Cette thèse essayera d’examiner dans un premier temps, la manière dont Foucault établit sa notion de la critique, conçue comme une attitude, un « êthos », une façon d’agir, et qui s’articule à une ontologie du présent. Et dans deuxième temps, la façon dont cette notion de la critique telle que reformulée dans une histoire de la gouvernementalité et inséparable du diagnostic d’une crise inscrite dans les plis des jeux de pouvoir, s’articule avec une analyse qui lui est propre du libéralisme et du néolibéralisme, et qu’il conçoit non pas comme idéologie, mais comme deux formes de gouvernement, et de rationalité gouvernementale complexe. C’est ainsi que nous essayons de suivre comment Foucault élabore son projet critique, en essayant de repérer la manière par laquelle Foucault cherche à établir un diagnostic de ce que nous sommes dans notre présent, par l’analyse critique de ce type de rationalité qui appartient aux sociétés occidentales modernes, et qui se caractérise par une double face individualisante et totalisante. En même temps, c’est une tentative qui vise à élaborer une stratégie de résistance, et à « promouvoir de nouvelles formes de subjectivité » ; à nous émanciper de ce « type d’individualité qu’on nous a imposé pendant plusieurs siècles ». Cette rationalité selon Foucault, trouve son point d’ancrage dans l’« Aufklärung ». Cela nous amène à interroger d’abord le rapport entre la critique et l’Aufklärung qui le conduit à situer son propre projet critique par rapport à la théorie Kantienne. Foucault s’interroge sur la relation entre la rationalisation et le pouvoir. Pour lui, il est inutile d’analyser cette rationalité appartenant aux Lumières. Il proposera une autre manière d’étudier les liens entre la rationalité et le pouvoir : d’abord en traitant la rationalisation de la société et de la culture, non pas de manière globale, mais dans plusieurs expériences comme la folie, la maladie la sexualité etc. Ensuite, malgré l’importance de la période des Lumières, il faut nous dit Foucault remonter à des processus beaucoup plus éloignés, tels que celui du pouvoir pastoral, afin de comprendre le moment dans lequel nous vivons. D’après Foucault en effet, le pouvoir pastoral a donné lieu à un art de gouverner qui intervient en politique à partir du XVIe siècle en formant l’arrière-plan historique de la gouvernementalité. Foucault précise « l’État moderne nait […] lorsque la gouvernementalité est effectivement devenue une pratique politique calculée et réfléchie ». L’une des questions fondamentales de cette époque au sortir de la féodalité, c’est : « Comment gouverner ? ». Cette question n’est pas dissociée, de cette autre question : « Comment n’être pas gouverné comme cela, par cela, au nom de ces principes-ci ? ». Cette question est selon Foucault, du côté d’une méfiance et d’une résistance au gouvernement. Mais aussi, elle exprime une aspiration à gouverner autrement. Autour de cela se construit la notion de l’« attitude critique ». La critique peut alors s’entendre comme « un art de l’inservitude volontaire », très proche, selon Foucault, de la manière dont Kant définit l’« Aufklärung » comme une sortie de l’état de minorité. Il s’agit bien de refuser d’obéir à la vérité en tant qu’elle serait pensée, imposée par un autre, et de penser par soi-même. En effet, l’attitude critique pour Foucault consiste à repenser la question de l’«Aufklärung » de Kant, non pas comme l’aube de la raison, mais comme effort permanent pour interroger la rationalité qui nous régit. / This thesis will try to examine at first, the way Foucault establishes his notion of criticism, conceived as an attitude, an "ethos", a way of acting, and which articulates in an ontology of the present. And secondly, the way in which this notion of criticism, as reformulated in a history of governmentality and inseparable from the diagnosis of a crisis inscribed in the folds of the plays of power, articulates with an analysis of his own of the liberalism and the neoliberalism, and such as he conceives not as ideology, but as two forms of government, and of complex governmental rationality. This is the way we try to follow how Foucault elaborates his critical project, by trying to locate the way in which Foucault seeks to establish a diagnosis of what we are in our present, by the critical analysis of this type of rationality which belongs to the modern western societies, and which is characterized by an individualizing and totalizing double face. At the same time, it is an attempt to develop a strategy of resistance, and to "promote new forms of subjectivity"; to emancipate ourselves from that "type of individuality that has been imposed upon us for several centuries". This rationality according to Foucault finds its anchor point in "Aufklärung". This brings us to question at first the relationship between the criticism and the Auflklärung that leads him to place his own critical project with regards to the Kantian theory. Foucault questions the relationship between rationalization and power. For him, it is useless to analyze this rationality belonging to the Enlightenment. He will propose another way of studying the links between rationality and power: at first by handling the rationalization of society and culture, not in a global way, but in several experiences as the madness, the disease, the sexuality Etc. Then, in spite of the importance of the Enlightenment, it is necessary tells us Foucault to go back to far more remote processes, such as that of the pastoral power, to understand the moment in which we live. According to Foucault indeed, the pastoral power gave rise to an art of government which intervenes in politics from the XVIth century, forming the historical background of governmentality. Foucault specifies "the modern state is born ... when governmentality has indeed became a calculated and reflective political practice". One of the fundamental questions of this era after feudalism is "How to govern? ". This question is not dissociated from this other question: "How can we not be governed like that by this in the name of these principles? ". This question is, according to Foucault, on the side of mistrust and resistance to the government. But it also expresses an aspiration to govern otherwise. Around this is constructed the notion of the "critical attitude". Criticism can then get on as "an art of voluntary inservitude" very close, according to Foucault, to the way Kant defines "Aufklärung" as an exit of the state of minority. It is well a question of refusing to obey the truth insofar as it is thought, imposed by another, and to think for oneself. Indeed, the critical attitude to Foucault consists in rethinking the question of Kant's "Aufklärung", not as the dawn of reason, but as permanent effort to question the rationality that governs us. This leads Foucault to question the role of philosophy, whether it can play a role of counter-power. His answer is that philosophy can be counter-power on condition of ceasing to conceive power from a legal or moral point of view. The role of philosophy will then be dice to make visible what is in our daily life, linked to ourselves and because of that which we do not perceive as such. This helps to intensify the struggles, tactics and strategies within power relations.

