This thesis argues that the modern notion of free-speech was born within the Westphalian nation-state. It suggests that the legal rights framework - particular to the Westphalian nationstate - not only legitimizes and legalizes the right to free-speech, but also enables us to invoke legally the necessary limitations that demand the limitation of free-speech in certain contexts. However, such a legal-rights framework is exclusive to the nation-state and cannot be enforced on an international level, outside of the nation-state boundary. With reference to examples on an international level, this thesis demonstrates that calls for the limitation of free-speech are indeed legitimate and necessary but cannot be enforced on an international level for the reasons just mentioned. In order to address this problem, this thesis proposes a framework - based on a Kantian model - that enables us to invoke the limitation of free-speech on an international level without appealing to a legal-rights discourse to do so.

In this essay I shall give a critical account of Spinoza's arguments for intellectual freedom as they occur in chapter twenty of the TRACTATUS THEOLOGICO-POLITICUS. His arguments exhibit certain ambiguities issuing from his appeal to the rational and prudent on the one hand and to several practical implications following from presumed facts about human nature on the other. These ambiguities will be discussed. This discussion will lead to Spinoza's doctrine of natural right upon which he constructs his political philosophy. One: THE HISTORICAL SETTING Here I shall give a brief outline of the political climate of Spinoza's time. My purpose is to show that Spinoza's ideas were at once advanced for his age while intended at the same time to solve some of the pressing problems he observed. Not until after his death were the civil liberties Spinoza considered important adopted as basic premises of government. Two: SPINOZAfS NOTION OF INALIENABLE NATURAL RIGHT AND HIS DOCTRINE OF NATURAL RIGHT This section is concerned with the question of whether Spinoza's idea ©f an inalienable natural right conforms with his general doctrine of natural right. I shall argue that it does not and that it probably has a more solid foundation in Spinoza's ethical rather than in his political theory. Three: SUPPRESSION IS LITERALLY INEFFECTIVE In this section I present and discuss Spinoza's proposition that suppression of thought and speech is literally ineffective because it is impossible to deprive men of the freedom to say what they think. I shall base my argument against Spinoza on the premise that there is nothing inherent in human nature which leads us to conclude that suppression is ineffective. I shall also try to Illustrate that his notion of an inalienable natural right to freedom of thought may be a viable political tool in the creation of a political and moral climate within a body politic encouraging the general acceptance ©f freedom of thought on principle. Finally I shall argue that Spinoza has to move away from considerations of human nature and deal with the rational and prudent when proposing that certain speech-acts may rightfully be restrained. Four: SUPPRESSION HAS UNDESIRABLE EFFECTS Here Spinoza describes some of the ill effects of suppression. These effects, he argues, will be felt by the oppressed as well as by the government. He says that suppression is a two-sided evil. On the one hand the suppressed will cause trouble for the government, on the other, those who enjoy the advantages, such as they are, of a suppressive government will become involved in internal power struggles and these in turn may lead to national unrest. Thus Spinoza concludes that the government cannot secure any advantage by resorting to suppression. It follows that only two factors may cause a government to resort to suppression as a means of maintaining control; one, ignorance of human nature and two, an inherent weakness in the government rendering it unable to confront rationally a powerful lobby of dissenters. Five: LEGITIMATE RESTAINTS OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH Recognizing that some speech-acts may reasonably be considered detrimental to the state, Spinoza feels that freedom of speech cannot be granted fully. He discusses which speech-acts and beliefs he considers to be detrimental to the state and how to deal with them. I shall argue that Spinoza is too vague on this subject and that in the light of his discussion here and the power-right relation of the sovereign, it is not always possible for him to determine when a speech-act is detrimental to society and when it is not. I shall argue that, consequently, his division between social and antisocial is not made sufficiently clear but remains rather a matter of contention. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

Freedom of speech in the Czech Republic This thesis deals with the freedom of speech in the Czech Republic especially with its limits and jurisprudence related to this key political right. It is composed of five chapters. The first chapter is The Introduction. It highlights the importance and necessity of the freedom of speech for an individual and the society. It also describes the main purpose of this work. The second chapter briefly summarizes the history and evolution of the freedom of speech in Bohemia particularly in the constitutional documents. The second chapter ends with adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (No. 2/1993 Coll.) which set the current constitutional state of the freedom of speech. The third chapter is named "Specification of the Freedom of Speech". At first it explores the guaranteeing of the freedom of speech in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and then in international treaties mainly International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and European Convention on Human Rights. There are also mentioned some constitutional rights associated with the freedom of speech. The subchapter 3.4 explicates the definition of "speech" in the czech law. The last part of chapter 3 pays attention to the specification of subjects of the freedom of speech...

