This is an investigation of the British Columbia trapping industry and associated markets. A major part of the study is devoted to familiarizing the reader with the present industry. The product, trapline tenure, trappers, fur traders, earnings from trapping, marketing of the product, and administrative arrangements are described. Many problems are associated with the industry today — low incomes; raw fur prices which are declining, uncertain, and unstable; widespread ignorance of proper trapping techniques, pelt handling methods, and marketing opportunities; factor immobility; and lack of organization and contact among trappers. At the local level, there is little competition among fur buyers. Either there is only one trader in an area, or if there is more than one, they often collude. In some areas, market imperfections such as ignorance of outside markets and lack of access to capital, provide an opportunity for fur buyers to exploit the primary producers. Public administrative policies are analyzed in terms of their economic consequences, and their ability to handle the problems of trappers. Present policies lack clearly defined goals, are outdated, fail to consider the socioeconomic needs of trappers, and provide few incentives for efficiency in resource use and development. Management devices succeed in conserving the resource (once the most basic problem), but today with raw fur prices low in comparison to a decade ago, they systematically lead to an underutilization of the resource. In the absence of any organized competition for traplines, there is little assurance that the rights are possessed by the most efficient producers. The primary method of raising revenue, the collection of royalty, negates the efficiency of the management system by encouraging economizing on the harvest and failure to report all animals trapped. Traders' fees ration buying rights on the basis of differential fees. Industry structure has been stagnated by measures that prevent flexibility in the scale of trapping operations. Management lacks adequate information for informed policymaking. And non-enforcement of regulations and lack of control over Indian trapping further decreases the effectiveness of the management system. Moreover, there is no effective organization for rationalizing conflicting land-use problems. As a way of overcoming these problems and leading to a more efficient development of the fur resource, the following recommendations are made: (i) full negotiability of trapline boundaries, (ii) disposition of trapline rights through public auction, (iii) simplification but expansion of present trappers' return form to include more information, (iv) extension of licensing and questionnaire requirements to all trappers, regardless of ethnic origin, (v) enforcement of regulations, (vi) abandonment of royalties, (vii) reduction of fur-traders' fee to one nominal amount, (viii) expansion of trapper education programs, (ix) encouragement of the growth of trapping organizations, and (x) special recommendations for Indians. Data and information on which this thesis is based were obtained from: (i) the provincial Fish and Wildlife Branch and the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, (ii) personal correspondence and interviews with trappers, fur buyers, provincial fur administrators, and Indian Affairs Branch authorities, (iv) mailed questionnaires to fur traders, (v) trappers' manuals, (vi) "A Report on the B.C. Fur Resources Study" (unpublished manuscript), and (vii) fur industry studies for other provinces. A sample of income for trapping in British Columbia was derived through the use of simple mathematics, provincial average fur value statistics, and the trappers' returns. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

This dissertation begins in 1821, when the Hudson's Bay Company took over the Columbia Department from the North West Company, which since 1813 had exported a single commodity (peltries) from the watersheds of two great rivers (the upper Fraser and lower Columbia) to two markets (London and Canton). This fur trade appeared at first so unpromising that the Hudson's Bay Company considered abandoning the lower Columbia region in 1821. Instead of doing so, between 1821 and 1843, the Hudson's Bay Company consolidated its operations in the Columbia Department through the application of a number of venerable commercial policies of the Canadian fur trade. The company extended its fur trading activities to all the major rivers of the region, from the Taku in the north to the Sacramento in the south. To support this massive trade extension the company developed large-scale provision trades in agricultural produce and salmon on the lower Columbia and Fraser rivers. Environmental and cultural conditions favoured these developments. The company also took advantage of the possibility of seaborne transport to develop markets at Oahu (Hawaii), Yerba Buena (San Francisco), and Sitka. To these places the company exported, on its Pacific fleet of ships, a range of country produce from the west coast, especially lumber and salmon. By 1843 the company had developed a new regional economy based on local commodities and Pacific markets; fur continued to be sent to London on an annual vessel. These new exports, and this new regional economy, depended on Native labour in addition to a permanent non-Native workforce of about 600. The company in several places colonized the Native economy and redirected its produce to foreign markets. In 1843 the trade in fur remained—despite the emergence of profitable new export trades—the company's major source of profit from the Columbia Department. The dissertation ends in 1843 when, fearing the possibility of an unfavourable boundary settlement, the company established Fort Victoria to serve as new departmental headquarters, at the same time inaugurating a considerable northward realignment of company activities on the Pacific. At this new post the fur trade would be a minor activity; company officials intended to develop a wide range of resources on Vancouver Island, all of them involving the hiring of Native workers. Increasingly, with the help of Native labour and trade, the company embarked on policies of resource development and extension of commerce on the coast, while the interior districts produced only fur. Difficulties of transport and distance from market prevented similar developments in the company's districts east of the Rocky Mountains.

This dissertation begins in 1821, when the Hudson's Bay Company took over the Columbia Department from the North West Company, which since 1813 had exported a single commodity (peltries) from the watersheds of two great rivers (the upper Fraser and lower Columbia) to two markets (London and Canton). This fur trade appeared at first so unpromising that the Hudson's Bay Company considered abandoning the lower Columbia region in 1821. Instead of doing so, between 1821 and 1843, the Hudson's Bay Company consolidated its operations in the Columbia Department through the application of a number of venerable commercial policies of the Canadian fur trade. The company extended its fur trading activities to all the major rivers of the region, from the Taku in the north to the Sacramento in the south. To support this massive trade extension the company developed large-scale provision trades in agricultural produce and salmon on the lower Columbia and Fraser rivers. Environmental and cultural conditions favoured these developments. The company also took advantage of the possibility of seaborne transport to develop markets at Oahu (Hawaii), Yerba Buena (San Francisco), and Sitka. To these places the company exported, on its Pacific fleet of ships, a range of country produce from the west coast, especially lumber and salmon. By 1843 the company had developed a new regional economy based on local commodities and Pacific markets; fur continued to be sent to London on an annual vessel. These new exports, and this new regional economy, depended on Native labour in addition to a permanent non-Native workforce of about 600. The company in several places colonized the Native economy and redirected its produce to foreign markets. In 1843 the trade in fur remained—despite the emergence of profitable new export trades—the company's major source of profit from the Columbia Department. The dissertation ends in 1843 when, fearing the possibility of an unfavourable boundary settlement, the company established Fort Victoria to serve as new departmental headquarters, at the same time inaugurating a considerable northward realignment of company activities on the Pacific. At this new post the fur trade would be a minor activity; company officials intended to develop a wide range of resources on Vancouver Island, all of them involving the hiring of Native workers. Increasingly, with the help of Native labour and trade, the company embarked on policies of resource development and extension of commerce on the coast, while the interior districts produced only fur. Difficulties of transport and distance from market prevented similar developments in the company's districts east of the Rocky Mountains. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate