The thesis examines the policy and practice of literary translation into German during the Nazi regime. It is shown that translation survived, albeit in a constrained form, throughout the period and that heavy official intervention was itself grounded in contradictory attitudes to translation. A consideration of the state regulation and reception of translation demonstrates that translated literature was regarded with suspicion as a potentially harmful invasion of the foreign. Terms used - such as the 'alien within' and the danger of miscegenation - clearly participate in the surrounding discourse of anti-Semitism. However, a database of translations published in the period shows that while such views certainly shaped the selection of genre and source language, there was no simple suppression and numbers remained stable or even rose until 1940. This is accounted for on the one hand by the regime's promotion of certain translations, selected on criteria that draw on notions of literature's cultural specificity as an expression of the Volk soul. An approved translation is compared with its source, showing that consonance with this literary ideology has been enhanced by the detail of translation choices; official reviews further position the text within the boundaries of acceptability. On the other hand, the single largest translated genre of the pre-war period, the Anglo-American detective novel, was not promoted but reviled by the literary bureaucracy. An examination of the source texts and translations of ten detective novels demonstrates that the ideologically marginalised genre adapted itself to the receiving culture by heightening the rule-boundness, strict gender roles and portrayals of authority present in the source texts. The glamorisation of foreign settings remains unaffected, suggesting the persistence of a pre-1933 fascination with Anglo-American culture. The thesis concludes that while the foreignness of foreign literature was fiercely attacked by literary policymakers, it was also promoted in certain, politically acceptable forms and in other cases persisted on its own commercial trajectory despite official disapproval. The study thus contributes to the understanding both of an under-researched area of literary policy in Nazi Germany and of the ideological, institutional and commercial contexts of translation.

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[no abstract included] / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

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Within a year of his accession to power, Hitler, by concluding a non-aggression pact with Poland and by bringing relations with Russia to an impasse, had revolutionized German foreign policy. This policy reversal was chosen, primarily, for tactical reasons and only secondarily for ideological reasons. Prom the outset, it is true, relations with Russia were made difficult by Hitler's persecution of the German Communist Party and by his own hatred for Bolshevism. But it was only after Poland had twice threatened a preventative war against Germany and after Germany had become diplomatically isolated through her desertion of the League of Nations, that Hitler decided upon a rapprochement with Poland and a break with Russia. This policy was finalized by the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of January, 1934. The political orientation of German foreign policy, established by this pact, remained fixed in its outlines for the following five years. During these years, Hitler used the anti-Communist bogey to justify his foreign policy coups and to ease his relations with Poland. Russia herself, he ignored as a power factor in opposition. Nor did he consider a political understanding with her. However, he did toy with the idea of her as an object of aggression. In the spring and summer of 1939, Hitler's Soviet policy was changed by his decision, in early spring, to settle with Poland. Even after making this decision, he continued to ignore Russia. In mid-April, however, stiffening British resistance and the threat of an Anglo-Russian understanding, on the one hand, and coy hints by the Soviet Government that it might be prepared for a detente with Germany on the other hand, persuaded Hitler that the only way of intimidating the West into neutrality and Poland into submission and of preventing a Russo-British alliance, was to raise the threat of a Russo-German understanding. During the following months this tactic proved to be unsuccessful and by mid-July, Hitler, however unwillingly, became convinced that only the reality of a Russo-German alliance would suffice to drive the Western democracies into neutrality. It was mainly for this reason, that Hitler sought the pact with Russia. When war came and Western resistance was not paralyzed, the original reason for the Moscow Pact disappeared. However, the consequent Western belligerency made a continued policy of friendship with Russia necessary throughout the winter of 1939 to I940. The idea of an eventual attack on Russia had never been completely absent from Hitler's mind, but before the defeat of France in June, 1940, it had never been more than a vague notion. With the defeat of France, Hitler, assuming that Britain, too, would capitulate, briefly considered the idea of an attack on Russia as a strategic goal. When Britain continued to resist, Hitler, frustrated that he could not end the war and confident that he could vanquish Russia, convinced himself that Britain's attitude was based on hopes placed in Russia. Thus to destroy Britain's last remaining hopes on the continent, Hitler, in late July, decided upon an attack on Russia. During the following months the diplomatic, military, and economic preparations for the attack were completed, and with the attack on June 22, 1941, an era of Russo -German relations was ended. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

The analysis of the German foreign policy multilateralism and its transformation showed that each examined period evinces clear tendencies which meet three concepts of multilateralism outlined in the theoretical beginning of the thesis. Regardless of some fundamental changes in understanding of multilateralism and its new dimensions, it is not possible to speak about development towards any hegemonic or unilateral policy. What could have been seen in the last analyzed period, was an apparent preference for pragmatic and short-term foreign and security policy. During the nineties, Germany hesitantly normalized its international role by breaking some of the taboos typical of the past decades. Foreign and security policy, however, was still based on pacifist identity and values, which have been replicated for years. This tendency corresponds with the reflexivist approach to multilateralism. Following period witnessed the emancipation of Germany and its interests. The government was neither afraid to decline participation in the operation, which did not have UN approval, nor to end up in isolation. The relationship with the United States cooled down and Gerhard Schröder stressed instead the bilateral alliance with France. European integration was no longer an obligation, but rather became a voluntary...

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This thesis explores the political, economic and theoretical underpinnings of the German Democratic Republic’s (GDR’s) development policies towards the Third World between c.1960 and 1990. Particular attention is paid to Africa. Case studies of assistance to SWAPO and the ANC further focus the attention of the reader on southern Africa in particular. Aspects of both military and civilian aid are considered, including both development initiatives overseas in Africa, and development training for Africans within the GDR itself. Since German “reunification”, the GDR’s history has been explored largely from a West German perspective. The present work attempts to provide a more balanced view of successes and shortcomings of the GDR’s policies towards, and interaction with, African countries and liberation movements. It also aims to bring to the attention of English-speaking readers German archival sources, other primary sources and published works which they would otherwise have been unlikely to encounter. From its formation, the GDR made strenuous efforts to develop relations with countries which were either free from colonial dependency or were struggling for freedom. Over the course of thirty years, it followed a number of different approaches, and developed diverse objectives. These were shaped in the wider context of the cold war, the Hallstein doctrine (which established that the FRG – and, in effect, its allies - would not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognised the GDR), the relationships between the GDR and partner socialist states, and the economic difficulties faced by the GDR. Arising from this complex situation, from time to time, both internally in the GDR and in terms of its foreign affairs, tensions and discrepancies arose between theoretical objectives and political and economic reality. Despite these severe constraints, during the period under review, the volume and range of the GDR’s relationships with developing countries increased dramatically. For example, between 1970 and 1987, the number of developing countries with which the GDR had foreign economic relations on the basis of international agreements grew from 23 to 64. Viewed within its economic context, the state was arguably far more committed to development aid than the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition, there is a great deal of evidence that “solidarity” with developing nations and the oppressed enjoyed a considerable degree of popular support.