Coalition stability is an important concept in coalition formation. One common assumption in many stability criteria in non-transferable utility games is that the preference relations of each agent is publicly known so that a coalition is said to be stable if there is no objection by any sub-group of agents according to the publicly known preferences. / However, in many software agent applications, this assumption is not true. Instead, agents are modeled as individuals with private belief and decisions are made according to those beliefs instead of common knowledge. There are two types of uncertainty here. First, uncertainty in beliefs regarding the environment means that agents are also uncertain about their preferences. Second, an agent's actions can be influenced by his belief regarding other agents' preferences. Such uncertainties have impacts on the coalition's stability which is not reflected in the current stability criteria. / In this thesis, we extend the classic stability concept of the non-transferable utility core by proposing new belief based stability criteria under uncertainty, and illustrate how the new concept can be used to analyze the stability of a new type of belief-based coalition formation game. Mechanisms for reaching solutions of the new stable criteria is proposed and a real life application example is studied. / Chan, Chi Kong. / Adviser: Ho-Fung Leung. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: B, page: 3594. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 101-103). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

by Chan Chi Shing. / Thesis (M.Ph.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1988. / Bibliography: leaves [78-81].

本論文研究兩個有關量子計算理論中的問題，其一為量子博弈論，其二為量子查詢複雜度。 / 博弈論於經濟學、計算機科學、生物學、數學等領域中皆為一門重要課題，近年越來越多有關的研究都把焦點放於量子博弈論之上。本論文的第一部份，我們研究由張氏於2010 年提出的量子策略博弈模型。其中研究重點在於某特定類型的博弈中，計算使用量子策略比經典策略多出的優勢。我們成功建構出一個特定的博弈，並証明使用量子策略比經典策略多出的優勢跟策略的多少成線性關係。 / 本論文的第二部份，主要研究有關量子查詢複雜度，它提供一個簡單的框架，用於理解量子力學的計算能力和限制。我們研究的重點在於量子的安得拉-卡普-羅森伯格猜想，那是關於決定某一類圖特性所需的量子查詢複雜度。我們將會介紹施氏與張氏的猜想、布爾函數分析及查詢複雜度研究中重要的研究結果。我們嘗試証明施氏與張氏的猜想，並於最後提出一個有關布爾函數塊敏感度，影響度及方差值的猜想。 / We study two problems, one in quantum game theory and another in quantum query complexity. / Game theory is an important research topic in many elds like economics, computer sciences, biology, mathematics, etc. A growing trend is that game theory is being studied under quantum setting. In part I, we study the quantum strategic game model proposed by Zhang [Zha10], in which one of the main problem is to measure quantitatively the advantages of using quantum strategies over classical ones. A natural measure is the increase of payoff , which is quantified in terms of multiplicative incentive in a normalized n x n bimatrix game. The maximal incentive under superposition mapping, which maps a classical correlated equilibrium p to a quantum state Σ[subscript s] Pspp(s) jsi, is conjectured to be Ω(n). However only a correlated equilibrium with multiplicative incentive n°·⁵⁸⁵··· under such mapping was found. We proved this conjecture by constructing a classical correlated equilibrium with multiplicative incentive of (n+3)/4 =Ω(n) under such mapping. The proof is much simpler than the old one and gives an optimal result. / On the other hand, we studied quantum query complexity, which provides a simple framework for understanding the computational power and limit by quantum mechanics. In particular, we are interested in the quantum version of Aanderaa-Karp-Rosenberg conjecture for non-trivial monotone graph properties. In part II, we introduce the conjecture by Shi and Zhang [SZ05], survey some important results in Boolean function analysis and query complexity. We put down some partial results on resolving conjecture of Shi and Zhang and propose another conjecture regarding block sensitivity, in uence and variance of a Boolean function, which is simple, interesting and related to the problem. