In the first essay, I decompose inflation risk into (i) a part that is correlated with real returns on the market portfolio and factors that determine investor’s preferences and investment opportunities and (ii) a residual part. I show that only the first part earns a risk premium. All nominal Treasury bonds, including the nominal money-market account, are equally exposed to the residual part except inflation-protected Treasury bonds, which provide a means to hedge it. Every investor should put 100% of his wealth in the market portfolio and inflation-protected Treasury bonds and hold a zero-investment portfolio of nominal Treasury bonds and the nominal money market account. In the second essay, I solve the dynamic asset allocation problem of finite lived, constant relative risk averse investors who face inflation risk and can invest in cash, nominal bonds, equity, and inflation-protected bonds when the investment opportunityset is determined by the expected inflation rate. I estimate the model with nominal bond, inflation, and stock market data and show that if expected inflation increases, then investors should substitute inflation-protected bonds for stocks and they should borrow cash to buy long-term nominal bonds. In the lastessay, I discuss how heterogeneity in preferences among investors withexternal non-addictive habit forming preferences affects the equilibrium nominal term structure of interest rates in a pure continuous time exchange economy and complete securities markets. Aggregate real consumption growth and inflation are exogenously specified and contain stochastic components thataffect their means andvolatilities. There are two classes of investors who have external habit forming preferences and different localcurvatures oftheir utility functions. The effects of time varying risk aversion and different inflation regimes on the nominal short rate and the nominal market price of risk are explored, and simple formulas for nominal bonds, real bonds, and inflation risk premia that can be numerically evaluated using Monte Carlo simulation techniques are provided.

Conjoint analysis is a popular method in consumer preferences research. One of the factors that caused the increasing popularity of this method in recent years is wide use of hierarchical Bayesian models which has been found invaluable in solving the problem of how to obtain reliable estimates of individual preferences without need for overloading respondents with too many conjoint tasks. First goal of my dissertation was to confirm whether the use of Bayesian models is the best choice under all circumstances or whether there are some limitations of this approach. For this purpose I conducted a study based on simulated datasets. Algorithm used enabled generation of datasets that differed in several parameters of interest but which were most comparable in other aspects. Results show that hierarchical models represent choice leading to highest accuracy in predicting respondents' choices in holdout tasks. Use of hierarchical models is most beneficial in the situation of strongly heterogeneous population yet limited amount of available data. In these cases we are able to capture the structure of heterogeneity with significantly lower number of choice task necessary from each respondent. Second goal of the dissertation was to answer the question whether we can increase also the effectiveness of the questioning in conjoint analysis by adding several direct questions. Suggested hybrid choice-based conjoint method (HCBC) combines conjoint analysis tasks with direct questions regarding the preference of levels for each attribute. These are used during the estimation of the model and for increasing the effectiveness if the conjoint analysis tasks design. The HCBC was compared with traditional choice-based conjoint (CBC) and adaptive choice-based conjoint (ACBC) based on practical study involving 421 respondents randomly assigned in one of three test groups. Suggested method has been found as useful alternative that can help with reducing number of choice task needed and as a solution for some situations when diverse importance of the attributes tested does not allow for indirect estimation of preferences with respect to all attributes tested.

Il a été démontré en laboratoire que l’équilibre de Nash n’était pas toujours un bon indicateur du comportement humain. Différentes théories alternatives (aversion à l’inégalité, réciprocité et norme sociale) ont vu le jour pour combler les lacunes de la théorie classique, mais aucune d’elles ne permet d’expliquer la totalité des phénomènes observés en laboratoire. Après avoir identifié les lacunes de ces modèles, ce mémoire développe un modèle qui synthétise dans un tout cohérent les avancées de ceux-ci à l’aide de préférences hétérogènes. Afin d’augmenter la portée du modèle, une nouvelle notion d’équilibre, dite comportementale, est ajoutée au modèle. En appliquant le nouveau modèle à des jeux simples, nous pouvons voir comment il élargit le nombre de comportements pouvant être modélisé par la théorie des jeux. / It has been shown in laboratory experiments that the Nash equilibrium was not always a good indicator of human behavior. Various alternative theories (inequity aversion, reciprocity and social norms) have emerged to fill gaps in the classical theory, but none of them can explain all the phenomena observed in the laboratory. After identifying the shortcomings of these models, this thesis develops a model that summarizes advances made by those models into a coherent whole by using heterogeneous preferences. To increase the scope of the model, a new notion of equilibrium, a behavioral equilibrium, is added to the model. By applying the new model to simple games, we can see how it expands the number of behaviors that can be modeled by game theory.

Il a été démontré en laboratoire que l’équilibre de Nash n’était pas toujours un bon indicateur du comportement humain. Différentes théories alternatives (aversion à l’inégalité, réciprocité et norme sociale) ont vu le jour pour combler les lacunes de la théorie classique, mais aucune d’elles ne permet d’expliquer la totalité des phénomènes observés en laboratoire. Après avoir identifié les lacunes de ces modèles, ce mémoire développe un modèle qui synthétise dans un tout cohérent les avancées de ceux-ci à l’aide de préférences hétérogènes. Afin d’augmenter la portée du modèle, une nouvelle notion d’équilibre, dite comportementale, est ajoutée au modèle. En appliquant le nouveau modèle à des jeux simples, nous pouvons voir comment il élargit le nombre de comportements pouvant être modélisé par la théorie des jeux. / It has been shown in laboratory experiments that the Nash equilibrium was not always a good indicator of human behavior. Various alternative theories (inequity aversion, reciprocity and social norms) have emerged to fill gaps in the classical theory, but none of them can explain all the phenomena observed in the laboratory. After identifying the shortcomings of these models, this thesis develops a model that summarizes advances made by those models into a coherent whole by using heterogeneous preferences. To increase the scope of the model, a new notion of equilibrium, a behavioral equilibrium, is added to the model. By applying the new model to simple games, we can see how it expands the number of behaviors that can be modeled by game theory.