The study examined China's conduct of its most important overseas propaganda activities in the United States during World War II. The findings showed that the main characteristics of China's propaganda in the United States in the war years included, (a) official propaganda in the United States was operated by the Chinese News Service and its branch offices in several cities; (b) unofficial propaganda involved work by both Americans and Chinese, among them, missionaries, newspapermen, and businessmen who tried to help China for different reasons; (c) both China lobby and Red China lobby, changed people's image about China, either the Nationalists or the Communists; and (d) propaganda toward the overseas Chinese in the United States was to collect donations and stir up patriotism.

A presente tese trata do objetivo brasileiro de ocupar uma cadeira permanente no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas. Primeiramente, aborda-se o tema da reforma do Conselho sob uma perspectiva geral, apresentando-se uma retrospectiva histórica e explanando a composição e o método decisório desse Órgão. Na seqüência, parte-se para o debate sobre a reforma, enfatizando-se o posicionamento dos principais grupos de países. A partir daí, passa-se a analisar o tema sob a ótica dos interesses brasileiros, analisando-se a intenção em ocupar uma cadeira permanente quando da criação das Nações Unidas, assim como o posicionamento brasileiro sobre as atividades do Conselho e as perspectivas de reforma no período entre 1945 e 1992, ano este em que a Assembléia Geral passou a tratar oficialmente dessa questão. Uma vez que o tema passou a ser estudado pela Organização Internacional, a presente pesquisa analisa a candidatura brasileira a membro permanente nos governos Itamar Franco, Fernando Henrique Cardoso e Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a fim de se comparar como o tema da reforma foi abordado por cada um deles. Ao final, conclui-se que as políticas adotadas por esses governos foram diferentes. No governo Itamar, não obstante o curto período, percebe-se grande empenho quando do lançamento da candidatura brasileira. Por outro lado, Fernando Henrique, ao assumir a Presidência da República, deu continuidade às pretensões brasileiras, porém de forma mais tímida. O Presidente Lula, por sua vez, retomou a importância do tema, empenhando-se cada vez mais para alcançar esse objetivo. No entanto, também se pôde perceber que fatores externos influenciaram as políticas adotadas. / This paper concerns about the Brazilian purpose to become a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations. First of all, it presents the issue about the reform of the Security Council, presenting an historical review and explaining its composition, functions and powers. Next, it deals with the discussion about the reform, emphasizing the opinion of the main group of States. From then on, it turns to analyze the subject matter on the Brazilian interest’s point of view, observing the intention to occupy a permanent seat by the time of the UN creation, as well as the Brazilian opinion about the Council activities and the possibility of a reform between 1945 e 1992, the year the General Assembly officially became concerned. Once the issue turned to be examined by this International Organization, this research analyses the Brazilian candidacy for a permanent seat during the governments of Itamar Franco, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in order to compare how the reform issue was deal by each one. At the end, it concludes that the policies they put in force were different one another. During Itamar’s period, despite its shortness, it shows great commitment to become a permanent member. On the other hand, when Fernando Henrique acceded the Presidency, he kept the same goals, but not that hard. The President Lula, in his turn, rescued the importance and focused that aim. Nevertheless external matters affected those policies.

<p>The aim of this thesis is to describe and analyse the Swedish policy towards the Korean Conflict 1947–1953. “Swedish policy” means primarily the Swedish Government’s policy, but also the action taken by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Defence Staff. </p><p>When the UN treated the issue of Korea in the years before the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 the Swedish government abstained from voting for reasons of principle or legality, namely that the Korean issue belonged to the peace regulations after the Second World War, in which Sweden, as an ex-neutral state, considered that it should not participate. </p><p>During the Korean War 1950–1953 the Swedish government almost consistently and in many different ways supported the US-led coalition in defence of South Korea. Although never officially mentioned, this support was given with considerable uneasiness. This uneasiness stemmed not only from fears that the neutrality policy would be compromised in the eyes of the Soviet Union but also from fears of what the reaction would be like in Sweden. The fear concerned two things: that the public support for Sweden joining the Western alliance would be strengthened, and that there would be negative reactions among their own crack units, who were regarded as neutrality supporters. Certain elements in the policy adopted by the Government have been judged as attempts to try to counteract this. </p><p>Due to its status as non-aligned country without combat troops in Korea Sweden was given a number of assignments of a mediating and bridging nature during the Korean War. The Swedish government had worries that some of those assignments would be expensive and difficult to carry out. But Sweden had an obvious interest in putting an end to the war and the government also realized that the fact that Sweden was given such missions could be used to justify the Swedish policy of neutrality. </p><p>The Korean War broke out quickly and surprisingly and was initially mobile and fluctuating with several dramatic changes in the successes in the field. Throughout the war, also when the warfare had become more static and the armistice negotiations had started, there was a latent threat of escalation towards a major war between East and West. The Swedish foreign and security policy experts in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Defence Staff could not predict the outbreak of the Korean War and all the dramatic shifts, but they had an accurate basic attitude concerning the two superpowers’ desire to avoid a world war and restrict the Korean War to Korea. </p>