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In this dissertation, through three separately published articles, I interrogate the role of expert knowledge in First Amendment theory and doctrine. I argue that expert knowledge ought to play a prominent role in answering doctrinally relevant empirical questions, as in the case of incorporating a scientifically grounded understanding of visual perception into Establishment Clause inquiries concerning religious symbols. Moreover, the generation and dissemination of expert knowledge itself is worthy of First Amendment protection, for example in protecting professional speech. And expert knowledge should determine the scope of First Amendment protection for professional advice. There is, in other words, a close but often underappreciated connection between expert knowledge and the First Amendment. In Active Symbols, I challenge the assumption sometimes articulated in Establishment Clause case law involving religious symbols that visual representations of religious symbols are merely “passive” as compared to textual (spoken or written) religious references. Drawing on one relevant body of expert knowledge—cognitive neuroscience—I argue that images are at least as “active” as text. The lack of judicial expertise on the empirical question of how visual images, as opposed to spoken or written words, communicate has led to a distortion in the development of Establishment Clause doctrine. This distortion can be remedied by taking relevant expert knowledge into consideration where such knowledge can answer germane empirical questions that are doctrinally relevant but tend to be outside the realm of judicial expertise. Professional Speech argues that the First Amendment protects the communication of expert knowledge by a professional to a client-within a professional-client relationship for the purpose of giving professional advice. The First Amendment thus provides a shield against state interference that seeks to prescribe or alter the content of professional speech. The key to understanding professional speech, I suggest, lies in the concept of the learned professions as knowledge communities. First Amendment protection for professional speech can be justified on all traditional grounds: autonomy interests of the speaker and listener, marketplace interests, and democratic self-government. Unprofessional Advice provides a theory to identify the range of valid professional advice for First Amendment purposes. Building on the concept of the professions as knowledge communities, this article explores the range of professional advice that may be given consistent with the professional knowledge community’s common ways of knowing and reasoning and the respective profession’s agreed upon methodology. Because knowledge communities are not monolithic, there is a range of knowledge that is accepted as good professional advice. Advice falling within this range should receive robust First Amendment protection. Advice not within this range, however, is subject to malpractice liability, and the First Amendment provides no defense.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1983. / Vita. Bibliography: leaves [193]-205.

This thesis analyses the question of the regulation, motivated by egalitarian concerns, of homophobic hate speech and homosexual pornography. I attempt to . critically evaluate what both liberal humanism and postmodernism can tell us about these types of speech, and how we should best treat them, in a framework that takes lesbians' and gays' equality as the underlying organising principle. Although homosexual pornography cannot be convincingly exempted from regulation by affirming that it is not, contrary to heterosexual pornography, implicated in gender oppression, the importance of free speech and the complexity of all pornography messages suggest that the state is not justified in suppressing sex expression relying on the reification of a single viewpoint about its harmfulness. The Law, in limiting pornography on the basis of the radical feminist rationale that assimilates it to hate speech, ends up making strong and arbitrary claims to truth, that are premised on doubtful assumptions, silence alternative knowledges, subjugate outsiders' experiences, and contribute to the creation of oppressive social identities. I advise against censoring pornography out of egalitarian concerns, and argue that, under certain conditions, engagement with court litigation and the deployment of the rights discourse can be promising strategies for lesbians and gay men challenging such obscenity laws. Hate speech seems more evidently linked to discrimination than pornography, and speech act theory suggests that it enacts a specific kind of subordination. However, the role played by homophobic hate speech in perpetuating inequality for queers is limited when compared to other social/discursive practices: thus hate speech laws are the easiest but also, taken on their own, a largely ineffective way of responding to homophobia. As such, these laws bear a presumption of being an unnecessary burden on freedom of expression, a liberty that minorities have a vested interest in keeping as intact as possible. Against homophobia a radical measure is required that, focusing on education, will actively promote equality values. This remedy will be consistent with free speech doctrine to the extent that hate speech will, setting apart some specific cases, escape regulation, and that the State will assume an attitude directed to reaching understanding.

Freedom of expression is one of the most important rights protected under the Constitution. It is as a pre-condition of the enjoyment of all other rights (except, may be the right to life). The right of freedom of expression is the mouthpiece of all other rights, without which all other rights are as good as dead. Freedom of expression has been found to be of importance for several reasons:- the search for truth rationale; the political process rationale; individual self-fulfilment. Despite its resonance, freedom of expression is not absolute in South Africa. It is limited by other equally important fundamental rights contained in the Constitutional document, such as the right to equality, dignity and privacy. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa makes it clear that some forms of expression that have racial connotations are not worthy of Constitutional protection 'from the word go'. These types of expression have the potential to debase the foundations upon which our constitution is premised. They show total disregard to the values of human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights. / Thesis (LLM) North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, 2004

Freedom of expression is one of the most important rights protected under the Constitution. It is as a pre-condition of the enjoyment of all other rights (except, may be the right to life). The right of freedom of expression is the mouthpiece of all other rights, without which all other rights are as good as dead. Freedom of expression has been found to be of importance for several reasons :- the search for truth rationale; the political process rationale; individual self-fulfilment. Despite its resonance, freedom of expression is not absolute in South Africa. It is limited by other equally important fundamental rights contained in the Constitutional document, such as the right to equality, dignity and privacy. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa makes it clear that some forms of expression that have racial connotations are not worthy of Constitutional protection 'from the word go'. These types of expression have the potential to debase the foundations upon which our constitution is premised. They show total disregard to the values of human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights. / (LLM) North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, 2004

Thesis (LL. M.)--Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army, 1968. / "April 1968." Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 91-93). Also issued in microfiche.