Thesis (Ph. D.)--Northwestern University, 1915. / Vita. "Chapters II and VII (with some changes) have appeared in the Monist and the Philosophical review.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2006.

Inaug.-Diss.--Würzburg. / Includes bibliographical references and index.

There seems to exist a tension between our metaphysical and phenomenological commitments in the free will debate. On the one hand, I argue that at the metaphysical level we cannot coherently defend the belief that we are morally responsible in the sense that we deserve to be rewarded and punished for our actions, where desert-entailing moral responsibility is the primary understanding of moral responsibility presupposed in the free will debate. I argue that we are responsible for our actions but only in the weaker sense, termed ‘attributability’ by Gary Watson. On the other hand, we are allegedly unrenounceably committed at the phenomenological level to conceiving of, and treating, ourselves and one another as morally responsible beings in the desert-entailing sense. P. F. Strawson famously defends this claim in his seminal work, ‘Freedom and Resentment’. In my thesis I will set out this tension by exploring both commitments in turn. I then aim to show that the tension can be dissolved by arguing, contra P. F. Strawson, that our phenomenological commitment is not in fact unrenounceable. The dissolution of this tension entails, I argue, that we must examine our conception of self and other. We must explore the implications of adopting a position which denies that we are morally responsible beings for our life-hopes, personal feelings, inter-personal relationships and projects. Most importantly, I argue that we must renounce our current retributive condemnatory practices which are based on the unjustified belief that we are morally responsible beings.

This thesis shows the ways in which the concepts of freedom and responsibility are related, and how indeed they illuminate each other. In Part One, it is shown that both are based on a concept of action, and it is thus with an analysis of action that a theory of freedom and responsibility must begin. Actions are first differentiated from events, so that conditions which must obtain from an event to be an action are specified. The concept of responsibility may then be used to illuminate action by showing how excuses indicate ways in which actions can fail. From this analysis, an analysis of action in the full sense emerges, namely, that an action in the full or unqualified sense is that to which no excuses are applicable. Action in the full sense is thus linked to responsibility in the full sense. The analysis of action shows that the breakdown of an action is the loss of control over its effects, and action in the full sense thus obtains where no breakdown occurs. Conscious control over an action is the control of an action's effects, which is the realization of intentions, and the control of intentions, which is what may be analyzed as rationality. Conscious control over an action, or agency, constitutes freedom on the plane of individual action. Thus, from the concept of responsibility emerges a concept of action and of agency which indicates what freedom is. Yet, it is the actual structure of action upon which the action of responsibility rests. The theory of freedom is defined in Part Two against the incompatibilist position that if determinism is true, neither freedom nor responsibility exist. It is shown that causal determinism does not rule out actions being free in the sense required for an individual to be responsible; for them as a theory of action shows that it is not an action's being caused but the nature of its causes which makes it free or unfree. If the action is caused so that it is in the conscious control of the agent, it is free. The rest of Part Two examines moral practices such as praise and blame in light of the limits determinism places on them. It is necessary to show what rational or justifiable grounds there could be for practices such as praising and blaming in any theory of freedom and responsibility. Part Three shows that agency, or control over an action, is extendable over the values upon which actions are based. Control over values is achieved by the individual consciously choosing values in awareness of being responsible for those choices and values. What the Existentialists call "Authenticity" is thus a fuller degree of freedom and of agency. This analysis of authenticity does not focus on how authenticity is a response to a value question posed by nihilism; but on how authenticity is an extension of our regular concepts of freedom and responsibility. It is shown that authenticity, when it is accompanied by full agency (as that notion is developed in Part One) is freedom and responsibility in the highest degree. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

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Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 66-68). / v, 68 leaves, bound 29 cm

