In this thesis I shall outline various modernist authors' arguments that collectivities (such as ethnic groups, nations, states and cultures) and subjectivities employ sacrificial violence to establish and assert their identity where identity is inescapably (?) understood in terms of the sovereignty of the collective or the post-Oedipal autonomy of the individual. To this end, violence has been posited as a historical and conceptual inevitability and is set as the default-state of human nature and politics. In recent times, protesting voices (from post-feminist, post-colonial, post-modern and the emerging human rights discourses) have begun to rigorously contest the notion of violence as the default-state. As a result, the legitimacy of sacrifice as the primary modus to an autonomous selfhood has been radically problematised. I believe that a comprehensive understanding of the nature of this crisis of identity formation , and the possibility of transcending it, is to be found in the paradigmatic shift away from Newtonian thought toward a post-Newtonian worldview. In seeking to challenge the assumption of violence-as-default, I shall translate the comprehensive sacrificial nature of collective identity and subjectivity into a complexity-based model that allowed me to make three crucial conceptual moves toward a comprehensive understanding of post-sacrificial identities that occupy an important place in a post-Newtonian world. First, it will allow me to challenge the assumptions that supported the Hobbesian myth of autonomy/sovereignty sacrificially achieved by charting the ontological shift that compels us to understand "entities" (be it a cell, an individual or a state) not in terms of autonomy but interdependence. Secondly, it provides the conceptual tools needed to understand the systemic nature of sacrificial violence by reading subjectivity violence and collectivity violence in terms of their organic self-similarity. This will equip me to comprehensively explore a postsacrificial epistemology valid for both collective identities and subjectivity. Thirdly, I propose a model of post-sacrificial identities that are created and sustained at the edge of chaos through the dynamic interplay of order and disorder that reconciles creative and destructive forces in a generative unity. I believe that this post-Newtonian reading will clear the conceptual space needed to suggest there might yet be hope for a future that does not embrace violence as default-state.

Forgiveness is traditionally understood as a personal change of heart, in which an individual victim of a wrongdoing overcomes her resentment towards the perpetrator of that wrongdoing. Peter Strawson (1974) famously argued that resentment is a personal participant retributive reactive attitude, and the overcoming of such an attitude through forgiveness is itself a personal reactive attitude – in other words, forgiveness is an affective response to a wrongdoing by an individual victim, that is devoid of a retributive element. Because reactive attitudes are personal, it is argued that collectives – groups of individuals – cannot forgive, since collectives cannot, as collectives, hold reactive attitudes. I argue against this. I show that it is possible for collectives to hold attitudes in a way that is not reducible to individuals holding attitudes as individuals, and yet these attitudes still remain personal. Individuals exist within communities, and are interdependent on one another. Much of an individual‟s beliefs and attitudes depend on the collectives that she is a part of. I argue that an attitude is collective when it is deemed to be the appropriate attitude for members of the collective to hold. Members of the collective will take this attitude on as their own insofar as they identify themselves as members of the collective. Individuals hold the attitude, making the attitude personal, but since the individuals hold the attitude in virtue of their membership to a collective, the attitude is also collective. Given that forgiveness is itself a reactive attitude, and that collectives can hold attitudes, I argue that it is possible for a collective to forgive. Members of a collective will come to forgive when forgiveness is held up as the appropriate attitude for them, and once enough members have taken on the attitude of forgiveness as their own attitude, a collective can be said to have forgiven.