Thesis (M.A.)--Cincinnati Christian Seminary, 1986. / Abstract. "#031-0026." Thesis originally submitted to Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in 1986, and accepted, with minor changes, by Cincinnati Christian Seminary for their M.A. degree in 1986, according to Trinity's librarian 3/87. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 149-151).

Afhandling--Copenhagen. / "Fortegnelse overføort literatur": p. [389]-394.

Thesis (M.A.)--Indiana University, 2009. / Title from screen (viewed on August 26, 2009). Department of English, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI). Advisor(s): Jonathan Eller, John Rudy, Thomas Marvin. Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 67-68).

Podemos afirmar que o tratamento dado por Hume à relação entre a Divindade e o mal moral no final da seção 8 da Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano (EHU) tem seu desenvolvimento mais profundo e sofisticado nos Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural. Embora Hume também trate desse tópico na seção 11 da EHU, a ampla e profunda crítica feita às pretensões levantadas pelo argumento do desígnio nos Diálogos oferece um efetivo desdobramento da questão abordada por Hume em EHU 8. O abandono em EHU 8 de uma inquirição mais detalhada do problema acerca da relação entre o mal e a Divindade é compreensível. Com efeito, Hume pretendia ali, entre outras coisas, argumentar em favor de uma instância de destinação dos juízos de responsabilidade moral, a saber, o caráter. Daí ser aceitável a sua afirmação de que não é possível explicar precisamente como a Divindade pode ser a causa mediata de todas as ações dos homens sem ser a autora do pecado e da torpeza moral. Esses são mistérios que a simples razão natural e desassistida não está nem um pouco preparada para enfrentar, e seja qual for o sistema que ela adote, encontrar-se-á envolvida em inextrincáveis dificuldades (EHU 8 § 36). Certamente Hume não resolveu cabalmente essas dificuldades nos Diálogos, mas tentou enfrentá-las na medida em que uma razão desassistida, isto é, sem apoio em dogmas religiosos, pode fazê-lo. A partir desse aspecto da crítica de Hume empreendida nos Diálogos, minha intenção é examinar em que medida o argumento do desígnio se vê comprometido com o reconhecimento do mal no mundo. Para tanto, devo percorrer um longo caminho examinando as duas provas em favor da existência de Deus discutidas nos Diálogos. / It is stated that the treatment given by Hume to the relationship between God and moral evil at the end of section 8 of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (EHU) has its deeper and more sophisticated development in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Although Hume also treats this topic in section 11 of EHU, the wide and deep criticism regarding the assumptions raised by the design argument in Dialogues offers an effective development on the issue examined by Hume in EHU 8. The abandonment, in EHU 8, of a more detailed examination concerning the problem of the relationship between evil and divinity is understandable. Among other things, Hume intended to argue on that section in favour of an instance of destination to judgments of moral responsibility, namely, the character. Thus, it is acceptable his assertion that it is impossible to explain distinctly, how the Deity can be the mediate cause of all the actions of men without being the author of sin and moral turpitude. These are mysteries, which mere natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to handle; and whatever system she embraces, she must find herself involved in inextricable difficulties(8 EHU § 36). Hume certainly did not solve these difficulties in its totality in the Dialogues, but he tried to confront them to the extent that as \"unassisted reason\" can do so, that is, without the support of the religious dogma. From this aspect of Hume\'s criticism undertaken in the Dialogues, my intention is to examine in what extent the design argument is endangered by the recognition of evil in the world. Before that, I must walk a long path examining the two proofs of Gods existence discussed in the Dialogues.

Podemos afirmar que o tratamento dado por Hume à relação entre a Divindade e o mal moral no final da seção 8 da Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano (EHU) tem seu desenvolvimento mais profundo e sofisticado nos Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural. Embora Hume também trate desse tópico na seção 11 da EHU, a ampla e profunda crítica feita às pretensões levantadas pelo argumento do desígnio nos Diálogos oferece um efetivo desdobramento da questão abordada por Hume em EHU 8. O abandono em EHU 8 de uma inquirição mais detalhada do problema acerca da relação entre o mal e a Divindade é compreensível. Com efeito, Hume pretendia ali, entre outras coisas, argumentar em favor de uma instância de destinação dos juízos de responsabilidade moral, a saber, o caráter. Daí ser aceitável a sua afirmação de que não é possível explicar precisamente como a Divindade pode ser a causa mediata de todas as ações dos homens sem ser a autora do pecado e da torpeza moral. Esses são mistérios que a simples razão natural e desassistida não está nem um pouco preparada para enfrentar, e seja qual for o sistema que ela adote, encontrar-se-á envolvida em inextrincáveis dificuldades (EHU 8 § 36). Certamente Hume não resolveu cabalmente essas dificuldades nos Diálogos, mas tentou enfrentá-las na medida em que uma razão desassistida, isto é, sem apoio em dogmas religiosos, pode fazê-lo. A partir desse aspecto da crítica de Hume empreendida nos Diálogos, minha intenção é examinar em que medida o argumento do desígnio se vê comprometido com o reconhecimento do mal no mundo. Para tanto, devo percorrer um longo caminho examinando as duas provas em favor da existência de Deus discutidas nos Diálogos. / It is stated that the treatment given by Hume to the relationship between God and moral evil at the end of section 8 of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (EHU) has its deeper and more sophisticated development in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Although Hume also treats this topic in section 11 of EHU, the wide and deep criticism regarding the assumptions raised by the design argument in Dialogues offers an effective development on the issue examined by Hume in EHU 8. The abandonment, in EHU 8, of a more detailed examination concerning the problem of the relationship between evil and divinity is understandable. Among other things, Hume intended to argue on that section in favour of an instance of destination to judgments of moral responsibility, namely, the character. Thus, it is acceptable his assertion that it is impossible to explain distinctly, how the Deity can be the mediate cause of all the actions of men without being the author of sin and moral turpitude. These are mysteries, which mere natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to handle; and whatever system she embraces, she must find herself involved in inextricable difficulties(8 EHU § 36). Hume certainly did not solve these difficulties in its totality in the Dialogues, but he tried to confront them to the extent that as \"unassisted reason\" can do so, that is, without the support of the religious dogma. From this aspect of Hume\'s criticism undertaken in the Dialogues, my intention is to examine in what extent the design argument is endangered by the recognition of evil in the world. Before that, I must walk a long path examining the two proofs of Gods existence discussed in the Dialogues.

My dissertation gives the first analysis of misery in the thought of Aquinas and Teresa of Ávila, providing new insight into their ideas of happiness through means of contrast. I use the terms “misery” and “happiness” in a traditional sense to indicate life lived poorly or well, respectively, and I investigate these notions in Aquinas’ and Teresa’s principal texts, especially the Summa Theologiae and The Interior Castle. Both thinkers identify misery as a privation of God: a lack of the share in God’s goodness that one ought to have. Both see the escape from misery as a process of perfecting the soul’s faculties of intellect and will to unite one to God. For Aquinas, happiness is essentially an intellectual perfection: knowledge of God. Conversely, misery is an intellectual defect: lack of the knowledge of God that one ought to have. Moreover, Aquinas so analyzes “ought” that misery is a lack of what is naturally desired. Perfect happiness comes with the full understanding of God that one can only attain in heaven, but a middle ground exists between perfect happiness and misery. Even in this life, one can attain “imperfect happiness,” and the analysis of misery helps to clarify this obscure notion. The imperfectly happy have not acquired their consummate perfection, but understand as much about God as nature presently compels them to desire to know. A right will is both necessary and sufficient for escaping misery and obtaining happiness. The will depends on the intellect in such a way that it cannot desire correctly unless the intellect understands correctly. Moreover, sin colors one’s perception of reality, so that evil desire in the will causes error and ignorance in the intellect. Thus, one escapes misery if and only if one chooses to love God as one’s ultimate end. For Teresa, happiness is the union with God through knowledge and love for which the soul was made, and misery is the lack of this union. The soul escapes misery by developing a relationship with God in contemplative prayer, and Teresa illustrates happiness and misery through the titular metaphor of The Interior Castle. Notably, happiness requires that one’s union with God become perfectly secure, and I identify an intellectualist strain in Teresa that implies that the will cannot become perfectly committed to God unless the intellect can become perfectly firm in its certainty that God is the sole good. The quest for certainty is difficult, since like Descartes who will follow her, Teresa posits the existence of a deceiving demon with considerable influence over all the soul’s powers. Against that threat, Teresa claims to find certainty through mystical experience. God is Truth, containing and grounding all other truths. In the “spiritual marriage,” the soul sees God’s Triune nature as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, really three distinct persons yet one substance. The directness of this vision provides a certainty which no deception can overcome.