Background: In 1994, the Swedish parliament decided to realize an infrastructural project with PPP. The chosen project, Arlandabaneprojektet, is a four-track railway between Stockholm central station and Arlanda airport. The Swedish government established a PPPcontract with a private consortium which implied that the Swedish government was obligated to finance about one third of the total project cost. The contract also implied that the private consortium got all rights reserved for the operational service. This PPP-project has changed the prerequisites for the Swedish government to meet the transport political objectives. Aim: The aim of this study is to examine how the Swedish government fulfil the transport political objectives in a PPP-project. The purpose of this study is also to examine how the structure of the project contract affect the governmental performance management. Completion: This is a qualitative study. The interview study is based on six interviews. Three interviewees are representing the government’s responsible delegates. The other three interviews were conducted with experts and researchers with extensive knowledge in the project. The interview material is complemented with a document study of reports and investigations. We have also completed a theoretical study of governmental performance management in infrastructural PPP-projects. Furthermore, we have analyzed the empirical study based on the theoretical framework. Conclusions: The government’s possibilities to pursue performance management in line with transport political objectives has been and still is limited. The government has been tied up to a long term contract driven by commercial goals. The main factor behind this is that the government got into the project without having any specific and measureable objectives.