En février 1939, un peu plus de 300 000 miliciens espagnols, ainsi que 8000 brigadistes internationaux, entrent en France par les Pyrénées-Orientales. Presque tous sont placés dans des camps. Ce travail interroge les différents outils de contrôle mis en place par les autorités (ministère de l’Intérieur ou militaires) et les différentes mesures d’exclusions prises à l’encontre des individus les plus suspects. La première partie se penche sur les mesures de surveillance, individuelles et collectives, dans camps de la Retirada. La deuxième s’intéresse au renforcement de ce dispositif suite à la déclaration de la guerre jusqu’à l’armistice de juin 1940. Enfin, la dernière partie interroge les reprises et les ruptures administratives et juridiques de ce dispositif de la IIIème République par Vichy jusqu’à la Libération dans les camps du sud de la France. En se focalisant sur les réfugiés venus d’Espagne, cette thèse se penche sur la modernisation des outils de contrôle de police des étrangers incarnés par le Fichier central de la Sûreté nationale dans les années 1930. A travers de nombreuses sources d’archives inédites, elle questionne aussi la trajectoire, depuis les origines républicaines jusqu’à Vichy des questions du contrôle, de l’exclusion et de la répression des étrangers indésirables dans les camps du sud de la France et de l’Afrique du Nord. / In February 1939, about 300 000 Spanish militians and 8000 international brigades entered France by the Pyrenees-Orientales. Most of them are placed in camps. This work examines the different means of control instored by Ministry of Interior and military authorities and the various measures of exclusion taken against the most suspicious people. The first part deals with the individual and collective measures of surveillance in the camps of the Retirada. The second tellsabout the reinforcement of this system from the war declaration to the armistice of June 1940. Finally the last part questions the resumptions and disruptions of the system under 3rd republic in Vichy until the Liberation in Southern French camps. Through the story of these Spanish refugees, this thesis focuses on the modernization of police controls of foreigners registered in the National Security files of the 1930's. Through many sources of unpublished archives, from Republican origins to Vichy, the story of control, exclusion and repression of the unwanted foreigners is reconstituted in south of France and north Africa camps.

Tandis que la Drôle de Guerre est l’occasion d’une première confrontation avec la réglementation et la réquisition, la signature de l’armistice marque pour les entreprises de la Gironde occupée le début d’un dialogue complexe et fécond avec le gouvernement de Vichy et les autorités allemandes. Celles-ci font face à une polycratie franco-allemande, imposant des nouveaux cadres, administratifs et territoriaux, à leur activité. L’entreprise devient un enjeu réel de pouvoir. Apparaissent à la fois des réels points de convergence (aryanisation des « entreprises juives », rémunérations du travail) et d’importantes surfaces de tension (contrôle du port, concentration de la production, départ d’ouvriers pour l’Allemagne). Par ailleurs, le régime de Vichy ne lésine pas sur les moyens, en vue de faire de l’entreprise une vitrine idéologique (Révolution nationale) : cérémonies collectives, structures d’entraide, corporatismes, associations politiques, mouvements collaborationnistes. Armé d’un redoutable arsenal législatif et répressif, il parvient – avec le soutien des Allemands – à en faire un lieu d’exclusion, d’où sont violemment extraits les éléments jugés indésirables, que ce soit pour leurs activités politiques (les communistes) ou pour leur appartenance religieuse abusivement qualifiée de « raciale » (les juifs). À l’inverse, la stratégie consistant à faire de chaque établissement un lieu d’intégration à ses idéaux, ne rencontre qu’un succès mitigé. L’attachement des acteurs de l’entreprise à la personne même du maréchal Pétain, réel au début de la période, s’estompe sous l’effet des épreuves et des sujétions dont sont victimes les Girondins. De ce point de vue, la politique sociale de l’État français (Charte du travail et comités sociaux) ne lui permet pas – sauf exception – de « ramener » patrons et ouvriers dans le giron vichyste. Dans un contexte de graves pénuries (matières premières, main-d’œuvre, moyens de transport), les entreprises girondines cherchent bien des alternatives à ce qu’on appelle communément la « collaboration économique » : utilisation de produits de remplacement, reconversion des activités, réadaptation de l’appareil productif, essor des pratiques illicites (marché noir). Mais rares sont les patrons à ne pas devoir se poser la question de l’opportunité de proposer une offre de services à l’occupant. Cette offre est largement répandue, mais variable selon les métiers, les branches et les temps de l’Occupation. Les occupants tirent ainsi profit des atouts du tissu économique