Submitted by isabela.moljf@hotmail.com (isabela.moljf@hotmail.com) on 2017-07-04T12:31:19Z No. of bitstreams: 1 lucianirodriguespaiva.pdf: 1708723 bytes, checksum: 6cb4ce038cd3c7ff8ca7f499d9facdb3 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2017-08-08T14:47:17Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 lucianirodriguespaiva.pdf: 1708723 bytes, checksum: 6cb4ce038cd3c7ff8ca7f499d9facdb3 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-08T14:47:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 lucianirodriguespaiva.pdf: 1708723 bytes, checksum: 6cb4ce038cd3c7ff8ca7f499d9facdb3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-06-14 / Este trabalho tem como objetivo estudar os efeitos da transparência econômica e da clareza do Banco Central do Brasil (BCB) sobre a volatilidade das taxas de juros de longo prazo. Para tal, incluiu-se a estrutura a termo da taxa de juros em um modelo novo-keynesiano de economia aberta e com governo. Os resultados dos modelos com clareza e com transparência do BCB enfatizam a queda da volatilidade destas taxas, uma vez que a autoridade monetária publicou informações sobre o futuro da taxa básica de juros. Além disso, nos modelos com clareza do BCB, os choques de política monetária têm efeitos mais suaves e duradouros sobre os juros futuros, o que indica dominância da ferramenta forward guidance (clareza do BCB) na determinação destas taxas. / This paper aims to study the effects of economic transparency and the clarity of the Central Bank of Brazil on the volatility of long - term interest rates. For this purpose, the term structure of the interest rate was included in a new-keynesian model of open economy and with government. The results of the models with clarity and transparent BCB emphasize the fall in the volatility of these rates, since the monetary authority published information on the future of the basic interest rate. Moreover, in models with clarity, monetary policy shocks have smoother and longer-term effects on future interest rates, indicating the dominance of the forward guidance (BCB’s clarity) tool in determining these rates.

Thesis advisor: Susanto Basu / The Great Recession is arguably the most important macroeconomic event of the last three decades. Prior to the collapse of national output during 2008 and 2009, the United States experienced a sustained period of good economic outcomes with only two mild and short recessions. In addition to the severity of the recession, several characteristics of this recession signify it as as a unique event in the recent economic history of the United States. Some of these unique features include the following: Large Increase in Uncertainty About the Future: The Great Recession and its subsequent slow recovery have been marked by a large increase in uncertainty about the future. Uncertainty, as measured by the VIX index of implied stock market volatility, peaked at the end of 2008 and has remained volatile over the past few years. Many economists and the financial press believe the large increase in uncertainty may have played a role in the Great Recession and subsequent slow recovery. For example, Kocherlakota (2010) states, ``I've been emphasizing uncertainties in the labor market. More generally, I believe that overall uncertainty is a large drag on the economic recovery.'' In addition, Nobel laureate economist Peter Diamond argues, ``What's critical right now is not the functioning of the labor market, but the limits on the demand for labor coming from the great caution on the side of both consumers and firms because of the great uncertainty of what's going to happen next.'' Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates: The Federal Reserve plays a key role in offsetting the negative impact of fluctuations in the economy. During normal times, the central bank typically lowers nominal short-term interest rates in response to declines in inflation and output. Since the end of 2008, however, the Federal Reserve has been unable to lower its nominal policy rate due to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Prior to the Great Recession, the Federal Reserve had not encountered the zero lower bound in the modern post-war period. The zero lower bound represents a significant constraint monetary policy's ability to fully stabilize the economy. Unprecedented Use of Forward Guidance: Even though the Federal Reserve remains constrained by the zero lower bound, the monetary authority can still affect the economy through expectations about future nominal policy rates. By providing agents in the economy with forward guidance on the future path of policy rates, monetary policy can stimulate the economy even when current policy rates remain constrained. Throughout the Great Recession and the subsequent recovery, the Federal Reserve provided the economy with explicit statements