How do states win wars against other states? We have three explanations. By selection, states enter more winnable wars. By warfighting, states use negative inducements so enemies fear fighting. By peacemaking, states use positive inducements so enemies hope for settling. This dissertation investigates peacemaking. It theorizes that states optimally produce influence only if they efficiently combine warfighting negative and peacemaking positive inducements. It hypothesizes that using some peacemaking on average improves outcomes verses using none. The dissertation tests this with a statistical analysis that measures peacemaking as law of war compliance and estimates effects on all inter-state outcomes from 1899 to 1991. It finds that compliance likely on average improves immediate military and final political relative outcomes. This dissertation also tests peacemaking in four case studies from the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 and World War II. These case studies find that state peacemaking to enemy states, allies, leaders, troops, and civilians probably on average improves absolute war outcomes. These complementary and independent empirical results provide unprecedented support for the peacemaking explanation of how states improve inter-state war outcomes. To succeed, states should be prudent by selection, fierce in warfighting, and principled for peacemaking. / Government

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La guerre franco-prussienne (ou franco-allemande) de 1870-71 fut un conflit majeur dont l’issue changea considérablement l’équilibre des puissances en Europe avec notamment l’émergence de l’Empire allemand. Pourtant, elle a été oubliée. Bien que depuis la fin du XIXe siècle, elle fut largement traitée par l’historiographie, la question des responsabilités relativement à son déclenchement demeure un sujet de débat. Tandis que certains historiens estiment que cette guerre fut sciemment provoquée par Bismarck afin de parachever l’unification allemande, d’autres croient que la responsabilité est partagée et que ce conflit était tout simplement inévitable dans le contexte du refroidissement des rapports franco-allemands depuis la défaite autrichienne de Königgrätz (Sadowa). Le présent mémoire entend se dissocier de ces interprétations en jetant un nouveau regard sur le rôle joué par Bismarck lors des « préliminaires » (Vorgeschichte) de 1870. En s’appuyant sur des sources primaires ainsi que sur ce que les historiographies allemande, française et anglo-saxonne nous apprennent, il sera démontré premièrement que la candidature Hohenzollern pour le trône d’Espagne n’a pas été « fabriquée » volontairement par le chef de la diplomatie prussienne afin de compléter l’unification allemande, mais qu’elle fut promue d’abord et avant tout pour des considérations de prestige politique. Deuxièmement, la fameuse dépêche d’Ems modifiée par Bismarck ne peut être considérée comme l’élément déclencheur de ce conflit, car la décision d’aller en guerre fut prise à Paris avant que les effets de la dépêche ne se fassent sentir. Enfin, par son besoin d’un succès politico-diplomatique qui aurait consolidé le Second Empire en faisant oublier les reculades antérieures, par son refus de se satisfaire du retrait de la candidature Hohenzollern et par les erreurs de sa politique étrangère en général, la France a adopté une position belliqueuse et s’est retrouvée seule dans une guerre qu’elle n’avait su ni prévenir, ni préparer. L’enjeu à Paris n’était finalement pas le règlement pacifique des différends avec la Prusse, mais la pérennisation de la prépondérance française sur le continent européen. / The Franco-Prussian War (or Franco-German War) of 1870-71 was a major conflict, where the outcome dramatically changed the balance of power in Europe, including the emergence of the German Empire. However, it has been forgotten. Although since the late nineteenth century it was widely discussed by historians, the issue of liability with respect to its outbreak remains a matter of debate. While some historians believe that this war was deliberately provoked by Bismarck in order to complete the unification of Germany, others believe that the responsibility was shared and that this conflict was simply inevitable in the context of the worsening of Franco-German relations, since the Austrian defeat at Königgrätz (Sadowa), in 1866. This thesis aims to dissociate itself from these interpretations by providing new insight regarding the role played by Bismarck during the “preliminaries” (Vorgeschichte) of 1870. Through the use of primary sources and German, French and Anglo-Saxon historiography, it will be shown first that the Hohenzollern candidature for the Spanish throne was not “made” voluntarily by the chief of the Prussian diplomacy to complement the German unification, but was promoted first and foremost for reasons of political prestige. Secondly, the famous Ems telegram amended by Bismarck cannot be seen as the trigger of this conflict, as the decision to go to war was taken in Paris before the negative effects of the message were felt. Finally, through its need of a political and diplomatic success that would have consolidated the Second Empire by forgetting earlier setbacks, through its refusal to show full satisfaction with the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidature and through the misconduct of its foreign policy in general, France adopted a bellicose position and found itself alone in a war it could neither prevent nor prepare. The issue in Paris was ultimately not the peaceful settlement of disputes with Prussia, but the perpetuation of French dominance on the European continent.

