"Found at Sea" is a historical study centered on the Atlantic Ocean. This dissertation employs ships' logbooks in combination with a GIS mapping methodology to address the ocean, itself, as a site for historical developments. Eighteenth-century mariners sailed the ocean in more varied ways than historians have previously described. This dissertation demonstrates that the Atlantic Ocean of the late eighteenth century was a highly-populated, very social, international space. It was normal for a ship to see another ship about half of the days while it was at sea. During peacetime these sightings could lead to friendly exchanges of news, food, and even spare parts in case of emergency. During wartime, shipping patterns adjusted to reflect new trading alliances and the threat of enemy vessels.

This dissertation examines the history of three early computer programs that were designed to prove mathematical theorems: The Logic Theory Machine, the Program P, and the Automated Reasoning Assistant, all developed between 1955 and 1975. I use these programs as an opportunity to explore ways in which mathematical knowledge and practice were transformed by the introduction of modern computing. The prospect of automation generated disagreement about the character of human mathematical faculties like intuition, reasoning, and understanding and whether computers could be made to possess or participate in them. It also prompted novel discourse concerning the character of mathematical knowledge and how it should be produced. I track how the architects of each program built their beliefs about minds, computation, and proof into their theorem-proving programs and, in so doing, crafted new tools and techniques for the work of mathematics. The practitioners featured in this dissertation were interested in whether or not computers could “think.” I, on the other hand, am interested in how people think differently when they work with computers. And in particular how they thought differently about mathematics as they crafted a place for computers in the work of proof. I look for traces of their new ways of thinking in how they implemented their software. This is a new historiographical approach from existing history of computing that, for the most part, does not engage software at all or engages high-level descriptions or models of software. I argue this: what were for my actors implementation concerns are in fact significant epistemological issues for the history of mathematics. Especially in the early decades, actually getting programs to run on computers was no small feat. In implementing programs practitioners had to craft many new tools, both formal and material - from programming languages and data structures to punched card encodings and user interfaces. The work of implementation spans multiple media - from paper to transistor - and involves many practices - from diagramming to coding - demonstrating that the media of the “digital age” are multiple indeed. Moreover, implementation is the site where we see practitioners rethinking their objects of interest, their disciplines, their theories, through the lens of computation - what is possible and impossible for computers to do. Implementation is the practice of automation. In implementing their theorem-proving software, the actors in this dissertation gave new formulations and had new experiences of mathematical intuition, logical rules of inference, and other key tenets of twentieth-century notions of proof. The communities explored here were among the most influential and celebrated early contributors to automated theorem-proving. Each had quite a different relationship to the postwar American academic landscape relative to their disciplinary, institutional, and political makeup. Most importantly for they fundamentally and explicitly disagreed with each other about how the automation of proof should be done. Because of this, they developed very different automated theorem-proving programs – one seeking to simulate the human mind, another seeking to surpass it, and another seeking to develop theorem-proving software that would collaborate with a human user. Each of these projects intervened in the history of mathematics by introducing new forms – both social and technical – of proof.

In spite of a vast and robust literature on madness and its institutions, colonial Mexico remains unchartered domain and little is known about the Hospital de San Hipólito in Mexico City, the first hospital of the Americas to specialize in the care and confinement of the mentally disturbed. Founded in 1567 by a penitent conquistador, San Hipólito provided caridad or charity, including specialized medical and custodial services, to some of New Spain’s most marginal, troubled, and troublesome subjects. This dissertation examines the history of this precocious colonial institution—including its growing alignment with both the Inquisition and secular criminal courts from which it often received patients—raising questions about medical and nonmedical understandings of madness, or locura, and its connection to categories of race, class, and gender; patient experience and agency; and how the hospital fit (and did not) into larger imperial agendas. Although the dissertation charts the entirety of San Hipólito’s colonial history, a major focal point is the second half of the eighteenth century. It was during this period—often associated with the tightening of colonial rule under the absolutist Bourbon monarchs—that the hospital was remodeled and amplified, and its wards increasingly populated by allegedly insane criminals forcefully confined by mandate of the Inquisition and the secular law enforcement. Ostensibly intended for pobres dementes (mad paupers), by the late eighteenth century, San Hipólito had assumed a central role in the management of madness not just in connection to poverty, but also in relation to a range of religious and sexual offenses, and violent crimes such as murder. Drawing on hospital records, as well as criminal and Inquisition cases, I stress that such changes were broadly linked to the growing medicalization of madness rather than to its putative criminalization or the transformation of the hospital into an instrument of social control. San Hipólito was far from a bricks-and-mortar embodiment of a powerful colonial regime; its history reveals the ad hoc nature of confinement, and cases involving patient flight and concerns over feigned madness underscore the inability of the colonial state to fully govern the lives of its subjects. / History of Science