about the future path of monetary policy. In particular, the central bank has discussed the timing and macroeconomic conditions necessary to begin raising its nominal policy rate. Using this policy tool, the Federal Reserve continues to respond to the state of the economy at the zero lower bound. Large Fiscal Expansion: During the Great Recession, the United States engaged in a very large program of government spending and tax reductions. The massive fiscal expansion was designed to raise national income and help mitigate the severe economic contraction. A common justification for the fiscal expansion is the reduced capacity of the monetary authority to stimulate the economy at the zero lower bound. Many economists argue that the benefits of increasing government spending are significantly higher when the monetary authority is constrained by the zero lower bound. The goal of this dissertation is to better understand how these various elements contributed to the macroeconomic outcomes during and after the Great Recession. In addition to understanding each of the elements above in isolation, a key component of this analysis focuses on the interaction between the above elements. A key unifying theme between all of the elements is the role in monetary policy. In modern models of the macroeconomy, the monetary authority is crucial in determining how a particular economic mechanism affects the macroeconomy. In the first and second chapters, I show that monetary policy plays a key role in offsetting the negative effects of increased uncertainty about the future. My third chapter highlights how assumptions about monetary policy can change the impact of various shocks and policy interventions. For example, suppose the fiscal authority wants to increase national output by increasing government spending. A key calculation in this situation is the fiscal multiplier, which is dollar increase in national income for each dollar of government spending. I show that fiscal multipliers are dramatically affected by the assumptions about monetary policy even if the monetary authority is constrained by the zero lower bound. The unique nature of the elements discussed above makes analyzing their contribution difficult using standard macroeconomic tools. The most popular method for analyzing dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium models of the macroeconomy relies on linearizing the model around its deterministic steady state and examining the local dynamics around that approximation. However, the nature of the unique elements above make it impossible to fully capture dynamics using local linearization methods. For example, the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates often occurs far from the deterministic steady state of the model. Therefore, linearization around the steady state cannot capture the dynamics associated with the zero lower bound. The overall goal of this dissertation is to use and develop tools in computational macroeconomics to help better understand the Great Recession. Each of the chapters outlined below examine at least one of the topics listed above and its impact in explaining the macroeconomics of the Great Recession. In particular, the essays highlight the role of the monetary authority in generating the observed macroeconomic outcomes over the past several years. Can increased uncertainty about the future cause a contraction in output and its components? In joint work with Susanto Basu, my first chapter examines the role of uncertainty shocks in a one-sector, representative-agent, dynamic, stochastic general-equilibrium model. When prices are flexible, uncertainty shocks are not capable of producing business-cycle comovements among key macroeconomic variables. With countercyclical markups through sticky prices, however, uncertainty shocks can generate fluctuations that are consistent with business cycles. Monetary policy usually plays a key role in offsetting the negative impact of uncertainty shocks. If the central bank is constrained by the zero lower bound, then monetary policy can no longer perform its usual stabilizing function and higher uncertainty has even more negative effects on the economy. We calibrate the size of uncertainty shocks using fluctuations in the VIX and find that increased uncertainty about the future may indeed have played a significant role in worsening the Great Recession, which is consistent with statements by policymakers, economists, and the financial press. In sole-authored work, the second chapter continues to explore the interactions between the zero lower bound and increased uncertainty about the future. From a positive perspective, the essay further shows why increased uncertainty about the future can reduce a central bank's ability to stabilize the economy. The inability to offset contractionary shocks at the zero lower bound