Univ., Diss.--Bayreuth, 2003.

No description available.

It is the objective of this comparative thesis to analyze how Canadian and German legislators have addressed the compromise between minority shareholder protection and flexibility in the regulation of going private transactions. The structure of this study follows the distinction between indirect and direct-methods that are available to a controlling shareholder who sets out to eliminate minority shareholder participations in order to become the exclusive shareholder of a corporation. In fact, both jurisdictions under consideration provide for a complex regime of corporate and securities law to govern going private transactions. The interplay of corporate and securities law produces a typical regulatory conflict between the goals of shareholders as opposed to investor protection on the one hand, and the purpose of a flexible corporate law regime and efficient capital markets regulation on the other hand. This comparative analysis evidences the respective advantages and disadvantages of the Canadian and German regimes and provides for regulatory prescriptions that result from the comparison.

Zugl.: Leipzig, Universiẗat, Diss., 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [502]-534) and index.

Using 1,473 going private transactions completed between 1985 and 2007, I assess whether the increase in going private transactions that occurred after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was driven by SOX, or whether this phenomenon continues an ongoing historical trend. To examine this issue, I initially used structural break tests and intervention analysis. From the initial techniques, I find support that the passage of SOX increased going private transactions for these categories. Secondarily, I use Granger causality tests and impulse response functions to examine the link between going private transactions and the public stock market. When I categorize going private transactions according to the type of acquirer, transaction size, and target industry, I find bi-directional Granger causality relationships between smaller-sized going private transactions and the S&P 500 Index (or Tobin's Q). I also find several unidirectional Granger causality relationships for some categories of going private transactions, based on the type of acquirer or the target industry, to the S&P 500 Index (or to Tobin's Q). The impulse response of going private transactions (or the public stock market) to a shock in the public stock market (or going private transactions) is not immediate, but is delayed two to three quarters. The link between going private transactions and the public stock market is an ongoing phenomenon, continuing a historical trend for going private transactions. For going private transactions with structural breaks, SOX affects the linkage but not for going private transactions with no structural break.

China's different economic environment, government infrastructure, and legal system might cause different management buyout procedures and results from management buyout procedures in the United States. Management buyout was originally created to increase efficiency and reduce agency cost in the United States in the 1960s; but management buyout in China is merely a tool to provide incentive programs for current management teams and reduce state-owned corporate shares.