Canada and the United States are similar in many respects, and both protect individual rights at a constitutional level. However, the Supreme Court of Canada and the United States Supreme Court have developed alternative conceptions of the constitutional protection of freedom of expression and equality. This thesis describes these differences and attempts to explain the reasons for their development. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court merely requires that governmental actors refrain from overt discrimination on the basis of an objectionable ground. Thus, the Court has created numerous doctrines to limit equality to this definition, including color-blindness, intentional discrimination, and multiple levels of review. Each of these concepts has contributed to the application of formal equality by restricting governmental attempts, such as affirmative action, to alleviate social inequality. In addition, the Court's application of content neutrality to freedom of expression cases has restricted attempts to promote equality through legislation restricting hate speech and pornography. By contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted the protection of equality in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to respond to the actual social consequences of legislation. Rather than limiting the Charter to intentional discrimination, the Court will consider governmental actions which have the effect of creating or encouraging inequality. Similarly, governmental restrictions on hate speech and pornography have been upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada as necessary for the protection of equality. For the Supreme Court of Canada, equality has a social reality. These differences suggest an alternative role of government in the rights sphere in Canada and the United States. The United States Supreme Court has developed a rights interpretation which excludes much significant governmental action, whether positive or negative. The Court has incorporated the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment and, in doing so, has expanded individual rights at the expense of state power in the promotion of equality. The lack of such a development in Canada has resulted in a more substantial role for social legislation, while still protecting against governmental overreaching through the Charter.

Canada and the United States are similar in many respects, and both protect individual rights at a constitutional level. However, the Supreme Court of Canada and the United States Supreme Court have developed alternative conceptions of the constitutional protection of freedom of expression and equality. This thesis describes these differences and attempts to explain the reasons for their development. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court merely requires that governmental actors refrain from overt discrimination on the basis of an objectionable ground. Thus, the Court has created numerous doctrines to limit equality to this definition, including color-blindness, intentional discrimination, and multiple levels of review. Each of these concepts has contributed to the application of formal equality by restricting governmental attempts, such as affirmative action, to alleviate social inequality. In addition, the Court's application of content neutrality to freedom of expression cases has restricted attempts to promote equality through legislation restricting hate speech and pornography. By contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted the protection of equality in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to respond to the actual social consequences of legislation. Rather than limiting the Charter to intentional discrimination, the Court will consider governmental actions which have the effect of creating or encouraging inequality. Similarly, governmental restrictions on hate speech and pornography have been upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada as necessary for the protection of equality. For the Supreme Court of Canada, equality has a social reality. These differences suggest an alternative role of government in the rights sphere in Canada and the United States. The United States Supreme Court has developed a rights interpretation which excludes much significant governmental action, whether positive or negative. The Court has incorporated the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment and, in doing so, has expanded individual rights at the expense of state power in the promotion of equality. The lack of such a development in Canada has resulted in a more substantial role for social legislation, while still protecting against governmental overreaching through the Charter. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

Reputational interests are protected against defamatory and injurious statements by the common law o f defamation, which permits the targeted individual to recover damages for the injury to his reputation. At the same time, this body of common law sets limits to the constitutional right to free expression of the person who made the penalized communication. However, since s.32(l) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - according to the Supreme Court of Canada - restricts the Charter's application to the actions of legislative, executive and administrative branches of government, the Charter will be at best a bit player in defamation litigation governed by common law rule. This thesis deals with the tension between promoting free speech and protecting a person's reputation, i.e. with the questions whether the common law of defamation has achieved the correct balance between the protection of the individual's reputation and freedom of expression, or whether it needs to be modified in order to better accord with the Charter. A n important component of this thesis is its review of the decision of Hill v. Church of Scientology, where the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the question of whether defamation law needs to be reconsidered in light o f the Charter protection of free expression, and found the balance struck by the current law to be appropriate. A critical look at this decision, and more generally at the law of defamation itself, particularly its presumptions of falsity, malice and damages, will reveal the problems with the common law's resistance to making any major allowance for free expression. The author will argue that the Charter should apply to the common law in the same way as it applies to statutory law and that defamation law in particular would, in all probability, not survive the test under s.l of the Charter, concerning the justification of a limitation to a fundamental right. It will be concluded that the common law of defamation needs to be modified, i.e. that it must accord significantly more weight to freedom of expression in order to be consistent with the Charter. Insofar as the extent of such modification is concerned, the author will propose first of all to give the element of fault a more significant role in the common law of defamation. In addition, she will argue that the common law presumptions should be abolished. In sum, the author's reform proposal requires the plaintiff to prove not only that the words he complains of are defamatory, identify him and are published to a third person, but also that they are false, did indeed cause damage to his reputation and that the defendant acted with fault, i.e. intentionally or negligently, when publishing the defamatory falsehoods.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Reputational interests are protected against defamatory and injurious statements by the common law o f defamation, which permits the targeted individual to recover damages for the injury to his reputation. At the same time, this body of common law sets limits to the constitutional right to free expression of the person who made the penalized communication. However, since s.32(l) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - according to the Supreme Court of Canada - restricts the Charter's application to the actions of legislative, executive and administrative branches of government, the Charter will be at best a bit player in defamation litigation governed by common law rule. This thesis deals with the tension between promoting free speech and protecting a person's reputation, i.e. with the questions whether the common law of defamation has achieved the correct balance between the protection of the individual's reputation and freedom of expression, or whether it needs to be modified in order to better accord with the Charter. A n important component of this thesis is its review of the decision of Hill v. Church of Scientology, where the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the question of whether defamation law needs to be reconsidered in light o f the Charter protection of free expression, and found the balance struck by the current law to be appropriate. A critical look at this decision, and more generally at the law of defamation itself, particularly its presumptions of falsity, malice and damages, will reveal the problems with the common law's resistance to making any major allowance for free expression. The author will argue that the Charter should apply to the common law in the same way as it applies to statutory law and that defamation law in particular would, in all probability, not survive the test under s.l of the Charter, concerning the justification of a limitation to a fundamental right. It will be concluded that the common law of defamation needs to be modified, i.e. that it must accord significantly more weight to freedom of expression in order to be consistent with the Charter. Insofar as the extent of such modification is concerned, the author will propose first of all to give the element of fault a more significant role in the common law of defamation. In addition, she will argue that the common law presumptions should be abolished. In sum, the author's reform proposal requires the plaintiff to prove not only that the words he complains of are defamatory, identify him and are published to a third person, but also that they are false, did indeed cause damage to his reputation and that the defendant acted with fault, i.e. intentionally or negligently, when publishing the defamatory falsehoods. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate