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This thesis studies the step-by-step process of foreign policy making within the British Government from 1931 to 1939. It aims to pin-point the origin, evolution and nature of appeasement, the principal policy-makers' viewpoints and activities in policy formulating and their responsibility for encouraging the aggressive powers. In the Introduction, the subjective and objective roots of appeasement are explored, and the Author examines the reasons why it was pursued for nine years without change. Highlighting the shortcomings in the past and current research on the subject, a summary of the approaches used in the thesis is given. The First Chapter surveys policy-making during the Manchurian crisis of 1931, not only a starting point for appeasement, but also to a large extent the main reason for the European appeasement. The Second Chapter shows how the British Government appeased Mussolini in the Italo-Abyssinian conflict of 1935-36, and how appeasement in the Far East started to cause appeasement in Europe. Chapters Three, Four and Five indicate the development of appeasement policy towards Germany during 1936 - 1939, namely, how it was hatched during the Rhineland crisis of 1936, and how it was, through the Anschluss, brought to a climax at Munich in 1938. Chapter Six analyses the policy of the guarantee to Poland and of the Three Power conversations in 1939 with the observation that these represented the Chamberlain Government's efforts to change their policy within the scope of appeasement, but that appeasement led to their failure. In the Conclusion, the various arguments in favour of appeasement are criticised and lessons drawn from that disastrous age.

The problem of disarmament is the problem of the effective management of power within international society. Force cannot be eliminated as a factor in international relations, but it can be controlled. And a disarmament convention - an agreement to limit and perhaps reduce national armaments - can secure this control by stabilizing the configuration of world power. The obstacles to the negotiation of a disarmament convention are political rather than technical, and at the World Disarmament Conference of 1932-4, the major problem was the reconciliation of French and German claims. Germany, disarmed by the Peace Treaty of 1919, demanded "equality of rights" with other nations while France demanded additional security guarantees before she would agree to limit her arms. The reconciliation of French and German claims was in Britain's interest, because her security depended, in part at least, on a stable and peaceful Continent. Yet the British Government followed a policy that was not conducive to a reconciliation. British Ministers refused to offer France security guarantees to compensate for the inevitable increase in German power accompanying a grant of equality of rights and this refusal was the major factor leading to the breakdown of the Disarmament Conference in 1934. The main reason for the refusal was that British Ministers subscribed to the putative existence of an international "harmony of interests". They assumed that each state had a common interest in peace and that this common interest was compatible with the pursuit of the national interest, and they therefore hoped that international problems could be settled without recourse to force or threat of force. This was a delusion. Although professing a desire to achieve their objectives by peaceful means, "revisionist" states - including Germany - were not averse to using or threatening force if it would lead to the fulfilment of their national ambitions. "Harmony of interests" was a very self-serving doctrine. It permitted Britain to exert a large measure of influence on the Continent with very few commitments and at little cost, allowing the Government to concentrate on defending Britain's more immediate interests - the security of the Empire and the protection of her trade routes. Thus, the various disarmament schemes put forward by the Government at Geneva were based almost solely on Britain's immediate interests and made little attempt at trying to reconcile the interests of France and Germany – the main problem facing the Disarmament Conference. The British public came to believe in the premise of a "harmony of interests" and in consequence, despite its overwhelming majority in the Commons, the Government found it difficult - or chose to find it difficult – to deviate from its policy of "no commitments". Britain was even averse to mediating between France and Germany. Although the two Continental Powers looked to Britain for help in solving their problems, the British Government refused to play the role of "honest broker" - except when the role was inescapable — and thus failed to take advantage of many excellent opportunities for concluding a Franco-German settlement. By adopting a policy which offered short-term advantages but little hope of a long-term settlement of European problems, Britain was instrumental in causing the failure of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. This study is based on the records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments and the published diplomatic documents of Britain, France, Germany, America, and Belgium. Memoir sources, in general, were unhelpful, but did provide some useful information, as did a few unpublished documents from the Public Record Office, London provided by Dr. F. Marzari. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

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This thesis seeks to examine and analyze British interests in the Iraqi province of Mosul during World War I. The province was significant from many different points of view, diplomatic, strategic, and economic. Most scholars have tended to focus on one of these aspects and neglect the larger picture; this study will attempt to fill in the gap by discussing all of these aspects in their proper context. / text