The prevailing metaphysics of modern medicine and bioethics have been largely dualistic and materialistic in nature. The person is conceived of as a duality of mind and body, where the body is treated simply as a material object. In taking such a perspective, the background is set from which people can come to feel distanced from their bodies and believe it acceptable to alienate and sell their body parts. This thesis argues that the dualistic (and to a lesser extent the materialistic) conceptions of the person have contributed significantly to the objectification and commodification of the body. A most disturbing example of this is the patenting of human genetic material. / In place of the dualistic metaphysic, an embodiment perspective is proposed that treats the person as a unique individual who is inseparably unified in mind, body, and soul. This view can help address the problem of patenting and commercialisation as it avoids the difficulties raised by the application of property language to the body. The body is not simply an object that can be bought or sold, but is an integral part of a person's identity. This does not mean that medical research must be prohibited, but simply that an individual's cells and any derivative cell lines should not be subject to patents. Above all, an embodiment perspective forces the medical and technological establishment, and society in general, to accept that people are unique unified individuals who cannot be objectified, commodified, or alienated from their bodies and selves.

No description available.