For purposes of this thesis, we accept the view that the Christian Church's power declined after the Middle Ages, and a secular, industrial, mass society developed in Western Europe, a society which, by the nineteenth century, had begun to deprive men--particularly the proletariat—of their spiritual roots, and which created the need for a new faith. In Germany, this situation, especially acute after the first World War, was conditioned by the peculiar history of church-state relations there as well as by the weakened position of the middle classes. For a variety of reasons, young Germans in the first decades of this century were in a "revolutionary" mood. Adolf Hitler himself was such a young person, raised in a bourgeois Christian environment, yet strongly affected by the political and social trends of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. National Socialism, with its anti-Semitism and its call for national regeneration, became the substitute faith of Germans and was directed by cynical politicians. Much of this "theology" was determined by political considerations; that is, by what appealed to non-Nazi Germans. It demanded, for example, a total commitment which many were ready to give. The religious trappings of this Weltanschauung were manufactured by Nazi leaders, who did not themselves believe in them. Seeking to win the nation's youth, Hitler found himself in conflict with orthodox faith, but he knew that, if the Party was permanently to dominate Germany, Christianity would have to be eliminated. The Christian attitude, however, aided the Nazis in consolidating their power. The Lutheran view of the state, especially that of the "German Christians", offered little resistance. The Catholic attitude was more hostile, but ultimately did not prevent German Catholics from rivalling their Protestant colleagues in enthusiasm for Nazi reforms. [ ... ] / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

Within a year of his accession to power, Hitler, by concluding a non-aggression pact with Poland and by bringing relations with Russia to an impasse, had revolutionized German foreign policy. This policy reversal was chosen, primarily, for tactical reasons and only secondarily for ideological reasons. Prom the outset, it is true, relations with Russia were made difficult by Hitler's persecution of the German Communist Party and by his own hatred for Bolshevism. But it was only after Poland had twice threatened a preventative war against Germany and after Germany had become diplomatically isolated through her desertion of the League of Nations, that Hitler decided upon a rapprochement with Poland and a break with Russia. This policy was finalized by the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of January, 1934. The political orientation of German foreign policy, established by this pact, remained fixed in its outlines for the following five years. During these years, Hitler used the anti-Communist bogey to justify his foreign policy coups and to ease his relations with Poland. Russia herself, he ignored as a power factor in opposition. Nor did he consider a political understanding with her. However, he did toy with the idea of her as an object of aggression. In the spring and summer of 1939, Hitler's Soviet policy was changed by his decision, in early spring, to settle with Poland. Even after making this decision, he continued to ignore Russia. In mid-April, however, stiffening British resistance and the threat of an Anglo-Russian understanding, on the one hand, and coy hints by the Soviet Government that it might be prepared for a detente with Germany on the other hand, persuaded Hitler that the only way of intimidating the West into neutrality and Poland into submission and of preventing a Russo-British alliance, was to raise the threat of a Russo-German understanding. During the following months this tactic proved to be unsuccessful and by mid-July, Hitler, however unwillingly, became convinced that only the reality of a Russo-German alliance would suffice to drive the Western democracies into neutrality. It was mainly for this reason, that Hitler sought the pact with Russia. When war came and Western resistance was not paralyzed, the original reason for the Moscow Pact disappeared. However, the consequent Western belligerency made a continued policy of friendship with Russia necessary throughout the winter of 1939 to I940. The idea of an eventual attack on Russia had never been completely absent from Hitler's mind, but before the defeat of France in June, 1940, it had never been more than a vague notion. With the defeat of France, Hitler, assuming that Britain, too, would capitulate, briefly considered the idea of an attack on Russia as a strategic goal. When Britain continued to resist, Hitler, frustrated that he could not end the war and confident that he could vanquish Russia, convinced himself that Britain's attitude was based on hopes placed in Russia. Thus to destroy Britain's last remaining hopes on the continent, Hitler, in late July, decided upon an attack on Russia. During the following months the diplomatic, military, and economic preparations for the attack were completed, and with the attack on June 22, 1941, an era of Russo -German relations was ended. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

Hitler claimed to have studied Clausewitz and Machiavelli, but violated the tenets of both by permitting ideology to override strategy. Hitler's ideology is revealed from documentary sources: Mein Kampf, his speeches, and Tischreden (table talks.) Operation Sea Lion, the planned 1940 invasion of England, was cancelled because the Fuhrer regarded the British as nordic cousins. Operation Citadel, the 1943 Battle of Kursk, was conceived because he decided the racially inferior Slav must be subdued. Doomed from the outset, Hitler nevertheless launched Citadel and squandered most of Germany's remaining armor and elite troops. A general staff officer is interviewed as witness to the period. His background, training, and opinions of the Fuhrer are presented. Thesis conclusion: flawed ideology brought disastrous decisions.

