Leung, Ming Lam. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references and index. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / List of Figures --- p.viii / Chapter 1 --- Overview --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Background and Preliminaries --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1 --- Linear Algebra --- p.7 / Chapter 2.2 --- Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Computation --- p.12 / Chapter 2.3 --- Communication Complexity --- p.16 / Chapter 2.4 --- Game Theory and Evolutionary Dynamics --- p.20 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Multiplayer Strategic Games in Normal-Form --- p.20 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Classifications of Games --- p.22 / Chapter 2.4.3 --- Mixed Strategies and Correlated Strategies --- p.26 / Chapter 2.4.4 --- Nash Equilibria --- p.28 / Chapter 2.4.5 --- Dynamic Fixed Points and Stability --- p.31 / Chapter 3 --- Classical and Quantum Communication Complexity --- p.35 / Chapter 3.1 --- Summary of Previous Upper Bounds and Lower Bounds --- p.35 / Chapter 3.2 --- Two-way randomized protocol of Symmetric XOR Functions --- p.38 / Chapter 3.3 --- One-way and SMP randomized protocol of Symmetric XOR Functions --- p.41 / Chapter 3.4 --- Significance of Our Results --- p.45 / Chapter 4 --- Quantum Strategic Games and Static Equilibria --- p.49 / Chapter 4.1 --- Brief History of Quantum Game Theory --- p.50 / Chapter 4.2 --- Models of Quantum Strategies --- p.52 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Meyer's quantum unitary strategies --- p.53 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- EWL-model of quantum strategies --- p.54 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Zhang's model of quantum strategies --- p.55 / Chapter 4.3 --- Quantum Equilibrium Concepts --- p.58 / Chapter 4.4 --- Relations between Classical and Quantum Equilibria --- p.60 / Chapter 4.5 --- Refinements of Quantum Equilibria --- p.71 / Chapter 4.6 --- Generating Quantum Equilibria and PPAD-completeness --- p.74 / Chapter 5 --- Classical and Quantum Evolutionary Strategy Dynamics --- p.79 / Chapter 5.1 --- Evolutionary Game Theory --- p.80 / Chapter 5.2 --- Dynamic Strategy Evolution --- p.81 / Chapter 5.3 --- Major Properties of Classical Evolutionary Dynamics --- p.83 / Chapter 5.4 --- Analysis of Classical Strategy Evolution in Bimatrix Games --- p.86 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- Division of Regions in Strategy Space --- p.86 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- Symmetric Games --- p.91 / Chapter 5.4.3 --- Zero-Sum Games --- p.100 / Chapter 5.5 --- Quantum Strategy Evolution --- p.101 / Chapter 5.6 --- Significances of Employing Quantum Strategv Evolution --- p.106 / Chapter A Appendix: --- Common Classical Evolutionary Dynamics --- p.113 / Chapter A.1 --- Replicator Dynamics --- p.113 / Chapter A.2 --- Imitation Dynamics --- p.113 / Chapter A.3 --- Best Response Dynamics --- p.116 / Chapter A.4 --- Smoothed Best Response Dynamics --- p.117 / Chapter A.5 --- Differential Dynamics --- p.117 / Chapter A.6 --- Projective Dynamics --- p.121 / Bibliography --- p.123 / Index --- p.132

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Thesis (M. Sc.)--University of Canterbury, 2006. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 105-114). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Economics, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 1982 / Includes bibliographies. / by Bert Douglas Bernheim. / Ph. D. / Ph. D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics

Chan, Chun Him = 論競爭環境中出現的協作現象 / 陳俊謙. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 139-141). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chan, Chun Him = Lun jing zheng huan jing zhong chu xian de xie zuo xian xiang / Chen Junqian. / Title / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgements --- p.v / Table of Contents --- p.vii / Chapter 1 --- Prologue --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Prisoners' Dilemma and Snowdrift Game --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Formulation --- p.7 / Chapter 2.3 --- The Prisoners，Dilemma (PD) --- p.8 / Chapter 2.4 --- The Snowdrift Game (SG) --- p.9 / Chapter 2.5 --- Parameterizing Payoffs in PD --- p.10 / Chapter 2.5.1 --- The Temptation Reward Punishment Sucker System (TRPS system) --- p.10 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- "Our Expanded 2-parameter System (r, s system)" --- p.10 / Chapter 2.5.3 --- Our 1-parameter System (r system) --- p.11 / Chapter 2.5.4 --- The