The aim of this thesis is to describe and analyse the Swedish policy towards the Korean Conflict 1947–1953. “Swedish policy” means primarily the Swedish Government’s policy, but also the action taken by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Defence Staff. When the UN treated the issue of Korea in the years before the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 the Swedish government abstained from voting for reasons of principle or legality, namely that the Korean issue belonged to the peace regulations after the Second World War, in which Sweden, as an ex-neutral state, considered that it should not participate. During the Korean War 1950–1953 the Swedish government almost consistently and in many different ways supported the US-led coalition in defence of South Korea. Although never officially mentioned, this support was given with considerable uneasiness. This uneasiness stemmed not only from fears that the neutrality policy would be compromised in the eyes of the Soviet Union but also from fears of what the reaction would be like in Sweden. The fear concerned two things: that the public support for Sweden joining the Western alliance would be strengthened, and that there would be negative reactions among their own crack units, who were regarded as neutrality supporters. Certain elements in the policy adopted by the Government have been judged as attempts to try to counteract this. Due to its status as non-aligned country without combat troops in Korea Sweden was given a number of assignments of a mediating and bridging nature during the Korean War. The Swedish government had worries that some of those assignments would be expensive and difficult to carry out. But Sweden had an obvious interest in putting an end to the war and the government also realized that the fact that Sweden was given such missions could be used to justify the Swedish policy of neutrality. The Korean War broke out quickly and surprisingly and was initially mobile and fluctuating with several dramatic changes in the successes in the field. Throughout the war, also when the warfare had become more static and the armistice negotiations had started, there was a latent threat of escalation towards a major war between East and West. The Swedish foreign and security policy experts in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Defence Staff could not predict the outbreak of the Korean War and all the dramatic shifts, but they had an accurate basic attitude concerning the two superpowers’ desire to avoid a world war and restrict the Korean War to Korea.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

A presente tese trata do objetivo brasileiro de ocupar uma cadeira permanente no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas. Primeiramente, aborda-se o tema da reforma do Conselho sob uma perspectiva geral, apresentando-se uma retrospectiva histórica e explanando a composição e o método decisório desse Órgão. Na seqüência, parte-se para o debate sobre a reforma, enfatizando-se o posicionamento dos principais grupos de países. A partir daí, passa-se a analisar o tema sob a ótica dos interesses brasileiros, analisando-se a intenção em ocupar uma cadeira permanente quando da criação das Nações Unidas, assim como o posicionamento brasileiro sobre as atividades do Conselho e as perspectivas de reforma no período entre 1945 e 1992, ano este em que a Assembléia Geral passou a tratar oficialmente dessa questão. Uma vez que o tema passou a ser estudado pela Organização Internacional, a presente pesquisa analisa a candidatura brasileira a membro permanente nos governos Itamar Franco, Fernando Henrique Cardoso e Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a fim de se comparar como o tema da reforma foi abordado por cada um deles. Ao final, conclui-se que as políticas adotadas por esses governos foram diferentes. No governo Itamar, não obstante o curto período, percebe-se grande empenho quando do lançamento da candidatura brasileira. Por outro lado, Fernando Henrique, ao assumir a Presidência da República, deu continuidade às pretensões brasileiras, porém de forma mais tímida. O Presidente Lula, por sua vez, retomou a importância do tema, empenhando-se cada vez mais para alcançar esse objetivo. No entanto, também se pôde perceber que fatores externos influenciaram as políticas adotadas. / This paper concerns about the Brazilian purpose to become a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations. First of all, it presents the issue about the reform of the Security Council, presenting an historical review and explaining its composition, functions and powers. Next, it deals with the discussion about the reform, emphasizing the opinion of the main group of States. From then on, it turns to analyze the subject matter on the Brazilian interest’s point of view, observing the intention to occupy a permanent seat by the time of the UN creation, as well as the Brazilian opinion about the Council activities and the possibility of a reform between 1945 e 1992, the year the General Assembly officially became concerned. Once the issue turned to be examined by this International Organization, this research analyses the Brazilian candidacy for a permanent seat during the governments of Itamar Franco, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in order to compare how the reform issue was deal by each one. At the end, it concludes that the policies they put in force were different one another. During Itamar’s period, despite its shortness, it shows great commitment to become a permanent member. On the other hand, when Fernando Henrique acceded the Presidency, he kept the same goals, but not that hard. The President Lula, in his turn, rescued the importance and focused that aim. Nevertheless external matters affected those policies.

Since its inception, Israel has wrestled with attempts by adversaries to keep her politically isolated in the international arena. To garner more friends and expand diplomatic reach, Israeli leaders initiated a strategy of sharing specialized knowledge with other nations. The technologies and knowledge shared were based on the experience gained from Israel’s distinctive security and developmental struggles. The transfer of technology developed into a foreign policy instrument in Israel’s overall international relations. Technical cooperation became part of a broader foreign relations drive that sought to deliver greater diplomatic recognition for Israel. This strategy, which continues to present times, was born mostly out of two major necessities for the young struggling state. The first, to boost Israel’s political stature in international forums. The second, to counterbalance efforts by Israel’s rivals to keep the Jewish State isolated in the Middle East and the rest of the world. In the early years of the initiative, the technology transfers were mostly confined in fields related to agriculture and the military. In more recent years, the rise of Israel’s hi-tech industry has attracted worldwide attention creating new opportunities for Israeli foreign policymakers to widen the scope of technologies to be offered as part of international partnerships. The dissertation examines the interplay of technology/knowledge transfers as a source of soft power for Israel in efforts to advance relationships even with seemingly unlikely partner nations. It explores the usefulness of know-how sharing in the making, growing and maintaining Israel’s relationships with two influential Asian countries. The study considers the multiple factors including the convergence of interests as drivers of Israel’s ties to India and China in both secretive and open relationships. Over the span of five decades, the Jewish State’s international cooperation efforts have grown in scope of expertise in areas like agriculture, defense, anti-terrorist training, and disaster relief. The study explores the weight of Israel’s technology transfers as tools of diplomacy in terms of propping up trade ties, gaining more favorable policies towards Israel in the context of the conflict with Palestinians and boosting bilateral exchanges in the form of official visits and treaties.