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Wong, Chung Hoi. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [89]-94). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Chapter I --- Quantum Strategic Game --- p.1 / Chapter 1 --- Classical and Quantum Strategic Game --- p.5 / Chapter 1.1 --- Classical Strategic Game Theory --- p.6 / Chapter 1.1.1 --- Notation for Strategic Game --- p.6 / Chapter 1.1.2 --- Classical Equilibrium --- p.7 / Chapter 1.2 --- Quantum Strategic Game Theory --- p.9 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- Notation for Quantum Strategic Game --- p.9 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- Quantum Equilibrium --- p.11 / Chapter 1.3 --- Preservation of Equilibrium --- p.11 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- Quantum to Classical --- p.12 / Chapter 1.3.2 --- Classical to Quantum --- p.12 / Chapter 2 --- Incentives in Quantum Strategic Game --- p.15 / Chapter 2.1 --- Previous Result --- p.15 / Chapter 2.2 --- Improved Multiplicative Incentive to n0:638 --- p.17 / Chapter 2.3 --- Improved Multiplicative Incentives to (n) --- p.19 / Chapter II --- Quantum Aanderaa-Karp-Rosenberg Conjecture --- p.23 / Chapter 3 --- Introduction --- p.27 / Chapter 3.1 --- Non-Trivial Monotone Graph Properties --- p.27 / Chapter 3.2 --- Aanderaa-Karp-Rosenberg Conjecture --- p.27 / Chapter 3.3 --- Conjecture of Shi and Zhang --- p.28 / Chapter 4 --- Boolean Function Analysis --- p.31 / Chapter 4.1 --- Notations --- p.31 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Sensitivity and Block Sensitivity --- p.32 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- p-biased Mean and Variance --- p.33 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- p-biased Influence --- p.34 / Chapter 4.2 --- p-biased Fourier Analysis --- p.36 / Chapter 5 --- Decision Tree Complexity --- p.43 / Chapter 5.1 --- Deterministic Decision Tree Complexity --- p.43 / Chapter 5.2 --- Randomized Decision Tree Complexity --- p.45 / Chapter 5.3 --- Non-Deterministic Decision Tree Complexity --- p.47 / Chapter 5.4 --- Quantum Query Complexity --- p.50 / Chapter 5.5 --- The General Adversary Bound --- p.52 / Chapter 5.6 --- Quantum Query Complexity Lower Bound --- p.54 / Chapter 6 --- Classes of Boolean Function and Their Properties --- p.59 / Chapter 6.1 --- Properties of Monotone Functions --- p.59 / Chapter 6.2 --- Properties of Transitive Functions --- p.64 / Chapter 6.3 --- Properties of Monotone and Transitive Function --- p.70 / Chapter 7 --- Conjecture of Shi and Zhang --- p.73 / Chapter 7.1 --- Designing the Adversary Matrix by Fourier Coefficients of the Weight Function --- p.73 / Chapter 7.2 --- Designing of Adversary Matrix by Level k Fourier Weight --- p.78 / Chapter 8 --- Block Sensitivity-Influence Conjecture --- p.81 / Chapter 8.1 --- Boolean Functions That Satisfy the BSI Conjecture --- p.83 / Chapter 8.2 --- Recursive k-Majority --- p.84 / Chapter 8.3 --- Tribes of Size k --- p.85 / Chapter 8.4 --- Boolean Functions with Small Sensitivity Are Sparse --- p.87 / Bibliography --- p.89

