Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 140-145). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

A person on the eve of bankruptcy may enter into transactions or arrangements that are intended to, or that have the effect of, preserving its property from being seized and distributed among creditors. Such transactions may provide a bankrupt with collateral benefits such as the continued use and enjoyment of property, or they may benefit third parties such as members of the bankrupt's family, or they may benefit selected creditors to the detriment of others. The effect of such transactions is to frustrate the legislative scheme which provides for the distribution of a bankrupt's residual property. This effect may be desired by a bankrupt or by a recipient of the bankrupt's property, or it may be unintended. Insolvency legislation confers wide powers upon a trustee in bankruptcy to "review" such transactions by bringing proceedings to reverse their effect and recover the value lost to the bankrupt's estate. Reviewable transactions comprise two main categories: dispositions or unequal transactions in which a debtor parts with property for no or insufficient consideration (such as a transfer of property to a spouse or a sale in which a bankrupt does not receive a fair price) and preferential repayments of debts owed to certain creditors to the detriment of others. Reviewable transaction laws in Canada and England have a subjective basis in that they focus upon the intent of a debtor to defeat creditors or prefer one creditor over others. In contrast, relevant Australian and New Zealand laws have an objective focus and provide remedies where the effect of a transaction, rather than the intent of a debtor, is to defeat the interests of creditors. This paper conducts a comparative critique of reviewable transaction regimes. It makes the argument that subjective regimes tend to reflect their historical origins in fraud law and a desire to punish and frustrate the fraudulent intent of a bankrupt; an inappropriate policy foundation that fails to address the competing interests and policy considerations which should form the basis of reviewable transaction law. Objective regimes, which focus upon the effect of impugned transactions, provide more appropriately for the balancing of creditors' and recipients' interests and the making of provision for policy considerations. This paper also considers collateral effects of reviewable transaction regimes upon creditors' interests (such as effects upon claims to property recovered by a trustee) in a variety of circumstances and concludes that the results are often inconsistent and undesirable. In this respect the relative positions of secured and unsecured creditors are described in detail and proposals for reform are ventured.

A person on the eve of bankruptcy may enter into transactions or arrangements that are intended to, or that have the effect of, preserving its property from being seized and distributed among creditors. Such transactions may provide a bankrupt with collateral benefits such as the continued use and enjoyment of property, or they may benefit third parties such as members of the bankrupt's family, or they may benefit selected creditors to the detriment of others. The effect of such transactions is to frustrate the legislative scheme which provides for the distribution of a bankrupt's residual property. This effect may be desired by a bankrupt or by a recipient of the bankrupt's property, or it may be unintended. Insolvency legislation confers wide powers upon a trustee in bankruptcy to "review" such transactions by bringing proceedings to reverse their effect and recover the value lost to the bankrupt's estate. Reviewable transactions comprise two main categories: dispositions or unequal transactions in which a debtor parts with property for no or insufficient consideration (such as a transfer of property to a spouse or a sale in which a bankrupt does not receive a fair price) and preferential repayments of debts owed to certain creditors to the detriment of others. Reviewable transaction laws in Canada and England have a subjective basis in that they focus upon the intent of a debtor to defeat creditors or prefer one creditor over others. In contrast, relevant Australian and New Zealand laws have an objective focus and provide remedies where the effect of a transaction, rather than the intent of a debtor, is to defeat the interests of creditors. This paper conducts a comparative critique of reviewable transaction regimes. It makes the argument that subjective regimes tend to reflect their historical origins in fraud law and a desire to punish and frustrate the fraudulent intent of a bankrupt; an inappropriate policy foundation that fails to address the competing interests and policy considerations which should form the basis of reviewable transaction law. Objective regimes, which focus upon the effect of impugned transactions, provide more appropriately for the balancing of creditors' and recipients' interests and the making of provision for policy considerations. This paper also considers collateral effects of reviewable transaction regimes upon creditors' interests (such as effects upon claims to property recovered by a trustee) in a variety of circumstances and concludes that the results are often inconsistent and undesirable. In this respect the relative positions of secured and unsecured creditors are described in detail and proposals for reform are ventured. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

Zugl.: Tübingen, Universiẗat, Diss., 2007.

La tesi ha ad oggetto lo studio dei rapporti tra il trust e il nucleo di principi inderogabili in materia di crisi dell’impresa esercitata in forma societaria e delle sue soluzioni “negoziali” (: piani attestati, accordi di ristrutturazione, concordato preventivo) tanto in termini di compatibilità sistematico-astratta, quanto con riguardo alle funzioni concrete che detto istituto può svolgere in tali contesti. Il primo capitolo analizza le problematiche connesse alla fattispecie, diffusa nella prassi, del c.d. trust liquidatorio “extra-concorsuale”, anche alla luce delle regole che, in common law, disciplinano le interferenze tra «trust» e «insolvenza», sia del settlor sia del trustee, giungendo a negarne la legittimità. Il capitolo secondo prosegue con l’analisi comparatistica degli ulteriori istituti e contesti, propri del diritto statunitense e inglese, nei quali il trust viene utilizzato, a vari scopi, nell’ambito delle soluzioni non fallimentari della crisi d’impresa. Il terzo capitolo è dedicato all’esame delle fattispecie – diverse da quelle considerate nel capitolo primo – di trust nell’ambito delle tecniche di regolazione della crisi d’impresa, alternative al fallimento, nell’ordinamento italiano (: piani attestati, accordi di ristrutturazione e concordato preventivo): da una parte, sulla scorta degli esiti dell’analisi, svolta nel capitolo secondo, quanto agli utilizzi del trust nella crisi d’impresa societaria tipici dei sistemi statunitense e inglese; dall’altra, tenendo ferme le risultanze, emerse nel capitolo primo, in ordine al rapporto tra fenomeno fiduciario anglosassone e diritto fallimentare. / My dissertation deals with the compatibility of the «trust» – as a “foreign” institution – with the basic principles of corporate debt restructuring and/or reorganization in Italian bankruptcy law. More specifically, it draws extensively on the evidences from the common law experiences, with regard both to the general relationship between trusts and bankruptcy law [i.e. the treatment of the trust (rectius: the rights of the parties involved as well as their creditors) in the subsequent bankruptcy respectively of the trustee or the settlor] and to how and to which purposes are trusts used specifically in the corporate distress framework. The first chapter analyzes and criticizes a line of Italian cases dealing with the use of the trust as a form of private regulation of the corporate crisis. The second chapter further explores the functions played by trusts in the corporate bankruptcy – and their limits – in North-American and English law. The third chapter draws the consequences for Italian regulation on corporate restructuring, developing a new model on the use of trusts within said scope.