endogenously generates downside risk for the economy. This increase in risk induces precautionary saving by households, which causes larger contractions in output and inflation and prolongs the zero lower bound episode. The essay also examines the normative implications of uncertainty and shows how monetary policy can attenuate the negative effects of higher uncertainty. When the economy faces significant uncertainty, optimal monetary policy implies further lowering real rates by committing to a higher price-level target. Under optimal policy, the monetary authority accepts higher inflation risk in the future to minimize downside risk when the economy hits the zero lower bound. In the face of large shocks, raising the central bank's inflation target can attenuate much of the downside risk posed by the zero lower bound. In my third chapter, I examine how assumptions about monetary policy affect the economy at the zero lower bound. Even when current policy rates are zero, I argue that assumptions regarding the future conduct of monetary policy are crucial in determining the effects of real fluctuations at the zero lower bound. Under standard Taylor (1993)-type policy rules, government spending multipliers are large, improvements in technology cause large contractions in output, and structural reforms that decrease firm market power are bad for the economy. However, these policy rules imply that the central bank stops responding to the economy at the zero lower bound. This assumption is inconsistent with recent statements and actions by monetary policymakers. If monetary policy endogenously responds to current economic conditions using expectations about future policy, then spending multipliers are much smaller and increases in technology and firm competitiveness remain expansionary. Thus, the model-implied benefits of higher government spending are highly sensitive to the specification of monetary policy. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

Devido ao uso crescente de Forward Guidance (FG) pelo mundo e pelo Banco Central do Brasil (BCB), essa tese se dedica a estudar a aplicabilidade dessas medidas para o Brasil. No primeiro estudo, reunimos a literatura sobre o assunto e verificamos que apenas a versão quantitativa do Forward Guidance é recomendada, pelos ganhos institucionais e pela capacidade de evitar mau entendimento sobre a condicionalidade das previsões. Contudo, a versão qualitativa, a mesma que foi empregada pelo BCB, não é recomendada por não trazer os benefícios institucionais e estar mais sujeita às críticas de não condicionalidade das projeções e sobreposição da análise do Banco Central sobre o mercado. Destacamos que na literatura empírica não é claro que há um ganho de eficiência através de aumento da previsibilidade das ações da autoridade monetária com o uso do FG. Adicionalmente, podemos perceber, ao avaliar o comportamento das expectativas de mercado no período, que a autoridade monetária passou a usar FG, que o mercado seguiu as instruções mesmo na presença de choques inflacionários, mas alterando sua avaliação sobre a meta implícita de inflação, ou seja, o mercado acreditou que era uma projeção incondicional. Já no segundo estudo, através de análise fatorial, decompomos baseado na técnica de Gürkaynak, Sack e Swanson (2005), em componentes não observáveis a reação da curva de juros curta após a divulgação do comunicado do Copom Encontramos dois fatores não observáveis ortogonais, o que significa dizer que o mercado brasileiro, além de captar a mensagem sobre a taxa de juros corrente e seus desdobramentos sobre a curva de juros, existe outro componente que reflete a reação à comunicação, mas que interfere na trajetória da taxa de juros não relacionada à mudança na taxa de juros corrente. Ao regredir esses componentes contra a expectativa de inflação, percebemos que na Gestão de Henrique Meirelles, a autoridade afetava as expectativas de inflação aumentando o nível de informação do mercado e tinha capacidade de se comunicar e ser compreendido. Já na Gestão de Alexandre Tombini, perdese a capacidade de movimentar as expectativas de inflação com comunicação e a taxa de juros corrente passa a ser a única forma de reduzir as expectativas inflacionárias dos agentes. Por fim, no terceiro estudo, implementamos os choques antecipados de política monetária em um modelo DSGE de pequena economia aberta, a fim de medir o efeito de Forward Guidance na economia caso fosse feito com total credibilidade. Verificamos que a medida é muito poderosa caso implementada de maneira crível. Também podemos verificar, ao comparar com um anúncio não crível, que a trajetória esperada da taxa de juros exerce um papel importante sobre a economia e que a credibilidade em um processo de estabilização macroeconômica é fundamental. Em resumo, encontramos evidências de que a experiência do FG brasileiro não