"Montesquieu, in L'Esprit des Lois, 1748, divided the functions of state into: the legislative power, the executive power, and the power of judging. Indeed, three constitutional organs have invariably dominated state power. These are: the executive, the leigslative and the judiciary. According to Montesquieu, the state is said to be at 'equilibrium' when the three organs are independent of each other, with each carrying out its functions without interference. Ideally, the legislative organ ought to make laws, the executive to implement them, and the judiciary to adjudicate over disputes arising out of the day-to-day operations of the state. This attempt at dispersing state power is not arbitrary. It has got ends. One cardinal end in this regrad is the protection of fundamental human rights. It has been argued that where the three organs of state are allowed operatational autonomy, individuals stand to enjoy relatively profound liberty. Where state functions are entrusted with one person or organ, the tyranny of that person or organ is certain to overwhelm the realisation of fundamental freedoms and liberties. ... Both Montesquieu and Lock had tremendous faith in the tripartite government structure in so far as the protection of liberties was concerned. Informed by this philosophy, most democratic constitutions have weaved state power in almost similar terms envisioned by Montesquieu. Thus far, the 1787 Constitution of the United States of America (USA) could be ranked as one with the clearest distinction of state functions. Contemporary practice, however, appears to be in favour of complementing these traditional state organs, a sign, perhaps, that the conventional three organs of state per se have increasingly proved inadequate; at least in the sphere of human rights protection. There is a move, or rather, wave towards the establishment of independent national human rights institutions (NHRIs) to reinforce the bulwark of human rights protection mechanisms at state level, and the wave, arguably, is most pronounced in Africa. ... The current investigation will be completed in four distinct chapters. The current chapter serves well to introduce the study. The second chapter constitutes a comprehensive study of the conceptual foundations of national human rights institutions (NHRIs). The essence, structure and nature of NHRIs is also explored. The third chapter proposes to analyse the doctrine of separation of powers from a philosophical and later, from a practical point of view as it manifests itself in the Commonwealth tradition. The tripartite government configuration is discussed with the ramification of NHRIs in mind. It is instructive that without assessing the parent concept (the rule of law) a discussion on separation of powers remains orphaned. The fourth chapter shall first allude to the new challenges to human rights enforcement. It shall then discuss how these challenges and the development of NHRIs cry for a new thinking on the original tripartite system. The final section is an attempt at supplying a panacea to the challenges accentuated by the preceding part." -- Introduction. / Prepared under the supervision of Prof. Nii Ashie Kotey at the Faculty of Law, University of Ghana, Legon / LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa) -- University of Pretoria, 2006. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

"Implementation of human rights instruments, and protection and promotion of human rights at the national level is a contemporary phenomenon that is still developing. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Paris Principles provide for the creation of national institutions to carry out this task. This has led to national human rights institutions (NHRIs) becoming more prominent actors in the national, regional and international arena. However, NHRIs still face the problems of legitimacy, operational constraints, and ignorant population. These factors constrain the effective functioning of these institutions. It should be noted that the key constraint on the effective functioning of NHRIs is legitimacy. Such institutions usually find themselves not legitimate in the eyes of the people they are created to serve. The above brings to mind the question - what makes a NHRI effective? Generally, there is no consensus as to the effectiveness of NHRIs This study has therefore been triggered by widespread perceptions and reports within civil society that such institutions are left at the mercy of governments in power. Others have seen such institutions as a "double-edged sword" - in the best of circumstances, they strengthen democratic institutions but they can also be mere straw men, part of government's administrative machinery to scuttle international scrutiny. Another issue that has actuated this study is the misconception that people have about some NHRIs. This misconception originates not so much from the actual operation of human rights commissions but from the history of past ombudsman institutions that have purported to protect human rights." -- Chapter 1. / Prepared under the supervision of Professor Michelo Hansungule at the Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, South Africa / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2002. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM