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Nathanael Greene spent the first five years of the American Revolution serving as a line and field officer in the Continental Army and developed a nuanced revolutionary strategy based on preserving the Continental Army and a belief that all forces should be long-service national troops. He carried these views with him to his command in the southern theater but developed a partisan approach due to problems he faced in the region. Greene effectively kept his army supplied to such an extent that it remained in the field to oppose the British with very little outside assistance. He reluctantly utilized a partisan strategy while simultaneously arguing for the creation of a permanent Continental force for the region.

Nathan Greene is the Revolutionary Warfare general most associated with unconventional warfare. The historiography of the southern campaign of the revolution uniformly agrees he was a guerrilla leader. Best evidence shows, however, that Nathanael Greene was completely conventional -- that his strategy, operations, tactics, and logistics all strongly resembled that of Washington in the northern theater and of the British commanders against whom he fought in the south. By establishing that Greene was within the mainstream of eighteenth-century military science this dissertation also challenges the prevailing historiography of the American Revolution in general, especially its military aspects. The historiography overwhelmingly argues the myth of the valiant few -- the notion that a minority of colonists persuaded an apathetic majority to follow them in overthrowing the royal government, eking out an improbable victory. Broad and thorough research indicates the Patriot faction in the American Revolution was a clear majority not only throughout the colonies but in each individual colony. Far from the miraculous victory current historiography postulates, American independence was based on the most prosaic of principles -- manpower advantage.