apresentou os resultados desejados e a sua utilização não é recomendada, seja porque é uma medida que traz poucos benefícios e muitos riscos, seja porque temos evidências de que a autoridade não consegue manejar as expectativas de inflação com comunicação Contudo, caso o BCB recupere essa capacidade, como no passado, entendemos que os impactos de anúncios que surpreendessem a curva de juros seriam elevados. Ainda, nosso estudo reforça a análise de Woodford (2005) de que a compreensão do mercado acerca dos planos da autoridade monetária é chave para que a política monetária ganhe eficiência. Por isso, ter credibilidade é algo extremamente importante e quando se quer estabilizar uma economia deve-se buscar essa qualidade o quanto antes. Por fim, podemos inferir que a política monetária atualmente perdeu parte da sua eficácia, uma vez que os agentes não apreçam a taxa de juros necessária para colocar a inflação na meta e, como veremos no terceiro artigo, é importante que a trajetória esperada seja idêntica ao plano do Banco Central. / Due to the increasing use of Forward Guidance (FG) the world and the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB), this thesis is devoted to studying the applicability of these measures to Brazil. In the first study, we gathered the literature on the subject and found that only quantitative version of Forward Guidance is recommended by institutional gains and the ability to avoid misunderstanding about the conditionality of forecasts. However, the qualitative version, the same as that employed by the BCB, is not recommended for bringing institutional benefits and be more subject to criticism from non-compliance of the projections and overlapping of the Central Bank analysis of the market. We emphasize that the empirical literature is not clear that there is a gain in efficiency by increasing the predictability of the actions of the monetary authority using the FG. Additionally, we can see, to evaluate the behavior of market expectations for the period, the monetary authority started using FG, the market followed the same instructions in the presence of inflationary shocks, but changing its assessment of the implicit inflation target, or words, the market believed it was an unconditional projection. In the second study, through factor analysis, based on factored Gürkaynak technique, Sack, and Swanson (2005), on unobservable components the reaction of short yield curve after the announcement of the release of the Monetary Policy Committee We found two unobservable factors orthogonal, which means that the Brazilian market, and get the message about the current interest rate and its consequences on the yield curve, there is another component that reflects the response to the communication, but it interferes with trajectory of interest rates unrelated to changes in the interest rate. To regrow these components against the expectation of inflation, we realized that in Henrique Meirelles Management, the authority affected inflation expectations increasing market information level and was able to communicate and be understood. In the Alexandre Tombini Management, you lose the ability to move inflation expectations with communication and the interest rate becomes the only way to reduce inflationary expectations of agents. Finally, the third study, we implemented the anticipated shocks of monetary policy in a DSGE model of small open economy, in order to measure the effect of Forward Guidance on the economy if it were done with full credibility. We found that the measure is very powerful if implemented credibly. We can also verify by comparing with a non-credible announcement, the expected path of interest rates plays an important role on the economy and the credibility in a macroeconomic stabilization process is critical. In summary, we found evidence that the Brazilian FG experience did not produce the desired results and its use is not recommended either because it is a measure that brings few benefits and many risks, either because we have evidence that the authority cannot handle the inflation expectations with communication However, if the BCB recover this capacity, as in the past, we believe that the impact of ads that surprises the yield curve would be high. Still, our study reinforces the analysis of Woodford (2005) that the understanding of the market about the monetary authority plans is key for monetary policy to gain efficiency. So have credibility is extremely important and when you want to stabilize an economy should be sought that status as soon as possible. Finally, we can infer that monetary policy currently lost some of its effectiveness, since the agents do not correctly price the interest rate required to bring inflation on target and, as we shall see in the third article, it is important that the expected trajectory is identical Central Bank's plan to.

