No description available.

No description available.

published_or_final_version / Japanese Studies / Master / Master of Philosophy

The United States has shaped the global response to drugs over the last century. Afghanistan, and its resultant massive opium production, is the greatest failure of the internationalization of the American-led war on drugs. Starting during the Progressive-era, the United States backed a prohibitionist stance toward certain drugs, including opium and its derivatives. While Afghanistan was creating its own opium policies after complete independence from Great Britain, the United States pushed a global anti-drug approach. Despite having minimal contact previously, the Americans and Afghans joined in a brief, but significant, opium alliance during the Second World War, with the United States secretly purchasing the bulk of Afghan opium. After the war, the United States publicly asked Afghanistan to end opium cultivation while suggesting in private that the Afghans should continue production. At the United Nations, the Americans sabotaged the Afghans' attempt to get legal international recognition as an opium exporter. The United States did respond to Afghanistan's destitute condition by supplying developmental aid that would have the unforeseen consequence of increasing poppy cultivation. Improved transportation networks also provided opportunities for Western youth to visit Afghanistan as drug tourists and couriers. During the 1970s, the decade before the Soviet invasion, Washington's concern over Afghan opium reached the highest level of government. Despite new efforts to replace opium as a cash-producing plant, Afghan drug production steadily increased. With Afghanistan on the verge of transforming into a global producer of heroin, the United States fomented unrest in the nation by first funding and then backing known drug traffickers. Along with Soviet aggression, the American intelligence program led to chaotic conditions that were capitalized on by drug traffickers. After years of war in the 1980s and 1990s, Afghanistan gained the dubious title of the world's most prolific narco-state. After the post-9/11 invasion, with American boots on the ground for over a decade, Afghanistan remained a major source for opium. As a result, Afghanistan was the most visible breakdown of the American global war against drugs.