In this dissertation I trace the formation of citizens of the information age by comparing visions and practices to make children and the general public computer literate or cultured in the United States, France, and the Soviet Union. Computer literacy and computer culture programs in these three countries began in the early 1970s as efforts to adapt people to life in the information society as it was envisioned by scholars, thinkers, and practitioners in each cultural and sociopolitical context. The dissertation focuses on the ideas and influence of three individuals who played formative roles in propelling computer education initiatives in each country: Seymour Papert in the United States, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber in France, and Andrei Ershov in the Soviet Union. According to these pioneers, to become computer literate or computer cultured meant more than developing computer skills or learning how to passively use the personal computer. Each envisioned a distinctive way of incorporating the machine into the individual human’s ways of thinking and being—as a cognitive enhancement in the United States, as a culture in France, and as a partner in the Soviet Union. The resulting human-computer hybrids all demanded what I call a playful relationship to the personal computer, that is, a domain of free and unstructured, exploratory creativity. I trace the realization of these human-computer hybrids from their origins in the visions of a few pioneers to their embedding in particular hardware, software, and educational curricula, through to their development in localized experiments with children and communities, and finally to their implementation at the scale of the nation. In that process of extension, pioneering visions bumped up against powerful sociotechnical imaginaries of the nation state in each country, and I show how, as a result of that clash, in each national case the visions of the pioneers failed to be fully realized. In conclusion, I suggest ways in which the twentieth-century imaginaries of the computer literate citizen extend beyond their points of origin and connect to aspects of the contemporary constitutions of humans in the computerized world. / History of Science

While scholars have argued that modern medical authority over sexuality stands in some relation to earlier religious discourse, modern religion and its new relationship to medicine are absent from these narratives. This dissertation takes up just such a study through narrating the emergence of modern pastoral counseling and its assumptions, categories, and therapeutic techniques, all of which were deeply entangled with modern sciences of the mind. Modern pastoral counseling marks a decisive discontinuity from the long tradition of philosophical and Christian care for the soul in its relation to medicine and in its view of the self. This dissertation argues that mid-century American Protestant understandings of sexuality depended on a modern psychological conception of the self. Through analysis of archival documents, theological texts, and hospital case histories from the early clinical pastoral training movement, this study investigates the shifting pastoral rhetoric used to understand sexual maladjustment, and it traces shifting attempts to rework Christian sexual ethics. While psychiatry was the primary framework for making sense of queer love—at times even for queer people themselves—some fashioned new and imaginative languages for expressing forms of queer love and queer religion. Juxtaposing clinical discourse with these diverse genres not only illuminates the limits of contemporary debates about religion and sexuality, but it also illustrates the importance of studying entanglements of religion, science, and medicine in everyday life and social practice. / Religion, Committee on the Study of

This project uses convention documents to explore the relationship between a progressive religious movement and America’s progressive political party. The Social Gospel Movement rose in the early twentieth century as a response to modern industrial realities. It sought the Kingdom of Heaven on earth through progressive policy and church action. It supported the national progressive party of its era, the Republican Party. As the Democratic Party became America’s national progressive party, following the New Deal era, it failed to integrate the Social Gospel into its midst and has since experienced difficulty mobilizing religious voters and defining the sacred. Contemporary Democrats, religious scholars, and clergymen call on the Democratic Party to connect either with a revitalized Social Gospel or some similar religious tradition. These calls make sense in the context of the competing Republican Party’s successes relating to traditional and conservative Protestant voters. However, through an examination of convention speeches, party platforms, and politician-clergy relations, this project attempts to explain the historical inability of the Democratic Party to connect meaningfully with a religious movement- even one seemingly tailor-made like the Social Gospel Movement.

The years between the two world wars, which just preceded the emergence of the neo-Darwinian "new synthesis," were intellectually difficult ones for paleoanthropology in America. Patterns of thought deeply ingrained in biology and anthropology pushed writers on hominid evolution into interpretive "blind alleys." Most prominent among the patterns was what Ernst Mayr has called "typological thinking," which often mixed with a tendency to project "scientific" racism back into the hominid past. A "splitting" habit in taxonomy combined with these and with belief in "orthogenetic" change to make polyphyletism the norm. Hesitance to accept as human ancestors any Pleistocene forms exhibiting "primitive" characters led to phylogenies which put the known fossils on side-branches. Anatomically modern humans were thus left "ancestorless" by most writers, though nearly all continued to use existing fossils in their evolutionary scenarios by designating them as "structural ancestors." Research conducted in Europe before 1914 on the Neanderthal skeleton and on the interperetation of endocranial casts, along with the Piltdown fraud, did much to establish these phylogenies and scenarios. In tandem with these general themes came the ascendancy of several specific hypotheses that eventually clashed with accumulating evidence. That the brain had led the way in hominid evolution, that Neanderthals and other "low-brows" could be ruled out as ancestors, and that modern Homo sapiens had appeared early in the Pleistocene, became even harder to maintain. The close evolutionary bond between humans and great apes theorized in England by Sir Arthur Keith and elaborated in America by William King Gregory remained vigorous, however, despite challenge. The present study examines these issues through an analysis of the five Americans whose writings on hominid evolution were most extensive and varied--Henry Fairfield Osborn, George Grant MacCurdy, Ales Hrdlicka, Earnest A. Hooton and William K. Gregory. The writings of each are analyzed separately, so that both general themes and responses to the changing state of the discipline can be traced. This approach reveals that shared patterns of thought did not prevent considerable diversity on nearly every main issue, a fact which rendered the field fertile for rapid growth later.