Devido ao uso crescente de Forward Guidance (FG) pelo mundo e pelo Banco Central do Brasil (BCB), essa tese se dedica a estudar a aplicabilidade dessas medidas para o Brasil. No primeiro estudo, reunimos a literatura sobre o assunto e verificamos que apenas a versão quantitativa do Forward Guidance é recomendada, pelos ganhos institucionais e pela capacidade de evitar mau entendimento sobre a condicionalidade das previsões. Contudo, a versão qualitativa, a mesma que foi empregada pelo BCB, não é recomendada por não trazer os benefícios institucionais e estar mais sujeita às críticas de não condicionalidade das projeções e sobreposição da análise do Banco Central sobre o mercado. Destacamos que na literatura empírica não é claro que há um ganho de eficiência através de aumento da previsibilidade das ações da autoridade monetária com o uso do FG. Adicionalmente, podemos perceber, ao avaliar o comportamento das expectativas de mercado no período, que a autoridade monetária passou a usar FG, que o mercado seguiu as instruções mesmo na presença de choques inflacionários, mas alterando sua avaliação sobre a meta implícita de inflação, ou seja, o mercado acreditou que era uma projeção incondicional. Já no segundo estudo, através de análise fatorial, decompomos baseado na técnica de Gürkaynak, Sack e Swanson (2005), em componentes não observáveis a reação da curva de juros curta após a divulgação do comunicado do Copom Encontramos dois fatores não observáveis ortogonais, o que significa dizer que o mercado brasileiro, além de captar a mensagem sobre a taxa de juros corrente e seus desdobramentos sobre a curva de juros, existe outro componente que reflete a reação à comunicação, mas que interfere na trajetória da taxa de juros não relacionada à mudança na taxa de juros corrente. Ao regredir esses componentes contra a expectativa de inflação, percebemos que na Gestão de Henrique Meirelles, a autoridade afetava as expectativas de inflação aumentando o nível de informação do mercado e tinha capacidade de se comunicar e ser compreendido. Já na Gestão de Alexandre Tombini, perdese a capacidade de movimentar as expectativas de inflação com comunicação e a taxa de juros corrente passa a ser a única forma de reduzir as expectativas inflacionárias dos agentes. Por fim, no terceiro estudo, implementamos os choques antecipados de política monetária em um modelo DSGE de pequena economia aberta, a fim de medir o efeito de Forward Guidance na economia caso fosse feito com total credibilidade. Verificamos que a medida é muito poderosa caso implementada de maneira crível. Também podemos verificar, ao comparar com um anúncio não crível, que a trajetória esperada da taxa de juros exerce um papel importante sobre a economia e que a credibilidade em um processo de estabilização macroeconômica é fundamental. Em resumo, encontramos evidências de que a experiência do FG brasileiro não apresentou os resultados desejados e a sua utilização não é recomendada, seja porque é uma medida que traz poucos benefícios e muitos riscos, seja porque temos evidências de que a autoridade não consegue manejar as expectativas de inflação com comunicação Contudo, caso o BCB recupere essa capacidade, como no passado, entendemos que os impactos de anúncios que surpreendessem a curva de juros seriam elevados. Ainda, nosso estudo reforça a análise de Woodford (2005) de que a compreensão do mercado acerca dos planos da autoridade monetária é chave para que a política monetária ganhe eficiência. Por isso, ter credibilidade é algo extremamente importante e quando se quer estabilizar uma economia deve-se buscar essa qualidade o quanto antes. Por fim, podemos inferir que a política monetária atualmente perdeu parte da sua eficácia, uma vez que os agentes não apreçam a taxa de juros necessária para colocar a inflação na meta e, como veremos no terceiro artigo, é importante que a trajetória esperada seja idêntica ao plano do Banco Central. / Due to the increasing use of Forward Guidance (FG) the world and the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB), this thesis is devoted to studying the applicability of these measures to Brazil. In the first study, we gathered the literature on the subject and found that only quantitative version of Forward Guidance is recommended by institutional gains and the ability to avoid misunderstanding about the conditionality of forecasts. However, the qualitative version, the same as that employed by the BCB, is not recommended for bringing institutional benefits and be more subject to criticism from non-compliance of the projections and overlapping of the Central Bank analysis of the market. We emphasize that the empirical literature is not clear that there is a gain in efficiency by increasing the predictability of the actions of the monetary authority using the FG. Additionally, we can see, to evaluate the behavior of market expectations for the period, the monetary authority started using FG, the market followed the same instructions in the presence of inflationary shocks, but changing its assessment of the implicit inflation target, or words, the market believed it was an unconditional projection. In the second