The new Polish state which emerged after the First World War adopted a highly democratic constitution based upon that or the Third French Republic. The powers of the President and the Cabinet were indeed even weaker than those allowed by the French Constitution. Although the Senate could hold up legislation and demand that proposed laws be passed in the Sejm by an 11/20 majority, in practice political power was concentrated in the Lower House, elected by universal suffrage with proportional representation. This constitution, adopted in March 1921, worked badly from the start. One hundred and thirty years of partition had created very different political traditions among those who had lived under either Austrian, Prussian or Russian rule. In addition, the political experience of the Polish clubs in the ueichsrat, the Reichstag and the Duma had been that of sectional groups whose sole concern had been to obtain the redress of minority grievances, a training singularly unfitted for members of a national legislature such as the Sejm, a body responsible for the effective control of the country's government. Widespread poverty and ignorance encouraged politicians to indulge in demagogy, and the prevalence of corruption in public life tended more and more to be ascribed to the nature of parliamentary government, which became increasingly discredited. The long years of foreign rule, during which Polish national survival had been the pre-eminent goal in politics, obscured the new state's obligations towards her own national minorities, who made up altogether one third of her population. Moreover Poland's perilous international position, her newly won independence threatened by both Germany and Russia, lent calls for a stronger government greater force. Parliament was further discredited by the failure of the politicians to deal successfully with the exceedingly difficult economic problems which confronted the new state. Finally, the persistence in the post-war period of the now largely anachronistic conflict between the National Democrats, under Roman Dmowski and the supporters of Jozef Piłsudski, the charismatic leader of the Polish legions in the First World War and Supreme Commander in the victorious war with the Soviet Union, was a continual source of instability. Thus it was not surprising that the progressive breakdown of the parliamentary system, conflicts over the position of the Piłsudski-ites in the Army, and the recurrence of severe economic difficulties led to a coup in May 1926 which brought Piisudski to power after three days of fighting. Piłsudski had no well-defined political ideas. He was principally interested in foreign policy and Array affairs, and showed little interest in the day-to-day running of the Government. He did not, therefore, to the surprise of some of his adherents, establish a dictatorship after his coup. Instead he maintained the 1921 Constitution, introducing a number of modifications. Of these the most important were the provision that the Government's budget proposals be enacted automatically if the legislature failed to approve a budget in the specified time, and that which deprived Parliament of the right to effect its own dissolution, a right now granted to the President acting with the approval of the Cabinet. Piłsudski attempted to co-operate with Parliament through the accomodating Kazimierz Bartel, a former radical politician who was Prime Minister from May to September 1926 and again from June 1928 to April 1929 (between October 1926 and June 1926 he was Vice Premier). The system of government pursued in this period was a sort of guided democracy 1 which allowed Parliament a limited role in criticizing the activities of the Government, but reserved the formulation and implementation of policy as the exclusive province of the Cabinet. The Cabinet was only formally responsible to the Sejm, and in fact could not be forced to resign by a vote of no-confidence. Under Polish conditions there was much to be said for this semi-autocratic system. It allowed a fair degree of personal and political freedom; parties, apart from Communist organizations, were not banned, few people were arrested, and the press was relatively free. At the same time, it provided a strong Government with continuity of policy, a vital need if any consistent plan was to be pursued concerning the national minorities, economic problems or foreign policy. Yet this 'Piłsudski-ite system' was to prove scarcely more successful than the 1921 Constitution. Although Piłsudeki had come to power with the support of the parties of the Left (the Polish Socialist Party and the two radical peasant groups, the Peasant Party and the Liberation), he came into increasing conflict with then, particularly after the elections of March 1928. This conflict culminated in the formation of an alliance of six parties of the Centre and Left, the so-called Centrolew which demanded the replacement of the Piłsudski system 9 by a return to full democracy. Nevertheless, in the elections of November 1930, after arresting a large number of Opposition politicians and by using considerable administrative pressure to influence the voting, Piłsudski won a decisive victory over his opponents. The arrests, the Government's electoral victory, and the trial and conviction of the leading Opposition politicians in October 1931 saw the virtual abandonment by the Sanacja as the Government called itself, of the residual parliamentarianism which had persisted after the coup. Although the press continued to enjoy relative freedom, and most political parties were allowed to exist openly, the Government became far more autocratic, though still not authoritarian. This development became much more marked, and the clash between the liberal and authoritarian elements within the Sanacja more evident, after Piłsudski's death in May 1935 had exposed the ideological hollowness of hie 'system'. This thesis is an attempt to describe the failure of two constitutional experiments: that of the democratic constitution of March 1921, and that of the semi-autocratic system introduced after the coup of May 1926. It takes as its starting-point the elections of November 1922, the first to be held under the new constitution. The detailed narrative continues to the end of 1930, when the Government's victory in the elections and the arrest of the leading Centrolew politicians saw the culmination of the move to a more autocratic system. The problem of Poland's political evolution during this period has been relatively neglected, both in Poland and in the West. In Poland, a fair amount of work has been done on the radical political parties, both Communist and non-Communist. However, very little has been published on either the Piłsudskiites in this period, or the National Democrats, although there are signs that something may soon be done to bridge this gap. In America, a valuable book has recently been published on Piłsudski's coup, but since it concentrates its attention upon the events of the coup itself and on its military aspects, its treatment of the political background and of subsequent political developments in somewhat sketchy. Apart from this book, almost nothing of serious academic worth has been written in the West on Polish internal politics between the Wars, although a number of useful works on foreign policy have appeared. This thesis is based primarily on Government documents in tne Archiwum Akt Nowych in Warsaw, on papers dealing with the Polish Socialist Party in the Archiwum Zakładu Historii Partii. on the minutes of the debates in the Sejm and Senate, on memoirs and on contemporary newspapers.

