This dissertation argues that the Aristotelianism of Alasdair MacIntyre is more cogent than the prescriptive realism of John Hare. Chapter 1 introduces the relationship between moral philosophy and apologetics and presents the thesis of the dissertation. Chapter 2 surveys the Aristotelian elements of MacIntyre’s moral philosophy and provides an argument that these aspects of MacIntyre’s philosophy provide his Aristotelianism with significant explanatory scope. Chapter 3 continues an analysis of MacIntyre’s philosophy. The argument of this chapter is that the Thomist elements of MacIntyre’s philosophy further the explanatory scope of his Aristotelianism. The chapter concludes with a response to two major objections. Chapter 4 presents the moral philosophy of John Hare and argues that three areas that appear to provide explanatory scope do not. Chapter 5 summarizes the Kantian elements of John Hare’s moral philosophy. The argument of chapter 6 is that the primary argument of MacIntyre’s moral philosophy is sounder than the primary argument of John Hare’s moral philosophy. Chapter 7 provides the conclusion of the dissertation and explores the implications of MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism for Christian apologetics.