This thesis attempts to give an account of how Whitehall planned Britain's withdrawal from extra-European commitments in the years 1959-1968, demonstrating that foreign policy development was essentially a cross-departmental process, involving a synthesis of views articulated by the Treasury, Board of Trade, Ministry of Defence, Colonial Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, as well as the Foreign Office. More specifically, the thesis is concerned with the direct effects of the interplay of different departmental policies on British retrenchment from Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East. Most accounts of how ministers and officials approached the subject of withdrawal from international commitments lack any substantive analysis of documentary evidence, a fact attributable to the 'thirty-year rule'. Many academic works also contain a reference to 'delusions of grandeur' as the main explanation as to why Whitehall guided a tentative course in extracting Britain from its remaining overseas obligations. By examining Whitehall's attempts to review future policy, usually on an inter-departmental basis, this thesis questions the commonly held assumption that an outdated imperial sentiment permeated the political establishment until economic reality, namely the devaluation of sterling in November 1967, forced Britain to confront the fragility of its position. Developing and expanding upon previous scholarship, this thesis makes a contribution to historical knowledge by providing the first sustained and unified study of how the highest echelons of Whitehall framed Britain's long-term strategic aims in the late 1950s and 1960s. This thesis is a contribution to administrative, diplomatic and military history, and provokes a number of questions. To what extent, for example, did economic considerations inform the decisions of leading policy-makers? Did a misjudgment over the strength of British 'power' lead to the pursuit of inappropriate foreign policy objectives? How was foreign policy affected by defence policy? What influence did the Treasury exert over high foreign policy? Did the influence of civil servants vary according to policy issues and the personalities involved? In what ways did the views of the departments responsible for economic matters differ from those in charge of defence policy on the priority attached to military expenditure? To what extent did the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence disagree on matters regarding Britain's overseas commitments and possessions? In answering such questions, this thesis casts new light on how Whitehall, between 1959 and 1968, reduced the scope of Britain's international commitments, redirecting the central thrust of British foreign policy away from extra-European commitments towards Europe.

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The aim of the thesis is to analyze Britain's Mediterranean strategy and his relationship to the acquisition of the Dodecanese islands to Greece. Chapter I of this study includes a historical background of the islands prior to the Second World War. Chapter II examines British policy toward Greece and the Dodecanese between 1923-43. Chapter III provides an analysis of the role of the Dodecanese within British policy and military operations in the eastern Mediterranean. The last section deals with the actual restoration of the Dodecanese islands to Greece.

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This doctoral dissertation focuses on the significant activities of Sir Norman Angell during the years 1935 through 1940. During this period, Angell consistently attacked Britain's policy of appeasement toward the fascist powers. Drawing upon the Angell Papers housed at Bail State University, the study attempts to chronicle the efforts of Angell to persuade both the British Government and public to-reject appeasement and support a policy which advocated resisting aggression conducted by the fascist powers.As a significant advocate of the League of Nations and collective security, Angell was an early and extremely perceptive critic of fascism. He argued for stern resistance to Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931, and warned the British public of the potential threat to peace emanating from the rise of fascism in Germany. When Mussolini moved to aggrandize Italy by conquering powerless Abyssinia, Angell urged the British Government to support League of Nations sanctions directed against Italy. Using his skills as a lecturer and writer, Angell cautioned that failure to resist Italian aggression in Abyssinia would mortally wound the League of Nations and cripple the concept of collective security.As Angell continued to analyze the development of British appeasement and the demise of collective security, he began to perceive a pattern which showed that failure to resist aggression in the past had led directly to further aggression. Dismayed by the obvious impotence of the League of Nations in its feeble responses to the Italo-Abyssinian War, the Rhineland Crisis, and the Spanish Civil War, Angell moved inexorably toward adherence to a traditional balance-of-power concept. Although membership was theoretically open to the fascist powers, Angell envisioned an anti-fascist alliance of Britain, France and the Soviet Union. In Angell's opinion, this alliance would serve as the primary instrument for defense of the British Empire. Defense of the British Empire was important, according to Angell, because it actually served as an embryonic League of Nations. To those Conservative critics who opposed an alliance with the Soviet Union, Angell responded with the prophetic warning that Britain's rejection of the Soviet Union might lead to an alliance between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.As Angell began to manifest an increasing concern for the defense of the British Empire, he frequently associated with other individuals who held the same concern. Although ostensibly a Labourite, Angell was willing to cooperate with individuals of diverse political persuasions in order to reverse the British policy of appeasement. Indeed, he actively participated in an organization which served as a platform for Winston Churchill's attack on appeasement. In addition, in spite of opposition from the leadership of the Labour Party, Angell flirted with the possibility of actually becoming a Popular Front candidate for Parliament. After the Munich appeasement and the start of World War II, Angell was firmly convinced that his efforts to oppose appeasement had been justified.It is not possible to determine conclusively the impact of Angell's efforts on the thinking of the British Government and public. Yet, it must be assumed that the sheer volume of Angell's writings, lectures and organizational activity must have contributed to the popularly held belief that appeasement had encouraged further aggressive demands by the Axis powers which precipitated World War II.

