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When research was begun on this thesis, the object was to evaluate the British estimates of German military strength and intentions and then to determine the effect of these estimates on British policy. This has proved impossible largely because of the length of time that would be required to complete the study. As a result, the thesis has been strictly limited to an evaluation of British estimates of German military strength and intentions. Wherever possible, the estimates made by Government officials have been compared and contrasted with those made in Parliament and in the British press. [...]

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In September, 1911, Italy declared war on Turkey and proceeded to the conquest of the vilayet of Tripoli, a North African province of the Ottoman Empire. This thesis will attempt to determine the effect of this war upon British policy during the critical period just prior to the First Great War.

This thesis examines the attempts made by Carl Goerdeler, Ludwig Beck, Ernst von Weizsacker and Adam von Trott zu Solz to obtain the support of the British government in their effort to overthrow the Nazi regime between 1937 and 1940. The circumstances surrounding each mission are detailed, including the degree of readiness on the part of the German opposition for a coup d'etat and the particular form of support sought from the British to increase the chance of success in each case. Consideration is given to the factors which conditioned the British reaction to the resistance emissaries, including the British foreign policy imperatives of the moment, important events in European relations and the attitude and degree of influence wielded by the statesmen to whom the German resistance emissaries addressed themselves.

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From 1938 to the outbreak of war in 1939, German opponents of Hitler made numerous contacts with the British government. While the information sent came from a variety of sources, most of the reports landed on the desk of Sir Robert Vansittart, the former Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office. His "internal-exile" to the position of Chief Diplomatic Advisor, as well as his personality conflicts with his successor, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Lord Halifax, led to inefficient use of the information received from Germany. German warnings of Hitler's plans and ambitions, when listened to at all, were awkwardly and ineffectively incorporated into British foreign policy.