study, through factor analysis, based on factored Gürkaynak technique, Sack, and Swanson (2005), on unobservable components the reaction of short yield curve after the announcement of the release of the Monetary Policy Committee We found two unobservable factors orthogonal, which means that the Brazilian market, and get the message about the current interest rate and its consequences on the yield curve, there is another component that reflects the response to the communication, but it interferes with trajectory of interest rates unrelated to changes in the interest rate. To regrow these components against the expectation of inflation, we realized that in Henrique Meirelles Management, the authority affected inflation expectations increasing market information level and was able to communicate and be understood. In the Alexandre Tombini Management, you lose the ability to move inflation expectations with communication and the interest rate becomes the only way to reduce inflationary expectations of agents. Finally, the third study, we implemented the anticipated shocks of monetary policy in a DSGE model of small open economy, in order to measure the effect of Forward Guidance on the economy if it were done with full credibility. We found that the measure is very powerful if implemented credibly. We can also verify by comparing with a non-credible announcement, the expected path of interest rates plays an important role on the economy and the credibility in a macroeconomic stabilization process is critical. In summary, we found evidence that the Brazilian FG experience did not produce the desired results and its use is not recommended either because it is a measure that brings few benefits and many risks, either because we have evidence that the authority cannot handle the inflation expectations with communication However, if the BCB recover this capacity, as in the past, we believe that the impact of ads that surprises the yield curve would be high. Still, our study reinforces the analysis of Woodford (2005) that the understanding of the market about the monetary authority plans is key for monetary policy to gain efficiency. So have credibility is extremely important and when you want to stabilize an economy should be sought that status as soon as possible. Finally, we can infer that monetary policy currently lost some of its effectiveness, since the agents do not correctly price the interest rate required to bring inflation on target and, as we shall see in the third article, it is important that the expected trajectory is identical Central Bank's plan to.

Devido ao uso crescente de Forward Guidance (FG) pelo mundo e pelo Banco Central do Brasil (BCB), essa tese se dedica a estudar a aplicabilidade dessas medidas para o Brasil. No primeiro estudo, reunimos a literatura sobre o assunto e verificamos que apenas a versão quantitativa do Forward Guidance é recomendada, pelos ganhos institucionais e pela capacidade de evitar mau entendimento sobre a condicionalidade das previsões. Contudo, a versão qualitativa, a mesma que foi empregada pelo BCB, não é recomendada por não trazer os benefícios institucionais e estar mais sujeita às críticas de não condicionalidade das projeções e sobreposição da análise do Banco Central sobre o mercado. Destacamos que na literatura empírica não é claro que há um ganho de eficiência através de aumento da previsibilidade das ações da autoridade monetária com o uso do FG. Adicionalmente, podemos perceber, ao avaliar o comportamento das expectativas de mercado no período, que a autoridade monetária passou a usar FG, que o mercado seguiu as instruções mesmo na presença de choques inflacionários, mas alterando sua avaliação sobre a meta implícita de inflação, ou seja, o mercado acreditou que era uma projeção incondicional. Já no segundo estudo, através de análise fatorial, decompomos baseado na técnica de Gürkaynak, Sack e Swanson (2005), em componentes não observáveis a reação da curva de juros curta após a divulgação do comunicado do Copom Encontramos dois fatores não observáveis ortogonais, o que significa dizer que o mercado brasileiro, além de captar a mensagem sobre a taxa de juros corrente e seus desdobramentos sobre a curva de juros, existe outro componente que reflete a reação à comunicação, mas que interfere na trajetória da taxa de juros não relacionada à mudança na taxa de juros corrente. Ao regredir esses componentes contra a expectativa de inflação, percebemos que na Gestão de Henrique Meirelles, a autoridade afetava as expectativas de inflação aumentando o nível de informação do mercado e tinha capacidade de se comunicar e ser compreendido. Já na Gestão de Alexandre Tombini, perdese a capacidade de movimentar as expectativas de inflação com comunicação e a taxa de juros corrente passa a ser a única forma de reduzir as expectativas inflacionárias dos agentes. Por fim, no terceiro estudo, implementamos os choques antecipados de política monetária em um modelo DSGE de pequena economia aberta, a fim de medir o efeito de Forward Guidance na economia caso fosse feito com total credibilidade. Verificamos que a medida é muito poderosa caso implementada de maneira crível. Também