博弈理論己貫穿於許多不同的研究領域中，成為了一種非常有用的研究工具。在演化博弈中，個體可以通過比較彼此在競爭中表現的好壞，從一個策略改變至另一個策略。當依賴於收益參數的競爭個體系統處於穩定態時，可以是一個所有個體都採用同一策略的均勻系統，或是使用不同策略的個體共同存在的非均勻系統。近年來，均勻態和混合態或是均勻相和混合相之間的轉變成為物理學家們的研究熱點。 / 在論文的第一部份(第二及第三章)中，我們研究了有空間關聯的群體在規則晶格上演化雪堆博弄(ESG) 。在文獻中的分析方法大多數是基於對近似法(pair approximation) 。但是對近似法的結果，就算是在定性上，都未能捕捉到電算模擬結果中顯現的重要特性。例如，對近似法未能給出全c 態和混合態之間以及混合態與全D 態之間的轉變特徵，其中c和D 分別表示演化雪堆博奔中的兩種策略。而這些轉變作為收益參數的函數，卻可於ESG 在不同的規則品格中的電算模擬中被觀察到。對近似法的這些缺陷引發了本論文的研究。當不同局域競爭組態的分佈形式假設為二項式分佈，並將之引入到c 個體數目隨時間演變的動態公式中，就能得出全D 態。當進一步深入考慮ESG 的演化後，我們得知在收益參數較小時，D 個體被孤立的局部組態的比例在二項式分佈假設中被高估。通過修正D 個體被孤立的局部組態比例，就能得出全C 態。通過適當調整收益參數較小時D 個體被孤立的局部組態的比例，和收益參數較大時適當調整C個體被孤立的局部組態的比例，我們就能得出與模擬結果吻合較好的結果。然後，我們還將這個方法推廣至線性鏈和六角品格結構中。該種方法比對近似法得到的結果更好。 / 在論文的第二部份(第四章)中，我們研究了有本懲罰者的存在對演化雪堆博弈在正方晶格上演化的影響。該博弈中相應地有三種策略。懲罰者願意支付額外成本以對不合作者造成顯外的損失。同時懲罰者與其他合作者之間是合作的。我們展示了在收益參數組成的空間下得出的詳盡相圖。我們從動態演化後期出現的最終生存形態(last surviving patterns) 出發，討論了相圖中的相邊界成因。 / Game theoretical methods have become a useful tool in research across many fields. In evolutionary games, agents could switch from one strategy to another based on how well they perform as compared with others. Depending on a payoff parameter, a system of competing agents may form a homogeneous system with all agents taking on the same strategy or an inhomogeneous system with the coexistence of different strategies in the steady state. The transitions between the homogeneous and mixed states or phases are of much interest to physicists in recent years. / In Part I (Chapter 2 and 3) of the thesis, the evolutionary snowdrift game (ESG) is studied in spatially structured populations on regular lattices. Analytic approaches in the literature are largely based on the pair approximation. However, results of the pair approximation cannot capture the key features in simulation results even qualitatively. For example, the pair approximation fails to give the transition between an All-C and the mixed phase and the transition between the mixed phase and an All-D phase as a function of a payoff parameter observed in ESG on different regular lattices, where C and D are the two strategies in ESG. The failure motivated the present work. By incorporating different local competing configurations within an assumption of binomial distribution into the dynamical equation for the time evolution of the number of C-agents, the All-D phase readily emerges. Further consideration of the dynamics of ESG informs us that the proportion of isolated-D local configurations is over-estimated in the binomial distribution when the payoffparameter is small. By modifying the proportion of isolated-D congurations, the All-C phase results. By suitably adjusting the weighings of isolated-D congurations for small payoff parameters and isolated-C congurations for large payoff parameters, good agreement with simulation results is obtained. The approach is then generalized to linear chain and hexagonal lattice. The present approach performs much better than the pair approximation. / In Part II (Chapter 4) of the thesis, the effects of the presence of costly punishers in ESG are studied in a square lattice. There are, thus, three strategies in the game. The punishers are willing to pay an extra cost so as to inflict an extra damage to a defector, and they cooperate with other cooperators. Detailed phase diagrams are presented in the space formed by the payoff parameters. The phase boundaries are discussed within the idea of last surviving patterns at the late stage of the dynamics. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Chan, Wan Hang = 晶格上演化雪堆博弈及相關問題的研究 / 陳運亨. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 81-86). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Chan, Wan Hang = Jing ge shang yan hua xue dui bo yi ji xiang guan wen ti de yan jiu / Chen Yunheng. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Game Theory --- p.2 / Chapter 1.1.1 --- Prisoner Dilemma --- p.3 / Chapter 1.1.2 --- Snowdrift Game --- p.3 / Chapter 1.1.3 --- Costly Punishment --- p.4 / Chapter 1.2 --- Evolutionary Game Theory --- p.6 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- Updating Rules --- p.6 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- Updating Schemes --- p.6 / Chapter 1.2.3 --- Spatial Structures --- p.8 / Chapter 1.3 --- Analytic Approaches --- p.9 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- Mean-field Approach --- p.9 / Chapter 1.3.2 --- Last Surviving Patterns --- p.10 / Chapter 2 --- Evolutionary Snowdrift Game on Square Lattice --- p.11 / Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.11 / Chapter 2.2 --- Simulation Results --- p.12 / Chapter 2.3 --- Last Surviving Patterns --- p.15 / Chapter 2.4 --- Pair Approximation --- p.19 / Chapter 2.5 --- The Site Dynamical Equations --- p.22 / Chapter 2.5.1 --- Pure Binomial Approximation --- p.23 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- Modified Binomial Approximation --- p.24 / Chapter 2.5.3 --- Isolated Factor Correction --- p.27 / Chapter 2.5.4 --- The Zonal Correction --- p.31 / Chapter 2.6 --- Summary --- p.32 / Chapter 3 --- Evolutionary Snowdrift Game on Other Networks --- p.34 / Chapter 3.1 --- Snowdrift Game on Other Lattices --- p.34 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Linear Chain --- p.34 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Hexagonal Lattice --- p.40 / Chapter 3.2 --- Snowdrift Game on Small-world Network --- p.43 / Chapter 3.3 --- Summary --- p.50 / Chapter 4 --- Costly punishment in ESG on Lattices --- p.52 / Chapter 4.1 --- Introduction --- p.52 / Chapter 4.2 --- Model --- p.54 / Chapter 4.3 --- Simulation Results [1] --- p.56 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Results with fixed α and β [1] --- p.56 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Results with a fixed α [1] --- p.60 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Consideration of special local structures --- p.65 / Chapter 4.3.4 --- Results of different α --- p.67 / Chapter 4.4 --- Pair Approximation Extended to Three Strategies [1] --- p.69 / Chapter 4.5 --- Summary --- p.76 / Chapter 5 --- Summary --- p.78 / Bibliography --- p.81 / Chapter A --- Uncertainty in Simulation Results --- p.87

本論文擴展Young(1993b)所提出的演化議價模型(evolutionary bargaining model)以容許一個包含多個買家和賣家的雙邊市場。 本文應用隨機穩定性(stochasticstability)作為解決方案概念，發現當市場雙邊參與者的人數相同時，長期穩定分成會收歛到納什談判解 (Nash bargaining solution)，這和 Young的發現相符。然而, 若雙邊參與者的人數並不相同。則長遠而言，人數較少的一方將分得近乎所有得益.此結論符合瓦爾拉斯結論(Walrasian outcome)。 / This thesis extends the evolutionary bargaining model of Young (1993b), to allow for a two-sided market with multiple numbers of buyer and seller. Applying the solution concept of stochastic stability, we find that if the number of players in the two sides are symmetrical, then the long run stable division converges to the Nash bargaining solution, which coincides with Young's finding. However, if the number of players in the two sides are asymmetrical, then the smaller side obtains almost all of the surplus in the long run, which is consistent with the unique Walrasian outcome. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Tam, Yin Chi. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 52-53). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / 摘要 --- p.ii / Acknowledgements --- p.iii / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- Literature Review --- p.6 / Chapter 3. --- The Model --- p.8 / Chapter 4. --- Convergence of the Evolutionary Bargaining Process --- p.14 / Chapter 5. --- Mutations in the Evolutionary Bargaining Process --- p.16 / Chapter 6. --- Generic Stability --- p.19 / Chapter 6.1 --- Asymmetric Market and the Walrasian Outcome --- p.20 / Chapter 6.2 --- Symmetric Market and the Nash Bargaining Solution --- p.23 / Chapter 7. --- Discussion --- p.25 / Chapter 8. --- Conclusion --- p.27 / Appendix --- p.28 / Proof of Theorem 3 --- p.28 / Figures and Tables: --- p.46 / References --- p.52