This experiment investigated the effect of successive threats to the same attitudinal freedom on reactance arousal. Although the effect of repeated or successive threats to freedom was not considered in the original statement of reactance theory, later research suggests there will be special effects. A series of threats in close succession may arouse greater reactance than an additive model would predict. One possible explanation for such an increase in reactance is that the initial threat makes later threats more salient. Another possibility is that the later threat helps to clarify the individual's perception of the threatener's intention; that is, repeated threats imply that the behavior is directed toward the individual with a goal in mind. A second factor in the situation is whether the threatened individual has an opportunity to restore freedom between threats. Experiments on the prior exercise of freedom imply that an intervening reassertion of freedom will weaken the effect of subsequent threats by undermining their credibility. An experimental situation was created in which subjects were introduced to a (fictional) candidate for appointive office. After reading an initial description of the candidate and completing an initial preference rating, subjects received a pair of communications advocating his selection. Then a final rating of preference was made. The first communication always contained a threat to the freedom to reject the candidate. The first variable was the presence or absence of a threat in the second communication (Two vs. One Threat). The second variable was the presence or absence of an opportunity to restore freedom between the first and second communications (Forced Restoration vs. No Restoration), in the form of an essay pointing up reasons against the selection of the candidate. It was predicted that subjects' would exhibit greater negative change (in the direction of greater opposition to the candidate) after repeated threats than after a single threat when no intervening opportunity to restore freedom was permitted. No increase in negative change after successive threats v/as expected when an intervening restoration was allowed. A third variable, whether the second communication was attributed to the original communicator or a different one (Same vs. Different Source), was added to the design to gather support for either the salience or the perceived intent explanation for repeated threat effects. If the initial threat makes later ones more salient, the source of the later threat should make no difference. If the later threat clarifies the intent behind the first, then only repeated threats from the same source should produce an increase in negative change. The results of the experiment were not arrayed as expected. The only significant increase in negative change after repeated threats did occur when no restoration came between them. However, the increase appeared when the threats had different sources rather than the same source. This pattern of results supports neither the salience nor the perceived intent explanations. In addition, the intervening restoration had an unanticipated negative effect on change. These effects were considered as partial confirmation of the hypothesis, and it was proposed that threats from different sources aroused more reactance because they were perceived as different threats, while threats from the same source were viewed as a single, extended threat. Alternative explanations were discussed and issues for future research were raised. / This thesis was digitized as part of a project begun in 2014 to increase the number of Duke psychology theses available online. The digitization project was spearheaded by Ciara Healy.

Inaug.-diss.--Bonn. / Published in enlarged form in Renaissance und philosophie, hft. VII, 1914, with title: Die willensfreiheit bei Laurentius Valla und bei Petrus Pomponatius.

Consider this scenario: A terrorist just bombed the subway in London, which resulted in the casualties of numerous innocent people. His act can be considered well-planned for he fully knew what consequences his act would bring. If determinism is true, is it possible that the terrorist in question bombed the subway out of free will? An incompatibilist would respond to this question with a resounding “no”. A compatibilist, on the other hand, would answer yes, as long as the terrorist possessed certain psychological characteristics, causal histories, etc. This underlies the basis of disputes between the compatibilists and incompatibilists, who appear to hold opposite views on whether it is possible for someone to act out of free will if determinism is true. However, as I shall discuss in Chapter One, this disagreement is partly a verbal one that stems from the diverse meanings of the term “free will”. This thesis aims to transcend the verbal disagreement and explore where the deeper, more substantial disagreements may lie between compatibilists and incompatibilists. One possible sphere where substantial disagreements between compatibilists and incompatibilists may lie is the content of the ordinary concept of free will, or that of the strongest sense of control condition necessary for securing the ordinary concept of moral responsibility. On this view, the metaphysical question and the conceptual question about free will are inseparable; in order to find out the metaphysical satisfaction conditions of free will, one must first identify the conceptual satisfaction conditions of free will. Further, the latter is reflected in everyday free will/ moral responsibility ascriptions about hypothetical or real scenarios. In Chapter Two, I analyze how the recent experimental philosophy movement bears on this issue. By examining the findings of some current experimental philosophy studies, I argue that neither compatibilism nor incompatibilism can sufficiently capture the ordinary concept of free will or moral responsibility. In the light of my discussions in Chapter Two, I explain in Chapter Three why each of the various traditional accounts of free will (including compatibilism, libertarianism and hard incompatibilism) cannot independently provide an adequate “package deal” of solutions for the problem of free will. Near the end of the chapter, I propose a pluralistic, agnostic account of free will as an alternative solution. Despite its great instrumental value, experimental philosophy is not widely recognized as a philosophically significant methodology. Hence, Chapter Four is devoted to discussing the actual and potential values of experimental philosophy in the light of its contribution to the free will debate. I conclude that the encounter between the free will debate and the experimental philosophy movement is a fruitful one; the former proves the value of the latter by receiving helpful insights from it. / published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Master / Master of Philosophy