Benefit and Cost System (BC system) --- p.11 / Chapter 2.6 --- Parameterizing Payoffs in SG --- p.12 / Chapter 2.6.1 --- A Common 1-parameter System (rh system) --- p.13 / Chapter 2.6.2 --- Our 1-parameter System (r system) --- p.13 / Chapter 3 --- Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma (IPD) --- p.15 / Chapter 3.1 --- Tragedy of One-shot PD Game --- p.15 / Chapter 3.2 --- The First Cooperation --- p.16 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Repeated PD Game --- p.16 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Axelrod´ةs Tournament and Strategy “Tit-for-Tat´ح (TFT) --- p.17 / Chapter 3.3 --- The Second Cooperation --- p.18 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Nowak and Sigmund Evolutionary Experiment --- p.18 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Stochastic Reactive Strategies (SRSs) and Evolutionary Infinite IPD --- p.19 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- Experimental Setup --- p.20 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- Experimental Results --- p.21 / Chapter 3.3.5 --- Conclusion: TFT as a Pivot for Cooperation --- p.22 / Chapter 4 --- Evolutionary IPD with Strategy Lattices --- p.23 / Chapter 4.1 --- Sensitivity to Initial Conditions and Numerical Accuracy in IPD --- p.24 / Chapter 4.2 --- Modifications and Justifications --- p.24 / Chapter 4.3 --- Simulation Results --- p.26 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Strategy Frequencies Xi(t) versus Time --- p.27 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- "Mean Final State in the Whole r, s Space" --- p.32 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Time Evolution of (p) and (q) --- p.38 / Chapter 4.3.4 --- Mean Final State of a Strategy Lattice with Inclined Frequencies --- p.42 / Chapter 4.3.5 --- Conclusion --- p.50 / Chapter 5 --- Egoistic Exploiters Induced Global Generosity in Evolutionary IPD --- p.52 / Chapter 5.1 --- Introduction --- p.52 / Chapter 5.2 --- Modifications and Justifications --- p.52 / Chapter 5.3 --- "The Three Initial Conditions: Cases TO, T1 and T2" --- p.53 / Chapter 5.4 --- Simulation Results --- p.54 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- Distribution of the Final Dominant Strategies --- p.54 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- Case TO (100 Random Strategies) --- p.56 / Chapter 5.4.3 --- Case T1 (99 Random Strategies and a TFT-like Strategy) --- p.58 / Chapter 5.4.4 --- Case T2 (98 Random Strategies and both a TFT-like and an AllD-like Strategies) --- p.58 / Chapter 5.4.5 --- Comparing the Three Cases --- p.61 / Chapter 5.4.6 --- Discussion --- p.64 / Chapter 5.5 --- Analytic Manipulations for Small r Region --- p.65 / Chapter 5.5.1 --- Values of (pmps) and (qmps) for Case T2 --- p.65 / Chapter 5.5.2 --- Values of {pmps) and {qmps) for Case TO and T1 --- p.68 / Chapter 5.6 --- Conclusion --- p.71 / Chapter 6 --- The Basics of Networks --- p.72 / Chapter 6.1 --- Fully-connected Networks and Well-mixed Networks --- p.72 / Chapter 6.2 --- Simple Hypercubic Lattices --- p.73 / Chapter 6.3 --- Barabasi-Albert (BA) Scale-free Growing Networks --- p.74 / Chapter 7 --- Proposing the N-person Snowdrift Game (NSG) --- p.76 / Chapter 7.1 --- Introduction --- p.76 / Chapter 7.2 --- Limitations of 2-person Games on Networks --- p.76 / Chapter 7.3 --- The Existing N-person Games --- p.77 / Chapter 7.3.1 --- The Public Good Game (PGG) --- p.78 / Chapter 7.3.2 --- The N-person Battle of Sexes Games (NBOS) --- p.78 / Chapter 7.4 --- The NSG Scenario and Payoffs --- p.79 / Chapter 7.5 --- Everyday Examples of NSG --- p.80 / Chapter 7.6 --- Preview of Studies in Evolutionary NSG --- p.82 / Chapter 8 --- Evolutionary NSG in Well-mixed Populations --- p.84 / Chapter 8.1 --- The Method of Replicator Dynamics --- p.84 / Chapter 8.2 --- The Simulation Algorithm --- p.90 / Chapter 8.3 --- The Simulated Equilibrium Contributor Fraction x*(r) --- p.91 / Chapter 8.4 --- Analytic Manipulations on the Algorithm --- p.92 / Chapter 8.4.1 --- Conversion Probabilities and Equilibrium Conditions --- p.92 / Chapter 8.4.2 --- Discussions --- p.94 / Chapter 8.5 --- Analytic Treatments on the Time Evolution of the Contribution Level x(t) --- p.96 / Chapter 8.5.1 --- Discrete Time Equation --- p.97 / Chapter 8.5.2 --- Continuous Approximations --- p.97 / Chapter 8.5.3 --- Analytical Solutions of N=2 and N=S --- p.98 / Chapter 8.6 --- Conclusion --- p.100 / Chapter 9 --- Evolutionary NSG in Simple Hypercubic Lattices --- p.101 / Chapter 9.1 --- Comparison between Well-mixed and Lattice Populations --- p.101 / Chapter 9.2 --- Simulation Parameters --- p.103 / Chapter 9.3 --- Simulation Results for ID Lattices --- p.103 / Chapter 9.4 --- Analytic Theory for ID Lattices by Analyzing on the Local Configurations --- p.105 / Chapter 9.4.1 --- The Absence of Connected Contributors --- p.105 / Chapter 9.4.2 --- Theory for ID k=2 Chain Lattice --- p.106 / Chapter 9.4.3 --- Theory for ID k=4 Chain Lattice --- p.109 / Chapter 9.5 --- Simulation Results for 2D Lattices --- p.112 / Chapter 9.6 --- Analytic Theory for 2D k=4 Square Lattice --- p.115 / Chapter 9.7 --- Simulation Results for 3D Cubic Lattice --- p.120 / Chapter 9.8 --- Conjectures for Approximate Solutions in High-Dimensional Hy- percubic Lattices --- p.120 / Chapter 9.9 --- Extracting the Relation Neff=2k+1 --- p.122 / Chapter 9.10 --- Conclusion --- p.123 / Chapter A --- Evolutionary NSG in Barabasi-Albert Networks --- p.125 / Chapter A.l --- The New Elements in BA Networks --- p.126 / Chapter A.2 --- The Two Implementations - Model A and Model B --- p.126 / Chapter A.3 --- Results in Model A (Varying-N) --- p.127 / Chapter A.4 --- Results in Model B (Fixed-N) --- p.133 / Chapter A.5 --- Conclusion --- p.135 / Chapter B --- Supplementary Equations for Chapter 9 --- p.136 / Chapter B.l --- Equations for ID k=4 Lattice --- p.136 / Chapter B.2 --- Equations for 2D k=4 Lattice --- p.137 / Bibliography --- p.139

This dissertation comprises three essays in experimental economics. The first investigates the extent of strategic behaviour in jury voting models. Existing experimental evidence in jury voting models shows subjects largely act in accordance with theoretical predictions, implying that they have the insight to condition their votes upon their own pivotality. The experiment presented here tests the extent of these abilities, finding that a large portion of subjects behave consistently with such insight in the face of several variations on the basic jury voting game, but largely fail to do so in another, perhaps due to the difficulty of extracting informational implications from counterintuitive strategies. The second investigates the extent to which hypothetical thinking - the ability to condition upon and extract information from hypothetical events - persists across different strategic environments. Two games of considerable interest in the experimental literature - jury voting games and common value auctions - each contain the feature that a sophisticated player can simplify the problem by conditioning upon a hypothetical event - pivotality and winning the auction, respectively - and extract from it information about the state of the world that might affect their own behaviour. This common element suggests that the capability that leads to sophisticated play in one should lead to the same in the other. This paper tests this connection through a within-subject experiment in which subjects each play both games. Little evidence is found that play in one relates to play in the other in any meaningful way. Finally, the third, co-authored with Evan Friedman, investigates the nature of errors relative to Nash equilibrium play in a family of two-by-two games. Using data on one- shot games, we study the mapping from the distribution of player j’s actions to the distribution of player i’s beliefs (over player j’s actions) and the mapping from player i’s payoffs (given beliefs) to the distribution over player i’s actions. In our laboratory experiment, subjects play a set of fully mixed 2 × 2 games without feedback and state their beliefs about which actions they expect their opponents to play. We find that (i) belief distributions tend to shift in the same direction as changes in opponents’ actions, (ii) beliefs are systematically biased–“conservative” for one player role and “extreme” for the other, (iii) rates of best response vary systematically across games, and (iv) systematic failures to maximize expected payoffs (given beliefs) are well explained by risk aversion. To better understand the belief formation process, we collect subject-level measures of strategic sophistication based on dominance solvable games. We find that (v) the player role itself has a strong effect on sophistication, (vi) sophistication measured in dominance solvable games strongly predicts behavior in fully mixed games, and (vii) belief elicitation significantly effects actions in a direction consistent with increasing sophistication.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-83).

Thesis. 1977. B.S.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ENGINEERING. / Bibliography : leaf 41. / by Aleksandar D. Lekic. / B.S.