Depuis plusieurs années, une forme de discours s'est développée, faisant des mouvements de rénovation pédagogique les fossoyeurs toute influence éducative et de 68 le moment de la disparition de l'autorité. Sous la pression des injonctions de restaurer l'autorité et face aux incertitudes de notre temps, cette interprétation historique tend à se banaliser dans les esprits. Notre travail vient suspendre ces « évidences » en se proposant de répondre à trois questions. Qu'est-ce qui a été effectivement dit sur l'autorité dans la littérature novatrice et quelles en sont les conditions de possibilité ? Pourquoi l'autorité se pose comme problème à un moment donné ? Et quelle autorité est alors pensée ? Pour mener à bien cette entreprise, nous avons choisi de nous pencher sur une revue militante, Les Cahiers pédagogiques. La référence aux travaux de Michel Foucault nous a permis de construire un paradigme théorique pour archiver le corpus en présence en répondant aux questions posées par l'étude. A partir de l'étude de trois intrigues traversant la période 1957-1989, nous avons reconstitué différents « jeux énonciatifs » qui ont permis de mettre en évidence trois formations discursives sur l'autorité : l'autorité disciplinaire, l'autorité du futur et l'autorité de l'inégalité. L'évolution de ces pratiques discursives est en fait liée à l'émergence d'une hypothèse égalitaire d'émancipation face à une situation de crise, puis liée à l'effacement de cette tentative de bâtir une Société nouvelle. A l'issue de ce travail, nous sommes en mesure d'appréhender différemment les « évidences » de notre actualité et de poser à nouveaux frais la problématique sur l'autorité. / Over the past few years, a new form of discourse has emerged : the fact that the movement of pedagogical renovation has had a bad influence on education, and that the 68 movement has provoked authority to disappear. Under the pressure of injunctions asking for "renoving authority", this historical interpretation tends to become more pregnant in people's mind. This piece of work questions those pieces or "evidence", proposing to answer three major concerns: what does the Innovative literature say about authority, under which conditions those ideas are made possible? Why does the authority emerge as a concern at some point? Which kind of authority is thought? To answer those questions, we chose to focus on a militating journal "Les Cahiers pédagogiques". The reference to Michel Foucault allows us to build a theoretical paradigm to answer those crucial questions. Starting from three case studies from the 1957-89 period, we reconstituted different discursive formations setting three kinds of discourse on authority : discourse on discipline, on authority of the future, and on the authority of inequalities. The evolution of those discursive forms is related to the emergence of an egalitarian hypothesis of emancipation against a crisis, then related to the erasement of this attempt to build a new society. From this piece of work, we are now able to give different points of view on nowadays "evidence" and the problematic of authority.