podemos verificar, ao comparar com um anúncio não crível, que a trajetória esperada da taxa de juros exerce um papel importante sobre a economia e que a credibilidade em um processo de estabilização macroeconômica é fundamental. Em resumo, encontramos evidências de que a experiência do FG brasileiro não apresentou os resultados desejados e a sua utilização não é recomendada, seja porque é uma medida que traz poucos benefícios e muitos riscos, seja porque temos evidências de que a autoridade não consegue manejar as expectativas de inflação com comunicação Contudo, caso o BCB recupere essa capacidade, como no passado, entendemos que os impactos de anúncios que surpreendessem a curva de juros seriam elevados. Ainda, nosso estudo reforça a análise de Woodford (2005) de que a compreensão do mercado acerca dos planos da autoridade monetária é chave para que a política monetária ganhe eficiência. Por isso, ter credibilidade é algo extremamente importante e quando se quer estabilizar uma economia deve-se buscar essa qualidade o quanto antes. Por fim, podemos inferir que a política monetária atualmente perdeu parte da sua eficácia, uma vez que os agentes não apreçam a taxa de juros necessária para colocar a inflação na meta e, como veremos no terceiro artigo, é importante que a trajetória esperada seja idêntica ao plano do Banco Central. / Due to the increasing use of Forward Guidance (FG) the world and the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB), this thesis is devoted to studying the applicability of these measures to Brazil. In the first study, we gathered the literature on the subject and found that only quantitative version of Forward Guidance is recommended by institutional gains and the ability to avoid misunderstanding about the conditionality of forecasts. However, the qualitative version, the same as that employed by the BCB, is not recommended for bringing institutional benefits and be more subject to criticism from non-compliance of the projections and overlapping of the Central Bank analysis of the market. We emphasize that the empirical literature is not clear that there is a gain in efficiency by increasing the predictability of the actions of the monetary authority using the FG. Additionally, we can see, to evaluate the behavior of market expectations for the period, the monetary authority started using FG, the market followed the same instructions in the presence of inflationary shocks, but changing its assessment of the implicit inflation target, or words, the market believed it was an unconditional projection. In the second study, through factor analysis, based on factored Gürkaynak technique, Sack, and Swanson (2005), on unobservable components the reaction of short yield curve after the announcement of the release of the Monetary Policy Committee We found two unobservable factors orthogonal, which means that the Brazilian market, and get the message about the current interest rate and its consequences on the yield curve, there is another component that reflects the response to the communication, but it interferes with trajectory of interest rates unrelated to changes in the interest rate. To regrow these components against the expectation of inflation, we realized that in Henrique Meirelles Management, the authority affected inflation expectations increasing market information level and was able to communicate and be understood. In the Alexandre Tombini Management, you lose the ability to move inflation expectations with communication and the interest rate becomes the only way to reduce inflationary expectations of agents. Finally, the third study, we implemented the anticipated shocks of monetary policy in a DSGE model of small open economy, in order to measure the effect of Forward Guidance on the economy if it were done with full credibility. We found that the measure is very powerful if implemented credibly. We can also verify by comparing with a non-credible announcement, the expected path of interest rates plays an important role on the economy and the credibility in a macroeconomic stabilization process is critical. In summary, we found evidence that the Brazilian FG experience did not produce the desired results and its use is not recommended either because it is a measure that brings few benefits and many risks, either because we have evidence that the authority cannot handle the inflation expectations with communication However, if the BCB recover this capacity, as in the past, we believe that the impact of ads that surprises the yield curve would be high. Still, our study reinforces the analysis of Woodford (2005) that the understanding of the market about the monetary authority plans is key for monetary policy to gain efficiency. So have credibility is extremely important and when you want to stabilize an economy should be sought that status as soon as possible. Finally, we can infer that monetary policy currently lost some of its effectiveness, since the agents do not correctly price the interest rate required to bring inflation on target and, as we shall see in the third article, it is important that the expected trajectory is identical Central Bank's plan to.

