Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 110-113).

Thesis (M.A.)--Jāmiʻat al-Qāhirah, 1983. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 227-231).

Thesis (M.A.)--The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2010. / Directed by Jan Rychtar; submitted to the Dept. of Mathematics and Statistics. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Jul. 5, 2010). Includes bibliographical references (p. 54-57).

Thesis (M.Sc.)--University of Alberta, 2010. / Title from PDF file main screen (viewed on July 29, 2010). A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, Department of Computing Science, University of Alberta. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2006. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 105-107). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2005. / Title from title screen. Dr. Subhashish (Sub) Samaddar, committee chair; William Bogner, Arun Rai, Thomas Whalen, committee members. Electronic text (174 p. : ill. (some col.)) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed June 29, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 164-173).

Σκοπός της παρούσας διπλωματικής εργασίας είναι να αναλύσει τον τρόπο με τον οποίο η θεωρία παιγνίων συνεισφέρει στην λήψη αποφάσεων σε διαπραγματεύσεις. Στα πρώτα κεφάλαια της παρούσας εργασίας αναλύονται οι εισαγωγικές έννοιες της θεωρίας παιγνίων. Εκτός από της εισαγωγικές έννοιες αναφέρονται οι κατηγορίες των παιγνίων και γίνεται μια προσπάθεια ταξινόμησής τους βάσει κάποιων συγκεκριμένων χαρακτηριστικών. Στη συνέχεια αναφερόμαστε στις διαπραγματεύσεις ως μια πιο εξειδικευμένη μορφή θεωρίας παιγνίων. Έπειτα παραθέτουμε ορισμένα μοντέλα της θεωρίας των διαπραγματεύσεων και τέλος με τη χρήση των μοντέλων αυτών αναφερόμαστε σε πραγματικές περιπτώσεις διαπραγματεύσεων σε συγχωνεύσεις κι εξαγορές εταιρειών. / The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how which game theory contribute to decision making negotiations. The first chapters of this study analyzed the introductory concepts of game theory. Apart from the introductory concepts mentioned categories of games and is an attempt classification on the basis of some specific characteristics. at Then refer to the negotiations as a more specialized form of game theory. Then we present some models of Theory of negotiations and end the use of these models refer to real situations in negotiations mergers and acquisitions.

The developments of new technologies for commercial aviation involve significant risk for technologists as these programs are often driven by fixed assumptions regarding future airline needs, while being subject to many uncertainties at the technical and market levels. To prioritize these developments, technologists must assess their economic viability even though standard methods used for capital budgeting are not well suited to handle the overwhelming uncertainty surrounding such developments. This research proposes a framework featuring real options to overcome this challenge. It is motivated by three observations: disregarding the value of managerial flexibility undervalues long-term research and development (R&D) programs; windows of opportunities emerge and disappear and manufacturers can derive significant value by exploiting their upside potential; integrating competitive aspects early in the design ensures that development programs are robust with respect to moves by the competition. Real options analyses have been proposed to address some of these points but the adoption has been slow, hindered by constraining frameworks. A panel of academics and practitioners has identified a set of requirements, known as the Georgetown Challenge, that real options analyses must meet to get more traction amongst practitioners in the industry. In a bid to meet some of these requirements, this research proposes a novel methodology, cross-fertilizing techniques from financial engineering, actuarial sciences, and statistics to evaluate and study the timing of technology developments under uncertainty. It aims at substantiating decision making for R&D while having a wider domain of application and an improved ability to handle a complex reality compared to more traditional approaches. The method named FLexible AViation Investment Analysis (FLAVIA) uses first Monte Carlo techniques to simulate the evolution of uncertainties driving the value of technology developments. A non-parametric Esscher transform is then applied to perform a change of probability measure to express these evolutions under the equivalent martingale measure. A bootstrap technique is suggested next to construct new non-weighted evolutions of the technology development value under the new measure. A regression-based technique is finally used to analyze the technology development program and to discover trigger boundaries which help define when the technology development program should be launched. Verification of the method is performed on several canonical examples and indicates good accuracy and competitive execution time. It is applied next to the analysis of a performance improvement package (PIP) development using the Integrated Cost And Revenue Estimation method (i-CARE) developed as part of this research. The PIP can be retrofitted to currently operating turbofan engines in order to mitigate the impact of the aging process on their operating costs. The PIP is subject to market uncertainties, such as the evolution of jet-fuel prices and the possible taxation of carbon emissions. The profitability of the PIP development is investigated and the value of managerial flexibility and timing flexibility are highlighted.The developments of new technologies for commercial aviation involve significant risk for technologists as these programs are often driven by fixed assumptions regarding future airline needs, while being subject to many uncertainties at the technical and market levels. To prioritize these developments, technologists must assess their economic viability even though standard methods used for capital budgeting are not well suited to handle the overwhelming uncertainty surrounding such developments. This research proposes a framework featuring real options to overcome this challenge. It is motivated by three observations: disregarding the value of managerial flexibility undervalues long-term research and development (R&D) programs; windows of opportunities emerge and disappear and manufacturers can derive significant value by exploiting their upside potential; integrating competitive aspects early in the design ensures that development programs are robust with respect to moves by the competition. Real options analyses have been proposed to address some of these points but the adoption has been slow, hindered by constraining frameworks. A panel of academics and practitioners has identified a set of requirements, known as the Georgetown Challenge, that real options analyses must meet to get more traction amongst practitioners in the industry. In a bid to meet some of these requirements, this research proposes a novel methodology, cross-fertilizing techniques from financial engineering, actuarial sciences, and statistics to evaluate and study the timing of technology developments under uncertainty. It aims at substantiating decision making for R&D while having a wider domain of application and an improved ability to handle a complex reality compared to more traditional approaches. The method named FLexible AViation Investment Analysis (FLAVIA) uses first Monte Carlo techniques to simulate the evolution of uncertainties driving the value of technology developments. A non-parametric Esscher transform is then applied to perform a change of probability measure to express these evolutions under the equivalent martingale measure. A bootstrap technique is suggested next to construct new non-weighted evolutions of the technology development value under the new measure. A regression-based technique is finally used to analyze the technology development program and to discover trigger boundaries which help define when the technology development program should be launched. Verification of the method is performed on several canonical examples and indicates good accuracy and competitive execution time. It is applied next to the analysis of a performance improvement package (PIP) development using the Integrated Cost And Revenue Estimation method (i-CARE) developed as part of this research. The PIP can be retrofitted to currently operating turbofan engines in order to mitigate the impact of the aging process on their operating costs. The PIP is subject to market uncertainties, such as the evolution of jet-fuel prices and the possible taxation of carbon emissions. The profitability of the PIP development is investigated and the value of managerial flexibility and timing flexibility are highlighted.

