Thesis (Ph.D.)--Bowling Green State University, 2007. / Document formatted into pages; contains xiv, 346 p. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Bowling Green State University, 2006. / Document formatted into pages; contains v, 45 p. Includes bibliographical references.

The aim of this study is to place a wide variety of two-phenotype frequency-dependent selection models into a unified population-genetic framework. This work is used to illuminate the possible genetic constraints that may exist in such models, and to address the question of evolutionary modification of these constraints. The first part of Chapter 1 synthesizes from the literature a general framework for applying a genetic structure to a simple class of two-phenotype models. It shows that genetic constraints may prevent the population from achieving a predicted phenotypic equilibrium, but the population will equilibrate at a point that is as close as possible to the phenotypic equilibrium. The second part of Chapter 1 goes on to ask whether evolutionary modification of the genetic system might be expected to remove these constraints. Chapter 2 provides an example of the application of the framework developed in Chapter 1. It presents re-analysis of a model for the evolution of social behavior by reciprocation (Brown et al. 1982). The genetic results of Chapter 1 apply to this model without modification. I show that Brown et al. were unnecessarily restrictive in their assumptions about the types of genetic systems that support their conclusions. Chapter 3 discusses some models for the evolution of altruism that do not fit the assumptions of Chapter 1, despite their two-phenotype structure. These models violate the fundamental assumption of Chapter 1, this being the way in which individual fitness is derived from the behavioral fitnesses. The first part is a complete, in-depth analysis of diploid sib-sib kin selection. I show that some results from the basic model can be used, provided the behavioral inclusive fitness functions are substituted for the true behavioral fitnesses. The second part is an analysis of the validity of the concept of behavioral structure, as introduced by Michod and Sanderson (1985). I show that this concept is flawed as a general principle. Chapter 4 extends the basic model to the case of sex-allocation evolution. I show how many of the central results of sex-allocation theory can be derived more simply using a two-phenotype framework.

A critical examination of Popper’s falsificationism as a methodological criterion of demarcation led to the development o f a supplementary means of distinguishing science from pseudo- science The discipline is made the unit of appraisal and its pattern o f historical development b used as the indicator of demarcation. Results of a test of this indicator against astrology and physical optics accord with our basic judgm ents of these disciplines. The indicator effectively reveals that scientific creationism is pseudo-science, and that evolutionary biology is genuine science. Three fundam ental approaches to scientific investigation, viz. v erificationism , falsificationism and m ulti-cornered testing (M CT) are contrasted. MCT is distinguished by competition between hypotheses, which makes it more informative than at least the naive versions of the other two approaches. While competition does not produce immediate victors, it does make demands on theories, which can be augmented by prescribing a series of independent tests. The comparative method implies the existence of two types of evidence. Common evidence is that which io predicted or explained by two or more rival hypotheses. Discriminatory evidence favours one rival over the others. It is argued that in both the fields of species biology and speciation there have been instances o f over-relying on common evidence, o f indistinctly defining alternative hypotheses, of ro t following their logical consequences and of not using exisiing discriminatory evidence to adjudicate between these hypotheses. Species concepts and definitions of modes o f speciation are evaluated. Normative principles are suggested for defining species and other important terms in evolutionary biology, and for testing species concepts and modes of speciation. The advantages and limitations o f a historical indicator of demarcation and the merits and principles of the comparative approach to method are discussed and illustrated using the analoev of a mathematical game. Scientific crcanomsni is shown to have a coating of scientific method, but to have systematically violated fundamental methodological principles. D arn in ’* method in contrast, had a comparative structure, and distinguished between common *nd discriminatory evidence. While there are methodological problems sn evolutionary biology, these are shown to be minor in comparison to that four*! in to c n o fk ciratxxiiun.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1993. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [134]-148).