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This thesis builds on, and contributes to recent scholarship on the history of nineteenth‐century liberalism by exploring Greek legal thought and its political implications during the first decades after independence from the Ottomans (ca.1830‐1880). Protagonists of this work of intellectual history are the Greek jurists—a small group of very influential legal scholars—most of whom flocked to the Greek kingdom right after its establishment. By focusing on their theoretical contributions and public action, the thesis has two major contentions. First, it shows that the legal, political and economic thought of the jurists was not only conversant with Continental liberal currents of the Restoration, but, due to the particular local context, made original contributions to liberalism. Indeed, Greek liberals shared a lot with their counterparts in France, Italy and Germany, not least the belief that liberty originated in law and the state and not against them. Another shared feature was the distinction between the elitist liberal variant of the ‘Romanist’ civil lawyers such as Pavlos Kalligas, and the more ‘radical moderate’ version of Ioannis Soutsos and Nikolaos Saripolos. At the same time, the Greek liberals, seeking not to terminate but to institutionalize the Greek revolution, tuned to the radical language of natural rights (of persons and states) and national sovereignty. This language, which sought to control the rulers, put more contestation in power and expand political participation gained wide currency during the crisis of the 1850s, which exposed also the precarious place of Greece in the geography of European civilization. The second contention of the thesis is that this ‘transformation of thought’, informed the ‘long revolution’ of the 1860s and the new system of power this latter established. By so doing, it shows that liberal jurisprudence provided the intellectual foundations upon which the modern Greek state was build.

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Department of Classics. Bibliography: leaves 330-355.

The economic development of Greece and Rome hinged directly on the ability of commercial vessels to transport large volumes of goods across the Mediterranean and Black Sea. Archaeology has revealed the sizes, construction methods and cargos of these ships, but the navigational techniques that were employed to direct them from port to port remain unclear and elusive. In ancient literature, the oft-repeated themes of storm, shipwreck and death at sea led to the popular assumption among scholars that seafarers developed habits to minimize their exposure to this hostile element--hugging the shore to avoid the open sea, putting in at night, sailing only in summer, and using 'seafaring manuals' to help guide their way. While several recent studies have made some strides in overturning this overly simplistic view by highlighting aspects of navigation in certain areas and in certain periods, the 'standard model' lingers in both scholarly and popular imagination. This study offers a comprehensive review of the scattered textual and archaeological evidence pertaining to ancient seafaring and navigation, and a major reinterpretation of ancient commercial navigation in both periods. Chapters 2-3 explore the parameters of the maritime environment (coasts, winds, currents and visibility) and the human responses to them in the form of ships, seasonal rhythms and maritime corridors. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the ways in which Greek and Roman sailing masters accounted for the fundamental requirements of navigation--the determination of direction, position, speed and distance--using wind roses as a 'compass' and various stars and star groups at night. Chapter 6 treats the question of whether seafarers used written guides or experience, or both, to help determine their position. Chapter 7 explores the historical figure of the sailing master himself and integrates a wide range of evidence to reconstruct the navigational routines of the crews of Alexandrian grain ships during the Roman imperial era. My research concludes that both coastal and open-sea sailing were matters of routine in the commercial sector, that commercial seafarers did indeed sail at night and employ the stars to deduce navigational information, that winter sailing was a widespread practice, and that crews employed navigational strategies to weather storms, usually successfully. / text

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The purpose of this study was to examine the primary reasons for the refusal of the United States to grant diplomatic recognition to the revolutionary government in Greece between 1821-1833. The generally accepted reason has been the Monroe Doctrine. This policy statement by James Monroe in 1823 seemed to preclude any form of diplomatic recognition of the provisional government in Greece by the United States because the Greek Revolution was a European affair. If the American government were to prevent intervention in the Western Hemisphere by the European powers, then certainly the United States should not interfere in an area of primary concern to the Holy Alliance.President Monroe's words in his annual message to Congress were a statement of existing American policy and the principles should not be ignored entirely. However, it is the thesis of this paper that the desire for a commercial treaty with the Ottoman Empire was more significant in the development of American policy toward the Greek War of Independence. The expansion of American trade and commerce were goals of a government that practiced commercial diplomacy. The government of the United States sought in this particular case more trade in the Eastern Mediterranean and the right to navigate the waters of the Black Sea. A treaty with the Ottoman Empire was the key to this goal.To prove this thesis it was necessary to demonstrate that the menace from European powers, or the Holy Alliance, was minimal because those powers were too divided to pose a credible deterrent to American diplomatic recognition of Greece. Chapter one is devoted to a discussion of the European diplomatic situation with particular emphasis on the collapse of the Congress System and the "Eastern Question". Both bore direct bearing on American decisions concerning the Greek Revolution.The next chapter attempts to demonstrate that the United States had direct and serious involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since 1794 the United States had sought commercial advantages in the Levant, indeed, part of America's colonial legacy had been involvement in the Mediterranean trade. In addition to commerce, missionary activity, scholarly concern, and America's democratic heritage drew Americans to the Levant. By the time of the Greek Revolution the United States had bountiful interests in the Ottoman Empire. There were expectations of further advances in many quarters.The United States' response to the Greek Revolution between 1821-1833 is the subject of chapter three. America was divided between the philhellenes who advocated aid and recognition for Greece and those who did not wish to antagonize the Ottoman Empire and thereby lose commercial advantages in the Levant. This was the central issue in the debates on the Greek Question in the eighteenth Congress. Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, led the fight against the philhellene position so as not to jeopardize his secret attempts to secure a commercial treaty with the Ottoman Empire.The negotiations between representatives of the United States and Turkey, conducted in secret throughout the Greek Revolution, is the subject of chapter four. Only after the conclusion of the American-Turkish Treaty of Commerce did the United States grant diplomatic recognition to an already independent Greek nation. A commercial treaty with Turkey, a dying empire, in order to foster the expansion of American trade was the crucial determinant of American policy toward the Greek War of Independence.

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