Thesis (M.A.)--Carleton University, 1992. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Political Science, August 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A. in history)--Washington State University, August 2009. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on Sept. 17, 2009). "Department of History." Includes bibliographical references (p. 179-181).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 290-308).

This thesis focuses on analyzing the phenomenon of isolationism by testing the IR theories. The research examines the four historical cases of Ming and Qing Imperial China, Tokugawa's Japan, Great Britain under the Gladstone and Disraeli's stewardship, and finally, the U.S. behavior throughout the 1930s. The study distinguishes between the whole and limited isolationism, arguing that it is impossible to pursue complete isolationism due to globalization, interdependence, domestic constraints, and other factors. Furthermore, by explaining the phenomenon, neoclassical realism appears to best grasp the full image. Finally, by comparing the cases of American state behavior in the 1930s and under Donald Trump's presidency, the paper argues that the latter's policy should not be considered isolationist.

Thesis advisor: Robert Ross / Great powers use alliances to amass capabilities. As such, alliance balancing strategies are important part of a balance-of-power system. In order to seek security, great powers frequently employ alliance balancing strategies, which can take two forms: to divide hostile alliances or prevent those from forming (i.e. wedge strategies), and to bind their own allies (i.e. binding strategies). When choosing these strategies, great powers face two options: accommodation and coercion. This dissertation explores the question of how great powers choose between these two options. I argue that a great power chooses its wedge strategies based on two factors: its leverage over its target and the degree of security cooperation between its target and its adversary. When the great power’s leverage is strong, it will opt for accommodative wedge strategies, despite the degree of security cooperation between its target and its adversary. Meanwhile the great power is likely to use coercive wedge strategies as its complementary strategy. When the great power’s leverage is weak, it will evaluate the degree of security cooperation between its target and its adversary. When such cooperation is at a high level, the great power will choose coercive wedge strategies as its primary strategy and accommodative ones as its complementary strategy. In contrast, a great power’s choice of its binding strategies is determined by its leverage over its target and its fear of being abandoned by its target. When its leverage is strong, the great power will choose coercive binding strategies as its primary strategy and accommodative ones as its complementary strategy, despite the fear of abandonment. When its leverage is low, the great power will assess its fear of abandonment. Strong fear of abandonment will lead the great power to choose accommodative binding strategies as its primary strategy and coercive ones as its complementary strategy. I test this theory using qualitative cases studies of China’s choices of its alliance balancing strategies. These cases include variation in China’s strategic choices that allows me to test the explanatory power of my theory. I examine these cases drawing on archives, government documents, newspapers, and secondary materials from China and the United States. I conclude this dissertation with a summary of my findings and a discussion on implications and future research avenues. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

No description available.

This dissertation examines the emergence of revisionism in the foreign policies of the great powers: it is concerned with the rise of 'challenger' states. Current approaches to the rise of challengers (arguments from 'structure', 'prudence', and 'historical sociology') are if generally useful also incomplete, leaving the emergence of several great power challengers not fully explained. This dissertation offers a new explanation, not as a replacement but as a complement to these theories, and in doing so accomplishes two tasks: first, it explains cases previously unaccounted-for; and second, it does so in a fashion that acknowledges the co-determination of domestic and international politics. The new model suggests that the seeds of challenges to international orders are often found in the wartime experience itself, in social pacts between elites and societal groups struck to achieve mobilization requirements. Violation of these pacts in the postwar period can in turn generate powerful political movements for the overthrow of both the domestic and international postwar orders. The explanation offered by this model is then applied to five cases of great power behaviour after major wars. While imperfect in its ability to account for great power behaviour in all these cases and thus requiring refinement, the model obtains sufficient support to warrant further exploration of these and other cases in future studies.

No description available.

Despite a comprehensive research of South Africa’s power status, the available literature does not provide a satisfactory explanation of whether South Africa is an emerging power or not. Countries in the Global South with a vigorous economic growth are often offhandedly assigned an emerging power status. Since power is built on more than economics, more specific indicators of how to measure South Africa’s power status need to be applied, in order to draw legitimate conclusions about whether it is an emerging power or not, which this study aims to do. When South Africa’s power status is identified, the observance of changes in international power distribution and understanding of powerful states’ influence on the international arena may increase. It may also be easier to predict how their power statuses can favour or disfavour other countries. This investigation is conducted through a qualitative text analysis and a single case study with a deductive approach. South Africa’s power status is analysed through the glasses of the analytical framework of Sven Biscop and Thomas Renard’s “seven dimensions of power”. The findings suggest that South Africa is an emerging power, since the country succeeds in five out of seven dimensions of power, and partly succeeds in two dimensions, but has also made a great progress in most power dimensions.