This study basically analyzes timing, sequencing and pace of the financial liberalization experience of the Turkish economy in the 1980s and evaluates its implications for the crises in the Turkish economy since the 1990s. The objectives of this study are threefold: Firstly, it aims to reveal the main policy objectives and political factors pushing the government to take capital account liberalization decision in 1989. It is concluded that domestic decision makers have shaped and taken the decision of capital account liberalization in 1989, while the interaction of economic and political factors has played a major role in its timing. Secondly, it examines the extent to which economic and political institutional weaknesses in the Turkish economy, which generated inappropriate sequencing of financial liberalization policies in the 1980s, can be held responsible for the crises of 2000 and 2001 crises. It is concluded that financial liberalization policies were inappropriately sequenced, as domestic financial market and capital account liberalization were not accompanied or preceded by macroeconomic stability and financial sector institutional reforms such as prudential regulation and supervision of the banking sector. These factors have been instrumental in the crises episodes in Turkey through contributing to an environment conducive to crises. Thirdly, it aims to analyze whether there exists a clear association between weaknesses in the regulation and supervision of the banking sector and banking crises through an empirical analysis. It is concluded that the nature of the banking crises is more associated with the institutional structure of the financial system rather than macroeconomic conditions of the economy.