Thesis--Copenhagen.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Clark University, 1914. / "Reprinted from the Pedagogical seminary September, 1914, vol. XXI." Bibliography: p. 392-393.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Leland Stanford junior university, 1912. / Biography. "Published as no. 87 of the Psychological monographs." Bibliography: p. [243]-255. Also available in digital form on the Internet Archive Web site.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Leland Stanford junior University, 1912. / Biography. "Published as no. 87 of the Psychological monographs." Bibliography: p. [243]-255.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1973. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Illinois, 1915. / Vita. "Selected bibliography": p. 117-120.

Thesis (doctoral)--Jyäskyän yliopisto, 1982. / Summary in Finnish. Includes bibliographical references (p. 248-259).

Thesis (doctoral)--Jyäskyän yliopisto, 1982. / Summary in Finnish. Includes bibliographical references (p. 248-259).

This thesis investigates the Theory of Formal Discipline (TFD): the idea that studying mathematics develops general reasoning skills. This belief has been held since the time of Plato (2003/375B.C), and has been cited in recent policy reports (Smith, 2004; Walport, 2010) as an argument for why mathematics should hold a privileged place in the UK's National Curriculum. However, there is no rigorous research evidence that justifies the claim. The research presented in this thesis aims to address this shortcoming. Two questions are addressed in the investigation of the TFD: is studying advanced mathematics associated with development in reasoning skills, and if so, what might be the mechanism of this development? The primary type of reasoning measured is conditional inference validation (i.e. `if p then q; not p; therefore not q'). In two longitudinal studies it is shown that the conditional reasoning behaviour of mathematics students at AS level and undergraduate level does change over time, but that it does not become straightforwardly more normative. Instead, mathematics students reason more in line with the `defective' interpretation of the conditional, under which they assume p and reason about q. This leads to the assumption that not-p cases are irrelevant, which results in the rejection of two commonly-endorsed invalid inferences, but also in the rejection of the valid modus tollens inference. Mathematics students did not change in their reasoning behaviour on a thematic syllogisms task or a thematic version of the conditional inference task. Next, it is shown that mathematics students reason significantly less in line with a defective interpretation of the conditional when it is phrased `p only if q' compared to when it is phrased `if p then q', despite the two forms being logically equivalent. This suggests that their performance is determined by linguistic features rather than the underlying logic. The final two studies investigated the heuristic and algorithmic levels of Stanovich's (2009a) tri-process model of cognition as potential mechanisms of the change in conditional reasoning skills. It is shown that mathematicians' defective interpretation of the conditional stems in part from heuristic level processing and in part from effortful processing, and that the executive function skills of inhibition and shifting at the algorithmic level are correlated with its adoption. It is suggested that studying mathematics regularly exposes students to implicit `if then' statements where they are expected to assume p and reason about q, and that this encourages them to adopt a defective interpretation of conditionals. It is concluded that the TFD is not supported by the evidence; while mathematics does seem to develop abstract conditional reasoning skills, the result is not more normative reasoning.

Issued also as Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University. / Bibliography: p. 40-41.