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Active interrogation of highly enriched uranium /Fairrow, Nannette Lea, January 2000 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 117-123). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.
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Radioxenon generation using highly enriched uranium /Elliott, Anthony James. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (M.S.)--Oregon State University, 2009. / Printout. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 105-107). Also available on the World Wide Web.
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The role of Highly Enriched Uranium in South Africa’s nuclear diplomacyKrelekrele, Thembela January 2021 (has links)
Masters of Commerce / Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is one of the most dangerous materials in the world, because
it is a key ingredient in making a nuclear bomb. If a terrorist organisation can get HEU, it would
be close to making a nuclear bomb. After South Africa disarmed its nuclear weapons, it kept
HEU that was extracted from the nuclear bombs. The US tried to persuade South Africa to
blend down its HEU into low enriched uranium (LEU) or give it up for safekeeping. However,
South Africa refused to give it up. After a breach at Pelindaba, a national key point facility
where South Africa stores its HEU, the US intensified its efforts to pressure South Africa to
give its HEU up. It even promised incentives to South Africa should they agree to give it up,
but South Africa refused. The US used the nuclear terrorism narrative to justify its initiative to
eliminate vulnerable materials in the world. However, South Africa is yet to be swayed. This
is odd since South Africa's refusal can negatively affect its credentials as a nuclear nonproliferation
and disarmament champion and its image as a norm entrepreneur. The objective
of the study was to understand the role played by HEU in South Africa's nuclear diplomacy. It
was to explore HEU as a factor in the state's nuclear diplomacy and to understand the power of
having HEU in nuclear negotiations, as well as what SA intends to do with its HEU. The study
is framed theoretically by drawing on foreign policy theory, namely middle-power theory, and
revisionism. It juxtaposed middle power, reformist, and revisionist positions with status quo
foreign policy to analyse the role of HEU in South Africa's nuclear diplomacy. As a middle
power with a moral high ground, South Africa hoped that it can affect change in the nuclear
regime. However, when this did not occur its foreign policy shifted to a revisionist character
that is discontent with the status quo in the nuclear regime. SA is dissatisfied with the current
nuclear order and wants it revised towards liberal values such as equality and nondiscrimination.
It views the current nuclear order as nuclear apartheid.
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Procedimento de fabricação de elementos combustíveis a base de dispersão com alta concentração de urânio / Fabrication procedures for manufacturing high uranium concentration dispersion fuel elementsSOUZA, JOSE A.B. de 09 October 2014 (has links)
Made available in DSpace on 2014-10-09T12:34:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 / Made available in DSpace on 2014-10-09T14:06:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 / Dissertação (Mestrado) / IPEN/D / Instituto de Pesquisas Energeticas e Nucleares - IPEN-CNEN/SP
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Procedimento de fabricação de elementos combustíveis a base de dispersão com alta concentração de urânio / Fabrication procedures for manufacturing high uranium concentration dispersion fuel elementsSOUZA, JOSE A.B. de 09 October 2014 (has links)
Made available in DSpace on 2014-10-09T12:34:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 / Made available in DSpace on 2014-10-09T14:06:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 / O IPEN-CNEN/SP desenvolveu e disponibilizou para produção rotineira a tecnologia de fabricação de elementos combustíveis tipo dispersão, para uso em reatores nucleares de pesquisas. O combustível fabricado no IPEN-CNEN/SP está limitado à concentração de urânio de 3,0gU/cm3, para dispersões a base de U3Si2-Al, e de 2,3gU/cm3, para dispersões a base de U3O8-Al. O aumento da concentração de urânio nas placas combustíveis possibilita aumentar a reatividade do núcleo do reator e a vida útil do combustível. É possível aumentar-se a concentração de urânio no combustível até o limite tecnológico de 4,8gU/cm3 para a dispersão U3Si2-Al, e de 3,2gU/cm3 para a dispersão U3O8-Al, as quais estão bem qualificadas ao redor do mundo. Este trabalho tem como objetivo desenvolver o processo de fabricação de ambos os combustíveis com alta concentração de urânio, redefinindo-se os procedimentos de fabricação atualmente adotados no Centro do Combustível Nuclear do IPEN-CNEN/SP. Com base nos resultados obtidos conclui-se que para atingir a concentração desejada devem ser feitas algumas alterações nos procedimentos já estabelecidos, tais como mudança no tamanho de partícula dos pós e mudança no processo de alimentação da matriz de compactação. Os estudos realizados mostraram que as placas combustíveis com alta concentração de urânio a base da dispersão U3Si2-Al com 4,8 gU/cm3 fabricadas atenderam às especificações vigentes. Contudo, apesar da subjetividade da análise, a aparência da microestrutura obtida no núcleo das placas combustíveis a base da dispersão U3O8-Al com 3,2 gU/cm3 não foi considerada satisfatória devido à aparência da distribuição de vazios. O novo procedimento de fabricação foi aplicado na produção de placas combustíveis de dispersão U3Si2-Al com 4,8 gU/cm3 com urânio enriquecido, as quais foram utilizadas na montagem do elemento combustível parcial IEA-228 para ser testado quanto ao desempenho sob irradiação no reator IEA-R1 do IPEN-CNEN/SP. Esses novos combustíveis têm potencial para serem utilizados no novo Reator Multipropósito Brasileiro RMB. / Dissertação (Mestrado) / IPEN/D / Instituto de Pesquisas Energeticas e Nucleares - IPEN-CNEN/SP
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The role of Highly Enriched Uranium in South Africa’s nuclear diplomacyKrelekrele, Thembela January 2021 (has links)
Masters of Commerce / Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is one of the most dangerous materials in the world, because it is a key ingredient in making a nuclear bomb. If a terrorist organisation can get HEU, it would be close to making a nuclear bomb. After South Africa disarmed its nuclear weapons, it kept HEU that was extracted from the nuclear bombs. The US tried to persuade South Africa to blend down its HEU into low enriched uranium (LEU) or give it up for safekeeping. However, South Africa refused to give it up. After a breach at Pelindaba, a national key point facility where South Africa stores its HEU, the US intensified its efforts to pressure South Africa to give its HEU up. It even promised incentives to South Africa should they agree to give it up, but South Africa refused. The US used the nuclear terrorism narrative to justify its initiative to eliminate vulnerable materials in the world. However, South Africa is yet to be swayed. This is odd since South Africa's refusal can negatively affect its credentials as a nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament champion and its image as a norm entrepreneur. The objective of the study was to understand the role played by HEU in South Africa's nuclear diplomacy. It was to explore HEU as a factor in the state's nuclear diplomacy and to understand the power of having HEU in nuclear negotiations, as well as what SA intends to do with its HEU. The study is framed theoretically by drawing on foreign policy theory, namely middle-power theory, and revisionism. It juxtaposed middle power, reformist, and revisionist positions with status quo foreign policy to analyse the role of HEU in South Africa's nuclear diplomacy. As a middle power with a moral high ground, South Africa hoped that it can affect change in the nuclear regime. However, when this did not occur its foreign policy shifted to a revisionist character that is discontent with the status quo in the nuclear regime. SA is dissatisfied with the current nuclear order and wants it revised towards liberal values such as equality and non-discrimination. It views the current nuclear order as nuclear apartheid. Therefore, South Africa uses HEU as leverage against nuclear weapon states in nuclear diplomacy. It is using HEU as an act of defiance against nuclear weapon states (such as the US) that are yet to disarm their nuclear weapons.
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