La position actuellement dominante parmi juristes et théoriciens de la Finance Islamique penchant vers l’interdiction des produits dérivés dans les Institutions Financières Islamiques, la recherche d’une alternative à ces produits, en particulier pour la gestion des risques de marché, constitue l’un des axes de recherche fondamentaux concernant l’avenir de cette école de pensée et de ce type d’institutions. Ainsi, ce travail de thèse s’intéresse d’abord à l’inférence des significations financières contemporaines possibles du concept islamique dit de « Gharar interdit » (litt. « risque interdit ») en l’opposant notamment à la prise de risque permise, puis, à partir des résultats correspondants, à l’exploration et proposition d’instruments alternatifs aux dérivés. Sur le premier aspect, cette recherche est partie du patrimoine du Fiqh (« jurisprudence ») islamique, et a mobilisé des outils qualitatifs et numériques d’analyse, tout en s’inspirant de la méthode de l’idéaltype de Max Weber. Sur le second, elle a mis en oeuvre une enquête combinant littérature et terrain, avant de faire passer les instruments obtenus par un filtre construit à partir des résultats du premier aspect. Ce travail a principalement permis de jeter une lumière nouvelle sur les théories de la prise de risque et du Gharar en Islam, de repérer et de discuter les zones d’ombre à l’origine des débats contemporains, de dresser un état des lieux de la recherche d’alternatives, d’identifier et de comprendre un phénomène nommé trappe à réplication, et surtout, de proposer une voie générale de sortie, utilisant la théorie islamique du besoin et de l’intérêt général, l’idée de partage du risque et celle d’alternative. / The currently prevailing position among Islamic Finance’s jurists and theorists being to prohibit derivative products in Islamic Financial Institutions, the search for an “Islamic” alternative to these products, in particular for market risks’ management, constitutes one of the fundamental axes of research concerning the future of this school and type of institutions. Thus, this doctoral work deals with the inference of the possible contemporary meanings of the Islamic concept called “prohibited Gharar” (litt. “prohibited risk”) while opposing it to the permissible risk-taking, then, based on the corresponding findings, it deals with the exploration and proposal of alternative instruments to derivatives. On the first aspect, this research used texts of Islamic Fiqh (“jurisprudence”), and mobilised qualitative and numerical tools of analysis, while drawing on Max Weber’s method of the idealtype. On the second, it implemented a survey combining literature and field study, before passing the obtained instruments through a filter constructed from the results of the first aspect. This work has mainly contributed to shed a new light on the theories of risk-taking and Gharar in Islam, to identify and discuss the shadow areas behind contemporary debates, to draw up an inventory of research on alternatives, to identify and understand a phenomenon called replication trap, and especially, to propose a general way out, using the Islamic theory of need and public interest, the idea of risk-sharing and that of alternative.

Nous étudions dans cette thèse le partage des risques financiers dans un système bancaire islamique, dans un cadre d'analyse construit autour de deux prescriptions du droit musulman : l'interdiction du Riba et du Gharar. Nous étudions d'abord les contrats de partage, en s'intéressant à leur rôle en tant qu'actif et à la répartition du risque qui en découle. Notre travail porte ensuite sur la dominance des contrats à marge bénéficiaire dans la pratique actuelle des institutions financières islamiques. Nous analysons également la structure de capital de la banque islamique, notamment le rôle des comptes d'investissement rémunérés qu'elle propose, qui lui apportent une flexibilité importante, tout en l'exposant à certains risques. Nous montrons que l'intervention d'un régulateur est cruciale pour que la banque islamique puisse bénéficier des avantages des comptes d'investissement, sur le plan de la solvabilité et la liquidité. / We analyze in this thesis the financial risk-sharing in an Islamic banking system. We build an analytical framework based on two provisions of Islamic law of contracts: the prohibition of Riba and Gharar. First, we analyze profit-sharing contracts, focusing on their role as an asset and their risk allocation. We also explain the dominance of mark-up contracts in the current practice of Islamic financial institutions. We then analyze the capital structure of Islamic banks, focusing on non-remunerated guaranteed accounts and their flexibility. We show the central place of the regulator in producing the necessaries conditions of good uses of these resources.

This research critically analyses and compares how the United Arab Emirates (UAE)1 Law and English and Welsh (EW) Law regulates obligations in a contract, for a thing that is to come into existence in the future, namely a construction contract. Uncertainty/speculation as to how an obligation is to be performed in UAE Law is termed gharar. The word that is synonymous with this terminology in EW Law is “risk”. The extent of gharar or ‘risk’ (these terms are used on an interchangeable basis in this thesis) in an obligation plays a fundamental role in the profitability of a construction contract. Where losses become unacceptable, particularly for the Contractor, a dispute will arise. These circumstances may be in conflict with UAE Law, which obligates parties to a contract to ensure circulation of wealth by maintaining the anticipated profit to be made from a contract. This analysis also reviews how the level of gharar or ‘risk’ can be increased by operation of two types of provision that are included in standard forms of construction contract such as the International Federation of Consulting Engineers, Geneva, Switzerland (FIDIC) Conditions of Contract for Construction for Building and Engineering Works Designed by the Employer 1st Ed. 1999 (FIDIC99). The first is a provision that releases the Employer from liability where the Contractor does not give timely notice of an Employer’s act of prevention. The second is a provision giving the Employer a discretion to act in an opportunistic manner, and exempt or limit his liability. It considers how FIDIC99 should be applied to control gharar or ‘risk’ in a positive way. It also identifies similarities between how UAE Law controls gharar and that of the notion of parties’ reasonable expectations in contract Law (herein referred to as parties’ expectations), and how relational contracts operate to ensure parties achieve their expectations.

Charles University in Prague Faculty of Law Abstract of the dissertation The title of the dissertation: Sharia Law, particularly Islamic banking, in relations with international elements Author: JUDr. Ivana Hrdličková Supervisor: Prof. JUDr. Monika Pauknerová, CSc., DSc. Prague, February 2012 Key words: Islamic finance, sharia, mudaraba, musharaka, murabaha, ijara, sharia compliant, international law, choice of law, contract, riba, gharar, maisir. The dissertation, Sharia law, particularly Islamic Banking in the relations with international elements, considers an actual topic and branch of islamic law. Neither islam nor islamic law is a legal system applicable at any particular territory. However, legislation of the countries with majority of muslim population, is based, more or less, on islamic law. Whereas due to migration and globalization, islamic law unavoidably interferes in international law. The legal regulation of international private law under the terms stipulated by the law leads to the use of foreign law. One can thus meet the legislation based on islamic law, including in the field of contract law. In commercial contracts, where the one side is from countries where islamic law is a source of legislation, may be the choice of law (in accordance with article 3 of Rome I), which form's the basis...