Communication is an important aspect of modern monetary policy. Since the popularization of the inflation targeting framework, communication has been used to manage expectations and maintain credibility. In recent years, forward guidance as a signaling strategy has been recognized as an important tool of monetary policy. Can communication be considered an effective monetary policy tool? Using data from the United States, in a sample from 1990 to 2019, a Bai Perron test for multiple breakpoints is conducted to identify changes in both inflation expectations, term structure of the expectation, and expected real interest rates. We find evidence that changes in expectations for both inflation and real interest rates are associated with changes in central bank’s signaling strategy.

La presente tesi studia le aspettative in macroeconomia contribuendo alla letteratura esistente sia indagando circa il meccanismo di formazione delle aspettative, sia analizzando come le aspettative a razionalità limitata influenzino la dinamica economica. Nel primo capitolo viene presentato un esperimento nel quale ai soggetti viene chiesto di predire il valore futuro dell'inflazione: a seconda del trattamento, i soggetti possono venire esposti ad un segnale, che mira a stabilizzare l'economia, che fungendo quindi da indicazione prospettica (Forward Guidance). I risultati vengono poi studiati sottolineando il meccanismo di formazione delle aspettative soprattutto in funzione della credibilità del segnale; inoltre viene studiata l'efficacia dello strumento di politica monetaria nella stabilizzazione del sistema economico: si evidenzia come un segnale informativo permetta una sensibile stabilizzazione dell'economia, prevenendo spirali deflazionistiche. Nel secondo capitolo viene sviluppato un modello ad agenti il quale incorpora un meccanismo di formazione delle aspettative a razionalità limitata, derivato da esperimenti precedenti. Inoltre, grazie ad un peculiare processo di aggregazione, viene derivato un modello analiticamente trattabile che permette di studiare il meccanismo di trasmissione di uno shock, isolando gli effetti dovuti all'eterogeneità fra gli agenti e alle aspettative: entrambi gli effetti sono considerevoli ed aiutano nello spiegare la dinamica economica. / The present dissertation analyses expectations in macroeconomics, contributing to the existing literature both studying the expectation formation process, and inquiring how economic dynamic is influenced by boundedly rational expectations. The first chapter presents a learn to forecast experiment in which subject are asked to form expectation regarding the future value of inflation: depending on the treatment, subjects might be exposed to a signal, which possibly aim at stabilizing economy, mimicking the non conventional monetary policy instrument called Delphic Forward Guidance. The collected data are studied trying to recover the underlying expectation formation process highlighting especially the role of credibility of the signal; moreover from the data emerges that informative Forward Guidance helps in stabilizing economy, drastically reducing the probability of deflationary spirals. The second chapter develops an agent-based model, encapsulating a boundedly rational expectation formation process, which had been extrapolated in previous experiments. Moreover benefiting from a specific aggregation procedure, we derive a model characterized by high analytical tractability, allowing hence to study the transmission mechanisms of a shock by insulating the effects due to the heterogeneity among agents and due to expectations: both the effects are sizable and help in understanding the dynamics of the economic system.

The Diploma thesis deals with unconventional monetary policies,that important central banks used in order to cope with global financial and economic crisis in recent years. Goals of the paper is to introduce the most significant unconventional monetary policies, analyze their effectivity in selected countries (Japan, USA, Great Britain, eurozone and Czech republic), and statistically test impact of these nonstandard approaches on international trade.