This is a critical discussion of Vihvelin's recent book Causes, Laws, and Free Will. I discuss Vihvelin's ideas on Frankfurt-style cases and the actual-sequence view of freedom that is inspired by them.

Habilitationsschrift--Universität Bonn, 2001. / Bibliogr. p. 613-652. Index.

Zugl.: Frankfurt (Main), Univ., Diss., 2008

Thesis (Ph. D.)--York University, 2001. Graduate Programme in Political Science. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 444-465). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ67912.

The following is an attempt to ground personal duty – duty which is both believed and felt by all agents. To do this, I look at two contrasting attempts. The first is a rationalist attempt, which tries to ground it in conceptual necessity, the second an empiricist one, which uses empirical fact as its basis. In particular, it uses contingent facts about the things which are agents (people, for example), and what makes them feel a sense of duty. I argue that, ultimately, it is this type of grounding of duty which can be successful. Throughout, I emphasize two crucial points. The first is the freedom of the individual; the second is that duty is not a "want" or "desire;" rather, it is quite often what one does against one's own wants or desires. I argue that a paradigmatic example of establishing duty is Harry Frankfurt's theory of autonomous love.

Zugl.: Kassel, Universiẗat, Diss., 2006.

Proefschrift Universiteit van Amsterdam. / Met lit. opg. - Met samenvatting in het Nederlands.

Univ., Wirtsch.- u. sozialwiss. Diss., 1925--Frankfurt (Main)

Zugl.: Frankfurt (Main), Univ., Diplomarbeit, 2004 u.d.T.: Ballenberger, Matthias: Marktanalyse für eine spezielle Dienstleistung

Zugl.: Frankfurt (Main), Univ., Diss., 2006