The second is a. project management problem with task subcontracting. The project owner (P0) outsources the tasks in his project to different subcontractors (SCs), with contracts to govern the completions of the tasks and the associated costs and bonus. We model the subcontractors' task processing problem as a Cooperative Game so that subcontractors can benefit by resource sharing and execution time rescheduling. We prove that our cooperative game is balanced and propose a core allocation vector constructed from the optimal dual solution. Meanwhile, the project owner's optimal strategy to design the contracts is also obtained by implicit optimization skills. / The third problem we consider concerns about manufacturing outsourcing, where multiple manufacturers outsource their jobs to a third-party firm. The manufacturers book time windows from the third-party to process their jobs whose processing times are stochastic. Due to the capacity limitation of the third-party and the uncertainty in their processing times, it may be beneficial for the manufacturers to cooperate, provided that a proper cooperative mechanism can be devised. We model this problem as a Cooperative Game. However, it is more than a Sequencing Game commonly studied in the literature, because we consider the optimal booking decisions and the random processing times, which make it possible for the manufacturers to achieve a risk pooling effect by collaborating and booking together. We prove that the outsourcing game is balanced in the situation where the unit booking cost for each time window is unique. We also construct a core allocation based on the core vector derived form a Permutation Game. A main breakthrough is that the connective admissible rearrangement assumption is removed for the stochastic sequencing/booking game, following Slikker's technique. / This thesis investigates three problems in operations management, by using different concepts and techniques in Game Theory. The first problem is a two-echelon supply chain problem involving wholesaling, transporting and retailing of certain kind of perishable product. A key characteristic of the problem is that the upstream supplier adopts a. Group Buying Scheme (GBS) as his pricing mechanism and the downstream retailers, taking into consideration of the supplier's pricing mechanism, their respective market demands and other retailers' likely reactions, compete with each other to maximize their profit respectively. We model this problem as a. Stackberg game where supplier is the leader and retailers are the followers. Furthermore, the retailers' optimal ordering problem is solved by applying the solution concepts in Competition Game Theory and we prove that the Nash equilibrium always exists. Moreover, the equilibrium is the only Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium and a strong equilibrium as well. Finally we show that the GBS pricing mechanism, as compared with the traditional Flat Price scheme, can bring the supplier and retailers to a win-win situation. / Zhang, Feng. / Adviser: Xianqiang Cai. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-02, Section: B, page: . / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 136-140). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese.

Thesis. 1976. Ph.D.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics. / Microfiche copy available in Archives and Dewey. / Vita. / Bibliography: leaves 26-28, 79-80. / Learning behavior and the noncooperative equilibrium.--A game of fair division. / Ph.D.

