Zugl.: Wuppertal, Univ., Diss., 2006

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Fachbereich Evangelische Theologie--Marburg an der Lahn--Philipps-Universität, 1993.

Thesis (M. A.), Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1998. / Bibliography: leaves 187-191.

Originally presented as the author's thesis, Munich. / Bibliography: p. [183]-187.

Diss.--Universität Freiburg, 1995. / Bibliogr. p. 380-395. Index.

Leung Ka-wing. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 198-211). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / INTRODUCTION --- p.3 / Chapter CHAPTER ONE --- THE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR THE REFORMULATION OF PHILOSOPHY: THE RELATION OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY --- p.8 / Chapter §1.1 --- Philosophy and Science in Ancient Greek --- p.9 / Chapter §1.2 --- Christian Theology and the First Philosophy --- p.15 / Chapter §1.3 --- Hegel's Formulation of Philosophy --- p.18 / Chapter §1.4 --- The Estrangement of Philosophy and Science --- p.21 / Chapter §1.5 --- Reformulation of Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century --- p.24 / Chapter 1.5.1 --- Positivism --- p.26 / Chapter 1.5.2 --- Neo-Kantianism --- p.31 / Chapter 1.5.3 --- Phenomenology --- p.35 / Chapter CHAPTER TWO --- PHILOSOPHY AS PRIMAL SCIENCE --- p.43 / Chapter §2.1 --- Remark on the Division of Heidegger's Periods of Thinking --- p.44 / Chapter §2.2 --- The Background of the Kreigsnotsemester --- p.50 / Chapter §2.3 --- Philosophy and Worldviews --- p.54 / Chapter §2.4 --- Philosophy and Particular Sciences --- p.59 / Chapter §2.5 --- "The “Knowledge of Objects"" as the Subject-matter of Philosophy" --- p.63 / Chapter §2.6 --- The Problematic of Axioms --- p.65 / Chapter §2.7 --- The Teleological´ؤcritical Method of the Southwest German School of the Neo-Kantianism --- p.68 / Chapter §2.8 --- A New Approach to the Psychical --- p.71 / Chapter §2.9 --- The Problematic of Lived´ؤexperience --- p.78 / Chapter §2.10 --- The Method for the Science of Lived´ؤexperiencein general --- p.83 / Chapter CHAPTER THREE --- FROM LIFE TO BEING: THE ELEVATION OF THE BEING´ؤQUESTION TO THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF PHILOSOPHY --- p.92 / Chapter §3.1 --- Heidegger's First Confrontation with the Being- question --- p.94 / Chapter §3.2 --- Life and Philosophy --- p.98 / Chapter §3.3 --- The Incompatibility of Life and Science --- p.103 / Chapter §3.4 --- "The Venture of ""Destruction""" --- p.108 / Chapter §3.5 --- "“The Being of the Factical Life"" as the Problematic of Philosophy" --- p.114 / Chapter §3.6 --- The Problematic of Time --- p.126 / Chapter CHAPTER FOUR --- BEING´ؤUNDERSTANDING AND TEMPORALITY: THE FORMULATION OF PHILOSOPHY IN SEIN UND ZEIT --- p.133 / Chapter §4.1 --- Philosophy as Ontology --- p.133 / Chapter §4.2 --- The Priority of Human Dasein in the Being- question --- p.139 / Chapter §4.3 --- The Transformation of the Being´ؤquestion --- p.147 / Chapter §4.4 --- The Being-constitution of Dasein --- p.155 / Chapter §4. 5 --- The Problematic of Temporality --- p.165 / Chapter §4.6 --- The Structure of Understanding and the Horizonal Schema of the Ecstase of Zeitlichkeit --- p.168 / Chapter §4.7 --- The Failure of the Program of Sein und Zeit --- p.clxxxi / CONCLUDING REMARKS --- p.185 / Chapter I. --- On Existence --- p.cxci / Chapter II. --- on Understanding --- p.192 / Chapter III. --- on Historicality --- p.195 / BIBIOGRAPHY --- p.198 / Chapter I. --- Works by Heidegger and corresponding English translations --- p.198 / Chapter II. --- Other references: --- p.202

The argument of this thesis is that Heideggerian individuation does not constitute another form of solipsism and is not incongruent with Heidegger???s account of Mitsein (beingwith). By demonstrating how individuation is bound up with Mitsein I will also argue that this concept of individuation contains an ethics, conceived here as responsibility for one???s Being/existence that nevertheless implicates others. By tracing the trajectory of Heidegger???s thinking from Being and Time to the later text, Time and Being, I want to suggest that the meditation on Being and its relation to Dasein as an individual contains an ethical moment. Ethics, not conceived of as a series of proscriptions, in terms of the Kantian Categorical Imperative for example. Nor ethics conceived in terms of an obligation to and responsibility for another, as in Levinasian ethics, but an ethics in terms of responsibility for existence, and more specifically, for one???s own existence. The ethical moment in Heidegger, I argue, is not one as ambitious as changing the world or assuming infinite and numerous obligations on behalf of others. It is, rather, a question of changing oneself. It is a question of assuming responsibility in response to the call of Being. I will show how, given that Dasein is always Mitsein, others are situated in such an ethics. Central to the thesis is an examination of the relation between indivduation and Mitsein. While Heidegger is always careful to distinguish his form of individuation from other accounts of individuation or solipsism, such as those of Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant or Edmund Husserl???s, Heidegger???s conception of solipsism and its relation to his account of Mitsein remains somewhat obscure. As a consequence, there are several problems that this concept raises, all of which have been the subject of much debate. At the centre of this debate is the apparent tension between the concept of individuation and the notion that ontologically, Dasein is also a Mitsein. This tension has led to a number of interpretations, which either argue that the concept of individuation is inconsistent with the notion of Mitsein, or that it constitutes yet another instance of Cartesian subjectivity and that as a consequence, it is inherently unethical. This thesis contributes to this debate by submitting that the concept of individuation, while primary or central to Heidegger???s ontology, is not in tension with his account of Mitsein. I use Jean-Luc Nancy???s paradoxical logic of the singular to argue for this claim. I suggest that it is precisely this concept of individuation that can inform an ethics and theory of political action on account of the emphasis on individual responsibility. The second part of my argument, also made with the aid of Nancy, is that this can inform an ethics and a theory of political action, not at level of making moral judgements, or yielding standards of right and wrong, but at the level of individual and by implication, collective responsibility for one???s own existence. Given that there is no real separation between the ontic and ontological levels in Heidegger???s work, a taking responsibility at the level of one???s own Being will invariably play itself out ontically in factical life in terms of moral responsibility and judgement. I explore the concrete political implications of this through an examination of Heidegger???s account of freedom. I argue that Heidegger???s removal of freedom from the ontology of self-presence and his alternative conception of it provides us with a way of thinking freedom not in terms of a specific set of rights, but as a mode of being-in-theworld and as the basis for collective political action. I use the work of Hannah Arendt to develop a theory of political action, freedom and judgment from this revisionary conception of freedom.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Pennsylvania State University, 2007. / Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.

Diss.--Universität Tübingen, 2000.