D. Litt. et Phil. / This thesis examines the nature of the relationship that developed between Portugal and South Africa from the end of the Second World War until the 25 of April 1974, the date of the Portuguese revolution that led to Portugal’s disengagement from the African continent. It was during this period that Portugal experienced growing international hostility for wanting to retain control over her Asian and African colonies, as well as increasing internal pressure, which manifested itself in long-term insurgency wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. In addition, the Portuguese authorities also experienced strong opposition in mainland Portugal against the continuation of the wars in its African territories. At the same time, South Africa was also experiencing growing opposition in the international arena as a result of its racially discriminatory legislation. In addition, there was internal pressure from anti-apartheid groups. Moreover, towards the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the South African authorities also had to deal with growing SWAPO activity in the territory that was then known as South West Africa, which is now Namibia. Although it is widely assumed that there was a straightforward alliance between the governments of both countries, the reality was much more complex than existing perceptions about this issue. The relationship that developed between the governments of both countries grew as a result of several crucial challenges such as the growing mobilization of African nationalism, as well as the acute hostility that the two countries experienced in the international arena. It must be pointed out that both countries viewed their close interaction as something that brought tangible benefits to one another. However, this did not mean that the governments of both countries always had common objectives or a common vision of how they should tackle their own problems. In fact, the two sides had serious disagreements and they developed different approaches on how to deal with internal and external pressure. In addition, the image that the two countries wanted to portray of themselves in the international arena did not usually coincide. Such different approaches effectively meant that in terms of political relations the two sides had to take into account each other’s peculiarities and way of doing things. This thesis also investigates the secret links between the two countries and why such links had to remain a secret in order to avoid external scrutiny. It follows a straight chronological order that seeks to highlight most if not all aspects that characterized political relations between the two sides as well as the existing contradictions within such a relationship. The aim of this thesis is to examine, expose, divulge and clarify what became an important informal alliance during the Cold War, as well as how the joint efforts of such an alliance played themselves out during the long counter-insurgency wars that took place in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. The collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique marked the beginning of a period that led to the collapse of white rule in Rhodesia and increasing pressure on the South African military forces deployed in the former South West Africa. It is thus seen as one of the most important markers during the period that culminated in the end of the apartheid system in South Africa.

M.A. (Greek) / When I was in Primary School I recall hearing and reading about the exploits and conquests of Alexander the Great. To me, Alexander the Great or Μεγαλέξανδρος was more than a great warrior who tamed Bucephalus at a young age and then proceeded to conquer the known world before the age of thirty. Personally, he was a champion for Greece and for Hellenism. Alexander the Great ensured that Greece and Hellenism would become known and respected throughout the ages. Films have been made and books have been written about him. References have even made about him and his empire in Holy Scriptures like the Bible (in Daniel 7:6, 8:5-7, 11:3-4) as the Four-Horned Goat, the Four-Winged Leopard and the metal statue and the Quran (as Dhul-Qarnayn the Two-Horned One). When I was in High School I recall how passionately the global Hellenic community reacted when a small republic on Greece’s northern frontier proclaimed its independence with the official name “Republic of Macedonia”. This event struck a deeply emotional chord within me. I viewed this occurrence as a theft of my heritage. A proud heritage that was being appropriated by a young republic that was desperate to clutch onto anything in order to assign legitimacy to its newly-found independent status. For this reason, I did not hesitate to select this research topic when I decided to proceed with my postgraduate studies. This topic may not be the most unique one, especially within European and specifically Balkan academic circles, but it is a topic that has been deeply embedded in my conscience as a patriotic Greek who was determined to tackle this issue with the simple objective of proving that “Macedonia is Greek”. But one cannot be subjective in academic and scientific research and provide a discourse that is based on evidence that has been fuelled by passion. An academic researcher has a moral obligation to be objective and to inform on the basis of factual evidence and reason. There is a fine line between subjective emotion and objective truth when it comes to matters of patriotism and nationalism. Patriotism and nationalism can lead to fanaticism which I believe can ultimately defeat logic. A person can love his or her country and heritage and at the same 4 time refrain from feeling a sense of entitlement and demanding exclusivity to national symbolic factors. The most critical element is to be free from prejudice when attempting to uncover the truth...

Master of Arts Dissertation / No abstract

The focus of this thesis is Greece after the 1967 Colonels' Coup. After an analysis of American responses to military coups among allies since 1949, the Greek situation is explored in depth. Emphasis is given to Congressional and Executive infighting and bureaucratic interpretations of policy. The two presidents who dealt with the Colonels are studied for personal reaction. Sources include the New York Times and its Index, the Department of State Bulletins, current Greek history books, Congressional Hearings and other documents relating to Greece. Major conclusions are that Congressional- Executive infighting produced a meandering non-policy toward Greece, and there was a difference in Johnson's and Nixon's reaction with the latter being more pragmatic verbally but less effective factually.

No description available.