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At the beginning of the present century, Anglo-Russian rivalry was perhaps the most important factor in the international situation of the day. At that time it seemed sound doctrine to believe that Britain and Russia were bound to remain implacable enemies for an indefinite period of time. Nevertheless, seven years after the century had begun, these two apparently irreconcilable rivals had reached an agreement, which, if not cordial, was none the less real, and which relegated their well-night century-old rivalry to the realms of history. The animosity which was characteristic of Anglo-Russian relations throughout this period had its origins in the Near East during the last part of the eighteenth century, as a result of Russian efforts to obtain control of the Straits of Bosphorous and of the Dardanelles from the Ottoman Turk. However, the rise of revolutionary France put an end temporarily to this newly-born rivalry, and forced the two countries into a partnership to meet a nation who was a vital threat to both, with the defeat of Napoleon, though, this partnership dissolved and the rivalry appeared in a more intense form than before. Throughout the nineteenth century it spread successively from the Near East to Central Asia, and finally to the Far East. However, shortly after the coming of the twentieth century, both countries discovered they had a common rival in Imperial Germany, whose growing power now made her the leading European power on the continent. As in the case of revolutionary France, the two countries resolved to forego their rivalry in order to meet a common peril. Hence the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, From the British side, the material for the study of Anglo-Russian relations throughout this period is on the whole adequate. The original British Documents for the years 1878 - I897 are not available, but those for the years 1898 - 1907 are contained in the general collection "British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898, - 1914". There is also much material available in the memoirs and biographies of the leading British statesmen. On the Russian side, however, there is much to be desired. A certain number of official documents have been published in a spasmodic and desultory manner in the "Krasny Archiv", but much which is pertinent has been withheld. Only a few documents are available in English translation. The memoirs of émigré Russian diplomats, while available in so far as they go, suffer from the fact that they were composed in exile, with little else save memory to serve as a guide. As a result, there is much on the Russian side which is, and likely will remain unknown. Nevertheless, there is enough Russian material extant which, taken in conjunction with the British material available, is sufficient to enable the determining of the course followed by Anglo- Russian relations with a reasonable degree of certainty. In summing up, it should be emphasized that Anglo-Russian rivalry flourished most vigorously when neither country was menaced by a strong European power. When a strong power emerged which threatened to dominate the continent of Europe, this rivalry temporarily ceased. Since both Great Britain and Russia had developed immense empires in Asia in close proximity the one to the other, it was perhaps only natural that they should be serious rivals. Nevertheless, they both remained powers whose major interests lay in Europe. Here, in Europe, if the Near East be excluded, the vital interests of the two countries did not conflict. Both countries were interested in maintaining the status quo in Europe, as they clearly recognized that a Europe organized under the hegemony of another single power was a mortal threat to both. It can therefore be said that both Great Britain and Imperial Russia considered the maintenance of the European balance of power as essential to their long-term interests, and were prepared to forego their mutual rivalry to maintain it. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

The availability of new document sources in Britain and Brazil has made it possible to examine this crucial period in the development of relations between the two countries. After exerting considerable economic and political influence in Brazil during the nineteenth century, British supremacy began to be challenged by German and American interests. At the same time, the Brazilian economy was undergoing fundamental changes brought about by the collapse of rubber and coffee and the development of diversified industrial activity. The main effect of this process was to reduce Brazilian dependence on British capital and imports, and to foster her own growth as an international unit of some importance. British opinions regarding the state of Brazil during this period were generally pessimistic, and ran counter to the accepted view that she was passing through a phase of progress and prosperity. British diplomatic sources, not always well-informed, saw little hope for the country, and these thoughts were echoed by several leading Brazilian intellectuals. The British Minister in Rio de Janeiro, Sir William Haggard, was totally unconvinced about Brazil's future prospects, and was unsuccessful in developing fruitful relations with his counterparts. The policies of the Barão do Rio Branco brought Brazil closer to expanding American interests. The First World War was important in that it witnessed the eclipse of Germany from the international scene and produced a marked improvement in Anglo-Brazilian relations. The British Minister, Sir Arthur Peel, was more successful than his predecessor in his official dealings, and the common interests of the War established closer ties between the two countries. By the end of the War, however, Brazil had emerged as a prominent factor in the affairs of the hemisphere, and her own national and international development signalled the end of Anglo-Brazilian relations as they had existed before the turn of the century. / Arts, Faculty of / French, Hispanic, and Italian Studies, Department of / Graduate