What does socialism mean? This word carries many implications and in this thesis I consider how the concept of socialism was constructed within the discourses of classical Marxian economic and social theory. Socialism is understood to refer both to a general theory of historical and economic development as well as a particular post capitalist political economic system. One of the chief aims of this thesis is to examine the relationship between these two different levels of meaning of the word socialism. The classical Marxian discourse I analyze has three important levels or aspects which are combined in various ways to produce complex, though ultimately reductive, understandings of socialism. These are discourses of economic determinism, relative autonomy, and class analysis. How these modes of thought serve as the basis for policy, historical analysis and the construction of socialism as a political economic system is the principle topic of this thesis. I develop this thesis by examining three "moments" in the classical tradition: the work of the latter Engels, the period of the Second International, and Russian Marxism. Engels' work provides a basis for what follows as he subtly articulates the discourses of determinism, relative autonomy and class to produce a teleological vision of socialism. Later writers reproduce the tension created by the simultaneous use of the discourses of determinism and relative autonomy. The Second International, chiefly represented here by Karl Kautsky, use this classical conception to produce particular notions of socialist policy which I argue ultimately rely on a teleological notion of historical development. Later the Russian Marxists both extend and challenge the teleology and determinism of classical Marxian theory as they think about the nature of stages and the revolutionary transformation of societies. However, they frame what is innovative in their work within the boundaries bequeathed by Engels. In the final portion of this thesis I examine the consequences of the threads of the classical discourse on the construction of early "actually existing socialism" in the Soviet Union.

<p>This dissertation deals with curriculum debates concerning science, mathematics and technology within the Swedish secondary schools between 1900 and 1965. The aim of the study is to analyze different conceptions of these school subjects. How were they looked upon and presented during the debates? What kind of values and functions were they said to promote? I also discuss more principal questions regarding why the school subjects became objects for debate. Why did different actors engage in these discussions? A leading perspective of the study is that schools and their curricula often are used as arenas for larger debates concerning the role of science and technology in society. One of the reasons for this, I argue, is that a curriculum often is seen as representing a standpoint in these broader societal discussions. In the study, this is shown through a number of different debates concerning, for example, the amount of hours devoted to science, student conducted experiments, eugenics and environmental aspects. All of these issues demonstrate how the shape of curriculum was seen as having wider significance for society. An important reason for this is the connection between curriculum and future perspectives. Situations where a curriculum was to be rewritten were apprehended as opportunities to influence and secure the future. </p><p>Much previous work on curriculum matters has been occupied with the question of what curriculum “does” in schools; it includes and excludes certain ideas, it regulates and governs students to understand and reason about themselves in specific ways. In relation to this, my own research deals with what curriculum – or rather <i>the image</i> of curriculum – does to other groups in society. Through analyzing the engagement of teachers, politicians, authors and editors, I conclude that a curriculum can threaten or promise future perspectives and values that are important to these groups. </p>

This dissertation deals with curriculum debates concerning science, mathematics and technology within the Swedish secondary schools between 1900 and 1965. The aim of the study is to analyze different conceptions of these school subjects. How were they looked upon and presented during the debates? What kind of values and functions were they said to promote? I also discuss more principal questions regarding why the school subjects became objects for debate. Why did different actors engage in these discussions? A leading perspective of the study is that schools and their curricula often are used as arenas for larger debates concerning the role of science and technology in society. One of the reasons for this, I argue, is that a curriculum often is seen as representing a standpoint in these broader societal discussions. In the study, this is shown through a number of different debates concerning, for example, the amount of hours devoted to science, student conducted experiments, eugenics and environmental aspects. All of these issues demonstrate how the shape of curriculum was seen as having wider significance for society. An important reason for this is the connection between curriculum and future perspectives. Situations where a curriculum was to be rewritten were apprehended as opportunities to influence and secure the future. Much previous work on curriculum matters has been occupied with the question of what curriculum “does” in schools; it includes and excludes certain ideas, it regulates and governs students to understand and reason about themselves in specific ways. In relation to this, my own research deals with what curriculum – or rather the image of curriculum – does to other groups in society. Through analyzing the engagement of teachers, politicians, authors and editors, I conclude that a curriculum can threaten or promise future perspectives and values that are important to these groups.