I intend, with this thesis, to investigate how Michel Foucault's concept of ???a positive unconscious of knowledge??? can be illustrated by overlapping narrative segments. I have coined the term ???friction???, as a writing practice, to describe the space in-between narrative conception and conscious, ordered reflection upon that narrative. Thus, the thesis comprises an exploration of Foucault's intersecting marginal zone, which is an integral aspect of his philosophic concept of ???positive unconscious???. The ???positive unconscious??? is where the overlapping sections of what Foucault calls, a ???table??? (creative narrative) and ???tabula??? (the ordering of the narrative) are situated. The frictional form is synonymous with Foucault's concept. It is as a developing narrative conception that becomes an ordered practice, and also aims to be what Jacques Derrida calls ???a new writing???. Hence, Foucault's ???positive unconscious???, Derrida's ???new writing???, and the frictional narrative process all comprise, along with and through the multiple inclusions of myriad theorists, philosophers, fiction writers, lyric poets, etc., an amalgamated whole ???new??? narrative (the frictionalised thesis). The paradox of the ???new??? (frictional) narrative is that through mimesis comes characterised difference - a ???new??? hybridised space is opened up which both fascinates and appals, railing as it does against fixed, constraining and systematised linguistic and discursive structures. Yet this is a stimulating space that ultimately brings new focus to stifling self-conformity. It is a frictional space comprised of a profusion of literary ???voices??? made singular, a singularity that is also mutiplicitous in its composite origin. It is a frictional observance that refutes the injunction of needing definite closure given its inclusion of potentially unlimited sources.

This thesis develops a theory of action, drawing chiefly on the work of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault. I begin with a discussion of some popular theories of action. As I argue, these theories tend to suffer from three problems: they do not distinguish action from everyday behaviour, they do not account for the way in which action transforms the identity of the actor, and they tend to neglect the innovative and initiatory character of action. In chapter two, I discuss Arendt’s theory of political action, which goes a long way toward redressing these problems. However, the value of Arend's work is limited by her characterisation of the public sphere as subsumed by a 'social' rather than political form of community. Accordingly, I follow Dana Villa and Bonnie Honig's suggestions that a broader understanding of action is required in order to overcome the weaknesses of Arendt's work. In chapters four and five, I demonstrate that a reading of Foucault can yield just such a broader understanding. I begin with an analysis of The History of Sexuality and the argument that the transformation of ethical subjectivity can function as a means of resistance to the normalising effects of power, before moving on to discuss the essay 'What Is Enlightenment?' I argue that these works are part of a 'transformative project,' in which Foucault aims to facilitate the transformation of subjectivity as a means of resistance to social normalisation. This transformative project can be adapted into a theory of action that locates action within contemporary society but shares some of the best aspects of Arendt's theory. Finally, drawing on the work of Foucault and Adriana Cavarero, these theoretical reflections are applied to a discussion of action in the context of small communities. Small-community models of action are an important consideration because they allow us to avoid the traditional dichotomy between action as a task for the individual who transgresses social norms and action as a project of social reform.

The primary task of this work is a comparative analysis of the understanding of ‘freedom’ as presented in the works of Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault. I argue that, taken together, Heidegger and Foucault represent the most systematic and coherent articulation since Marx of the notion that our primary experience of the world is not mediated by consciousness but is, instead, a practical relation. This position permits Heidegger and Foucault to cast freedom not as a property, status or standing to be achieved by the subject, nor as an end-state to be achieved through a developmental anthropology, but rather as an ethical relationship to a field of possibilities—an ethos— and the practices that sustain this relationship. I use this discussion on freedom as a means of also contributing to two other debates, one regarding the general possibility of combining ontological and historical forms of critical analysis and the second, more specific question of Foucault’s relationship to Heidegger.

The primary task of this work is a comparative analysis of the understanding of ‘freedom’ as presented in the works of Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault. I argue that, taken together, Heidegger and Foucault represent the most systematic and coherent articulation since Marx of the notion that our primary experience of the world is not mediated by consciousness but is, instead, a practical relation. This position permits Heidegger and Foucault to cast freedom not as a property, status or standing to be achieved by the subject, nor as an end-state to be achieved through a developmental anthropology, but rather as an ethical relationship to a field of possibilities—an ethos— and the practices that sustain this relationship. I use this discussion on freedom as a means of also contributing to two other debates, one regarding the general possibility of combining ontological and historical forms of critical analysis and the second, more specific question of Foucault’s relationship to Heidegger.

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Diss.--Universität Wien. / Bibliogr. p. 351-364.

Texte remanié de: Ph. D. th.--Auckland, 2000. / Bibliogr. p. 241-258. Index.