There is no abstract available for this thesis.

The rationale for this study is Albert Speer's unique value as a source of information concerning the Third Reich and Adolf Hitler. Although there is a wealth of information available on Nazi Germany and Hitler, the observations of this intelligent man who was an important official of the regime and a close associate of Hitler himself carry weight that no other report can match. He was a well-educated, intellectual, and articulate man who left behind three comprehensive books and many articles and interviews. In addition to such publications, there are, in the National Archives in Washington, D.C., many records of interviews with Speer conducted by Allied personnel immediately following the war. Those documents have been used extensively in this study.There is no attempt either to indict or to vindicate Speer, as many authors have done, but rather the purpose is to present in narrative form an analytical study of the relationship between the two men. The central focus throughout examines Speer and Hitler in juxtaposition and forms conclusions on the nature of their complex and compelling attachment. In the process, historical events form the backdrop as Speer describes them for us. It is always Speer, not Hitler, with whom the primary interest lies.The question of how anyone of Speer's background and intelligence could have given his life to a regime devoted to gutter politics, conquest of a continent, and genocide always arises in any study of Speer. The strange hold the Nazis exert on the world's imagination seems to ebb and flow, but does not die out, nor does the awful suspicion that something similar could happen again. Speer used his writings to describe the process and warn against its resurrection, especially in light of the tremendous leap in technology we have seen. Do not look for monsters, he counseled, for monsters are easily identified and avoided. Beware the manipulators who orchestrate on a national scale those policies which bring harm to whole populations, men who loudly proclaim their humanness and ordinariness.This inquiry is not an attempt to prove a predetermined hypothesis, since it embodies a historical approach rather than an experimental one. Information is drawn from the books and papers of Speer, as well as official documents, but secondary works to corroborate the basic sources are cited at times. There is still no definitive biography of Speer, although he appears as a central figure in many works. Perhaps one of the reasons for this is that the Speer family has put his personal papers in Heidelberg beyond the reach of anyone until 1999, probably as a result of his negative treatment in various publications.The technical papers from the Ministry of Armaments and War Production are housed in the Bundesarchiv at Koblenz, but were not pertinent to this study. The Institut fur Zeitgeschichte in Munich houses official papers, as does the Berlin Document Center, while the Washington has the transcripts of Library of Congress in Hitler's Table Talks, some parts of which are used in this study. Speer's books and published material give an extensive look at his part in the Third Reich, his relationship with Hitler, and his own feelings and observations concerning both. The International Military Tribunal records from Nuremberg are both extensive and enlightening. One may also view the collection of Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler's personal photographer, in the Special Collections section at Bracken Library.Chapter I deals with Speer in the pre-war years as he rose to fame and became part of Hitler's inner circle, while Chapter II views the war years through Speer's experiences. In Chapter III the early relationship between Speer and Hitler is developed, and in Chapter IV the war, the collapse of the Third Reich, and the attendant disasters are covered.

The functioning and apparent successes of the political leadership in Nazi Germany, has for long presented political scientists with a very complex and seemingly ambiguous system to interpret and explain. This study addresses this very matter by firstly identifying the ideological environment within which it functioned as one in which an effective leader with effective leadership tactics was vital. Secondly, two factors are identified as key to the understanding and explanation of political leadership in the Third Reich. These factors are the 'Hitler myth' as a vibrant leadership cult that stood at the centre of Adolf Hitler's relationship with the German people and thus formed the base of Hitler's authority, and the 'Fahrer Prinzip' as expression of the totalitarian style of leadership present in the Nazi movement and the Nazi State, especially regarding the role of Hitler as Fahrer of the Nazi Party and later also of the Nazi State. / Dissertation (MA (Political Science))--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Political Sciences / unrestricted

The right of national independence, which came to be called the principle of self-determination, is, in general terms, the belief that each nation has a right to constitute an independent state and determine its own government. It will be the thesis of this paper to show that the Nazi regime under the rule of Adolph Hitler took this principle as its own insofar as its relations with other nations were concerned, but while they paid lip service to the principle, it was in fact being prostituted to the fullest degree in the case of Austria and the Anschluss of 1938.

Adolf Hitler advocated total control of the press for many years before he was elected Führer. Almost immediately after he assumed power in 1932, Hitler began writing new laws and regulations that totally exorcised all freedoms from the German press. This study follows the path that Hitler took to control the German press from 1920 until the end of World War II. It utilized translations of documents and statements by men whom Hitler appointed to control the press and books written by experts in the fields of communications as well as men who prosecuted Nazi war criminals after World War II. The study found that the control of the press was indeed a very necessary ingredient in Hitler's climb to power and remained crucial during his reign as Führer.