La guerre franco-prussienne (ou franco-allemande) de 1870-71 fut un conflit majeur dont l’issue changea considérablement l’équilibre des puissances en Europe avec notamment l’émergence de l’Empire allemand. Pourtant, elle a été oubliée. Bien que depuis la fin du XIXe siècle, elle fut largement traitée par l’historiographie, la question des responsabilités relativement à son déclenchement demeure un sujet de débat. Tandis que certains historiens estiment que cette guerre fut sciemment provoquée par Bismarck afin de parachever l’unification allemande, d’autres croient que la responsabilité est partagée et que ce conflit était tout simplement inévitable dans le contexte du refroidissement des rapports franco-allemands depuis la défaite autrichienne de Königgrätz (Sadowa). Le présent mémoire entend se dissocier de ces interprétations en jetant un nouveau regard sur le rôle joué par Bismarck lors des « préliminaires » (Vorgeschichte) de 1870. En s’appuyant sur des sources primaires ainsi que sur ce que les historiographies allemande, française et anglo-saxonne nous apprennent, il sera démontré premièrement que la candidature Hohenzollern pour le trône d’Espagne n’a pas été « fabriquée » volontairement par le chef de la diplomatie prussienne afin de compléter l’unification allemande, mais qu’elle fut promue d’abord et avant tout pour des considérations de prestige politique. Deuxièmement, la fameuse dépêche d’Ems modifiée par Bismarck ne peut être considérée comme l’élément déclencheur de ce conflit, car la décision d’aller en guerre fut prise à Paris avant que les effets de la dépêche ne se fassent sentir. Enfin, par son besoin d’un succès politico-diplomatique qui aurait consolidé le Second Empire en faisant oublier les reculades antérieures, par son refus de se satisfaire du retrait de la candidature Hohenzollern et par les erreurs de sa politique étrangère en général, la France a adopté une position belliqueuse et s’est retrouvée seule dans une guerre qu’elle n’avait su ni prévenir, ni préparer. L’enjeu à Paris n’était finalement pas le règlement pacifique des différends avec la Prusse, mais la pérennisation de la prépondérance française sur le continent européen. / The Franco-Prussian War (or Franco-German War) of 1870-71 was a major conflict, where the outcome dramatically changed the balance of power in Europe, including the emergence of the German Empire. However, it has been forgotten. Although since the late nineteenth century it was widely discussed by historians, the issue of liability with respect to its outbreak remains a matter of debate. While some historians believe that this war was deliberately provoked by Bismarck in order to complete the unification of Germany, others believe that the responsibility was shared and that this conflict was simply inevitable in the context of the worsening of Franco-German relations, since the Austrian defeat at Königgrätz (Sadowa), in 1866. This thesis aims to dissociate itself from these interpretations by providing new insight regarding the role played by Bismarck during the “preliminaries” (Vorgeschichte) of 1870. Through the use of primary sources and German, French and Anglo-Saxon historiography, it will be shown first that the Hohenzollern candidature for the Spanish throne was not “made” voluntarily by the chief of the Prussian diplomacy to complement the German unification, but was promoted first and foremost for reasons of political prestige. Secondly, the famous Ems telegram amended by Bismarck cannot be seen as the trigger of this conflict, as the decision to go to war was taken in Paris before the negative effects of the message were felt. Finally, through its need of a political and diplomatic success that would have consolidated the Second Empire by forgetting earlier setbacks, through its refusal to show full satisfaction with the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidature and through the misconduct of its foreign policy in general, France adopted a bellicose position and found itself alone in a war it could neither prevent nor prepare. The issue in Paris was ultimately not the peaceful settlement of disputes with Prussia, but the perpetuation of French dominance on the European continent.

In this thesis I present new insights into aspects of Peter Guthrie Tait's life and work, derived principally from largely-unexplored primary source material: Tait's scrapbook, the Tait–Maxwell school-book and Tait's pocket notebook. By way of associated historical insights, I also come to discuss the innovative and far-reaching mathematics of the elusive Frenchman, C.-V. Mourey. P. G. Tait (1831–1901) F.R.S.E., Professor of Mathematics at the Queen's College, Belfast (1854–1860) and of Natural Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh (1860–1901), was one of the leading physicists and mathematicians in Europe in the nineteenth century. His expertise encompassed the breadth of physical science and mathematics. However, since the nineteenth century he has been unfortunately overlooked—overshadowed, perhaps, by the brilliance of his personal friends, James Clerk Maxwell (1831–1879), Sir William Rowan Hamilton (1805–1865) and William Thomson (1824–1907), later Lord Kelvin. Here I present the results of extensive research into the Tait family history. I explore the spiritual aspect of Tait's life in connection with The Unseen Universe (1875) which Tait co-authored with Balfour Stewart (1828–1887). I also reveal Tait's surprising involvement in statistics and give an account of his introduction to complex numbers, as a schoolboy at the Edinburgh Academy. A highlight of the thesis is a re-evaluation of C.-V. Mourey's 1828 work, La Vraie Théorie des quantités négatives et des quantités prétendues imaginaires, which I consider from the perspective of algebraic reform. The thesis also contains: (i) a transcription of an unpublished paper by Hamilton on the fundamental theorem of algebra which was inspired by Mourey and (ii) new biographical information on Mourey.