Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 73-75).

Depression is the leading cause of disability around the world, and in Canada, 8% of adults will experience depression in their lifetimes. Nearly half of those with depression will not seek treatment, one of the major barriers being the social stigma associated with depression and other mental illnesses. Some of this stigma results from a mistaken understanding of free will and agency and the degree to which these are compromised in mental disorders. This thesis aims to show that free will in both psychologically healthy and pathological cases can be understood in a scientific causal deterministic way based on recent findings in neuroscience and psychology. The ‘will’ can be understood in terms of the normal range functioning of mechanisms for control, choice, and valuation. There is no ‘free’ will that is uncaused, but only relative freedom when these mechanisms are not internally damaged and there is no external coercion. Evidence that depression and mental illness can also be understood in a causal, deterministic way is also presented, and it is argued that this understanding can work back to reinforce the scientific understanding of the will in non-pathological cases. The understanding of free will based on healthy function and that based on pathological function are mutually reinforcing. The thesis concludes by showing that, based on a causal deterministic picture of the will, the stigma surrounding mental illness is unfounded, and that this view can lead to more compassion, understanding, and acceptance of both those with mental illness and the mentally healthy.

Thesis (PhD)--Macquarie University (Division of Society, Culture, Media & Philosophy, Dept. of Philosophy), 2006. / Bibliography: p. 218-228. / Free will and nature -- Metaphysical free will -- Incompatibilism -- Causal closure of the physical domain -- Free will and physics -- Free will within nature. / There is more than one problem of free will. Many philosophers approach the free will question seeking a foundation for systems of ethics or a justification for societal practices of praise and blame. ... Rather, I address the metaphysical question of how to accommodate free will within the natural world. I conclude that the natural world is not identical with the physical world and that it must contain entities or influences that are not physical in any current sense of that word. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / x, 228 p

Thesis (M. Div.)--St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 50-51).

Thesis (Ed. D.)--Washington State University, May 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 101-109).

Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 78-79).

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of St Andrews, February 2007.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2008. / Title from file title page. Pearl McHaney, committee chair; Stephen Dobranski, Nancy Chase, committee members. Electronic text (71 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed July 2, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-71).

Thesis (S.T.M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 70-79).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 111-124).