local, puisqu’ils parviennent à intégrer à leur économie de guerre les industries anciennement mobilisées pour la Défense nationale et plus encore les richesses tirées du sol girondin : le bois, la résine, le vin. / While the Phoney War occasioned a first confrontation with regulations and requisition, the signing of the Armistice marked the start of a complex period for the enterprises in occupied Gironde, in that it prompted a fruitful dialogue with the Vichy government and the German authorities. These enterprises faced a French German polycracy, which imposed new administrative and territorial executives on their activities. Enterprise became a real power issue. There were points of convergence (the aryanisation of “Jewish enterprises”, the remuneration of work) as there were of conflict (the control of the port, the concentration of production, the workers' departure for Germany). Moreover, the Vichy regime did all it could to make enterprise an ideological showcase (“Révolution Nationale”): ceremonies, support groups, corporatism, political associations, collaborationist movements. Armed with a formidable legislative and repressive arsenal, it managed – with the support of the Germans – to create a place of exclusion, from which were violently removed, any elements that were judged undesirable either for their political activities (communists) or for their religious affiliation, abusively qualified as “racial” (Jews). On the contrary, the strategy which consisted in making each establishment a place of integration of its ideals, was not met with much success. The attachment that the actors of the enterprises had for Maréchal Pétain himself, which was very real in the beginning, soon faded with the trials and constraints that the people of Gironde had to suffer. From this point of view, the social policy of the French State (“Charte du Travail”) did not allow it – with some exceptions – to “bring” employers and workers back to the Vichy realm. In a context of severe shortage (primary goods, labour and means of transport), enterprises in Gironde looked for alternatives to what we commonly call the “economic collaboration”: use of products of replacement, reconversion of activities, readjustment of the productive machine, development of illicit practices (black market). Few entrepreneurs, however, missed the business opportunity that lay in offering their services to the occupying forces. These services were widespread, but varied according to jobs, fields of activity and times of the Occupation. In this way, the occupying forces benefited, from the strengths of the local economic fabric, since they managed to integrate into their war economy not only the industries that had earlier been mobilized for the “Défense Nationale” but also the natural resources of the land: wood, resin, wine.

During the years 1940-1944, the period of the German Occupation, French women played an active role in the political sphere as part of the organized Resistance movements. The women who participated were not isolated examples, but an extremely diverse group that cut across social milieux, political alignments and religious persuasions. The range of their activity in the spectrum of roles and the differences in their style challenge the stereotypes and persistent attitudes in French culture about women’s nature. Women were leaders in the principal Resistance movements, participated in the organization and dissemination of the underground press and in the organization of the networks of passage. Their role was crucial in liaison activity. With ingenuity and resourcefulness, women, as women, made their own unique contributions to the Resistance movements. Those who were arrested and deported continued their resistance, even in prison and in the all-women’s concentration camp, Ravensbruck. I have attempted to place the women, Resistants in the context of the social history of the period. Under the collaborationist Vichy government, the domestic policy of France moved in a direction that reinforced and sharpened the most conservative attitudes towards women's role. Some of the effects of Vichy policy carried over to the post-war period, and were built into the social policy of the Fourth Republic. I have considered two models used by American sociologists and social historians to evaluate the effects of social crisis on women's roles. My purpose in so doing is not to compare the role and status of French women with that of American and British women, but merely to test whether the hypotheses are applicable to the situation of French women in the political sphere. I have used the underground press and témoignages (first-hand reports) assembled and published by women's committees. I have examined documents at the Bibliothẽque Marguerite Durand in Paris, and at the Muśee de l’Histoire Vivante at Montreuil. I have talked to women who actively participated in the Resistance movements. In addition, I have used published Resistance histories, both regional and general.