She, Yingni. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 74-78). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Scope --- p.2 / Chapter 1.2 --- Motivation --- p.5 / Chapter 1.3 --- Structure of the Thesis --- p.6 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1 --- Intelligent Agents and Multiagent Systems --- p.8 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Intelligent Agents --- p.8 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Multiagent Systems --- p.10 / Chapter 2.2 --- Minority Game --- p.13 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Minority Game --- p.13 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Characteristics of Minority Game --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Strategies for Agents in Minority Game --- p.18 / Chapter 2.3 --- Resource Allocation --- p.22 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Strategies for Agents in Multiagent Resource Allocation --- p.23 / Chapter 3 --- Individual Agent´ةs Wealth in Minority Game --- p.26 / Chapter 3.1 --- The Model --- p.26 / Chapter 3.2 --- Motivation --- p.27 / Chapter 3.3 --- Inefficiency Information --- p.28 / Chapter 3.4 --- An Intelligent Strategy --- p.31 / Chapter 3.5 --- Experiment Analysis --- p.32 / Chapter 3.6 --- Discussions and Analysis --- p.35 / Chapter 3.6.1 --- Equivalence to the Experience method --- p.36 / Chapter 3.6.2 --- Impact of M' and S' --- p.38 / Chapter 3.6.3 --- Impact of M and S --- p.41 / Chapter 3.6.4 --- Impact of Larger Number of Privileged Agents --- p.48 / Chapter 3.6.5 --- Comparisons with Related Work --- p.48 / Chapter 4 --- An Adaptive Strategy for Resource Allocation --- p.53 / Chapter 4.1 --- Problem Specification --- p.53 / Chapter 4.2 --- An Adaptive Strategy --- p.55 / Chapter 4.3 --- Remarks of the Adaptive Strategy --- p.57 / Chapter 4.4 --- Experiment Analysis --- p.58 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Simulations --- p.58 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Comparisons with Related Work --- p.62 / Chapter 5 --- Conclusions and Future Work --- p.69 / Chapter 5.1 --- Conclusions --- p.69 / Chapter 5.2 --- Future Work --- p.71 / A List of Publications --- p.73 / Bibliography --- p.74

It is demonstrated that for certain markets where traders have constant elasticity of substitution utility (CES) functions, the existence of a price equilibrium can be determined in polynomial time. It is also shown that for a certain range of elasticity of substitution where the CES market does not satisfy gross subsitutability that price equilibira can be computed in polynomial time. It is also shown that for markets satisfying gross substitutability, equilibria can be computed in polynomial time even if the excess demand is a correspondence. On the experimental side, equilibrium computation algorithms from computer science without running time guarantees are shown to be competitive with software packages used in applied microeconomics. Simulations also lend support to the Nash equilibrium solution concept by showing that agents employing heuristics in a restricted form of Texas Holdem converge to an approximate equilibrium. Monte Carlo simulations also indicate the long run preponderance of skill over chance in Holdem tournaments.

Co-management is considered an alternative approach to fisheries management, however, not all co-managed fisheries have been successful. Most studies discussing the success and failure of co-management have emphasized economic and social attributes of success and failure, such as fishery rights and institutional arrangements. The effect on co-management of biological characteristics, such as the growth rate of the fish stock and the stock size, has gained little attention. This study investigates the influence of intrinsic growth rate (r) and relative stock size (B') on fishers' decision to cooperate with catch quotas. The concept of mixed strategies from game theory is incorporated with basic economic concepts and a biomass dynamics model to capture important aspects in a fishery cooperative. The discounting concept is applied to capture the fishers' tendency to cooperate (��[subscript i]). Profits from fishing are specified for each fisher within a 2 by 2 matrix with two players and two strategies (cooperative and non-cooperative). When both players have dominant strategies, where one player's best strategy coincides with the other player's best strategy, the game has a pure strategy equilibrium. Alternatively, the equilibrium outcome of the game is determined using mixed strategies. The results indicate that the biological parameters, r and B', influence fishers' cooperation. However, social parameters (��[subscript i]) and economic parameters (profit/cost ratio when the stock is at the carrying capacity) must also be considered. Furthermore, this study finds that the fishers are more likely to play the cooperative strategy over very wide ranges of r and B' when their tendencies to cooperate are high. In contrast, the fishers are more likely to play mixed strategy when their tendencies to cooperate are low. Having a large discrepancy between the fishers' tendencies to cooperate has less influence on the outcomes of the game than having high values for the fishers' tendencies to cooperate. The profit/cost ratio generally accentuates the most frequent outcomes of the game. For instance, if the outcomes are mostly mixed strategies, a higher ratio expands the mixed strategy outcomes over wider ranges of r and B'. / Graduation date: 2001