<b>Duelling</b> The norm of duelling endured for hundreds of years in Europe. In the United Kingdom it disappeared abruptly in the mid-nineteenth century, whereas in France it declined slowly. I present a simple model of social norms that explains these phenomena. The model predicts that the evolution of norms is characterised by tipping, whereby norms can shift suddenly due to shocks, and by a ratchet effect, whereby changes in parameters can cause norms to decline gradually. I show that the model can be supported by an equilibrium of a repeated game, with no special assumptions about preferences. <b>Community enforcement using modal actions</b> I prove two folk theorems for repeated games with random matching. A large group of players is rematched at random each period, so that players who deviate must be sanctioned by third parties. Previous analyses have either relied on strong assumptions about information transmission, or have been limited to equilibria that are not robust to noise or in which players are indifferent. I use a simple construction based on modal actions to obtain results for strict and robust equilibria. <b>Learning repeated-game strategies</b> The literature on boundedly rational learning has tended to focus on stagegame actions. I present a stochastic learning rule for repeated-game strategies. Players form beliefs about their opponent’s strategy based on past actions and best-respond. Occasionally, they make mistakes and experiment, and I show that the equilibrium selected depends on exactly how players make mistakes. Simple specifications of the learning rule yield intuitive selection results: the maxmin, or Rawlsian, outcome; the Nash bargaining solution; the maximum of the sum of payoffs; and a generalisation of risk dominance.

In many branches of the economy, including transportation, lodging, and more recently cloud computing, users can reserve resources in advance. Although advance reservations are gaining popularity, little is known about the strategic behavior of customers facing the decision whether to reserve a resource in advance or not. Making an advance reservation can reduce the waiting time or the probability of not getting service, but it is usually associated with an additional cost. To evaluate this trade-off, we develop a game-theoretic framework, called advance reservation games, that helps in reasoning about the strategic behavior of customers in systems that allow advance reservations. Using this framework, we analyze several advance reservation models, in the context of slotted loss queues and waiting queues. The analysis of the economic equilibria, from the provider perspective, yields several key insights, including: (i) If customers have no a-priori information about the availability of servers, then only customers granted service should be charged a reservation fee; (ii) Informing customers about the exact number of available servers is less profitable than only informing them that servers are available; (iii) In many cases, the reservation fee that leads to the equilibrium with maximum possible profit leads to other equilibria, including one resulting with no profit; (iv) If the game repeats many times and customers update their strategy after observing actions of other customers at previous stage, then the system converges to an equilibrium where no one makes an advance reservation, if such an equilibrium exists. Else, the system cycles and yields positive profit to the provider Finally, we study the impact of information sharing in M/M/1 queues with strategic customers. We analyze the intuitive policy of sharing the queue length with customers when it is small and hiding it when it is large. We prove that, from the provider perspective, such a policy is never optimal. That is, either always sharing the queue length or always hiding it maximizes the average number of customers joining the queue.