The study of humility has progressed slowly due to lack of theory and measurement issues. In the present dissertation, I review the literature on humility and propose a theory of relational humility. The model conceptualizes humility as a personality judgment, aligning its study with a large literature that spans social and personality psychology. Then, in four studies, I examined initial evidence for the theoretical model. In Study 1 (N=300), I created the Relational Humility Scale (RHS) and evaluated its items using exploratory factor analysis. The RHS was found to have 3 subscales: Global Humility, Superiority, and Accurate View of Self. In Study 2, its structure was replicated on an independent sample (N = 196). In Study 3, I conducted a longitudinal study of undergraduate students (N =84) in forming groups. As predicated, trait humility was related to acceptance and status in the group, as well as other personality traits related to humility such as narcissism and agreeableness; however, self-enhancement of humility (i.e., overestimating one’s humility) was not related to other correlates of low humility. In Study 4 (N=123), I examined humility in the context of conflict and forgiveness. As predicated, humility judgments were related to changes in forgiveness over time, as well as viewing an offender as spiritually similar. I then discuss implications of these findings for the study of humility from a relational perspective.

The premise for this study is the question how we should relate to people with different religious beliefs. The aim is to examine if an existence characterized by a religious diversity should affect the certainty and confidence in our faith. To answer my question I have turned to the philosophers David Basinger, Mikael Stenmark, William Lane Craig and Robert McKims different views on this issue. Using an approach based on a comparative method and argument analysis I have then assessed their different opinions in the matter. Based on my own discussion of these arguments I conclude that a religious diversity should imply a reduction in our own religious confidence and that it should be reduced in relation to the amount of disagreement that exist between conflicting religious perspectives in an specific case and matter. This may also foster a reduction of religious intolerance through a nuanced of our own belief while highlighting the conceptions and values in our own religion that stresses tolerance.

Research on humility has long been handicapped by the lack of a valid and reliable measure. This research focuses on constructing and validating a measure of Healthy Humility, defined as an unexaggerated, open perception of the abilities, achievements, accomplishments, and limitations of oneself and of others - a perception that focuses primarily, but not exclusively, on the value of the non-self. Through a series of two separate studies using a total sample of 678 undergraduates, an 11-item scale scored on a 6-point Likert scale was developed. A third study using a sample of 183 undergraduates used measures of self-esteem, hope, existential meaning, depression, and anxiety to validate and explore the relationship between the Healthy Humility Inventory (HHI) and the aforementioned variables. Regression analyses supported hypothesized relationships between the HHI and measures of hope and existential meaning, and the trend of the relationship between measures of self-esteem and the HHI, though not significant, also followed along the lines of the hypothesized relationship. A hierarchical regression analysis demonstrated that the HHI explained a significant amount of variance (p<.05) on measures of depression and anxiety above and beyond that explained by self-esteem.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Denver Seminary, 2006. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 185-192).

This thesis is an exploration of the shame that inheres in not being able to self-admire. I call this incapacity to admire oneself ontological shame, and I argue that it is the source of the masquerades, concealments and negative emotions that surround the pursuit and defence of a self-esteem founded on an impoverished form of pride. I argue that there is a radical asymmetry between our admiration and esteem for others and how we evaluate our own sense of self-worth. Where admiration at its highest pitch is the wonderful agape experience of apprehending preciousness in others, our own sense of self-worth is limited to experiences of pride and other forms of self-affirmation; none of which allow us the joy of seeing ourselves as wonders in the world. Because we can admire and want to be admired, not being able to self-admire amounts to a limitation of a sort which carries with it a primordial resentment against life itself. It is largely how we respond to our ontological limitation and to our resentment that determines the positive or negative manner in which we interact with others, and whether or not we are likely to have an envious or humble disposition. In the first three chapters I lay the groundwork for the main argument of the thesis by highlighting the difficulties self-esteem theorists have in agreeing upon the value of ‘high’ self-esteem, introduce the relation between self-esteem and shame, argue for a distinction between self-esteem and public esteem, and provide an account of the gift-exchange nature of admiration which explains why we cannot self-admire. In the central chapters I focus on shame; on acts of concealment that can be either appropriate covering for, or deceitful denial of our ontological limitation; how self-worth is created through a reconciliation to shame, and why the ‘self-act dissociation’ theories of guilt fail to capture the shame attached to ‘being guilty’ of a wrongdoing. In Chapters Seven and Eight I examine envy, first in how it can be disguised as moral resentment; how it differs to admiration in its role in emulation, and finally how as a disposition it stands in stark contrast to humility. It is in humility that we grasp the benefits associated with our own incapacity to self-admire through our need to interact and exchange gifts with others.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of New South Wales, 2001. / Also available online.

Thesis (M.A.)--Abilene Christian University, 1996. / Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [156]-177).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Münster, 1981. / Vita. Includes index. Bibliography: p. 171-175.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Denver Seminary, 2006. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 185-192).

This dissertation explores the moral and spiritual role of the self-assessing emotions of shame and pride in the works of Abu Hamid al-Ghazālī (c. 1058-1111) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). In my analysis of their ethical and religious views on these topics, I demonstrate their great debt to Aristotle’s treatment and his ethics and moral psychology more broadly. Nevertheless, I also point to ways in which they adapted Aristotle’s views on shame and pride to their religious commitments. Aristotle understood shame as an emotion that, while praiseworthy, cannot be considered a virtue in the full sense since it presupposes wrongdoing. The virtuous do nothing wrong and, therefore, have nothing of which to feel ashamed. Pride or, more precisely great-souledness, is for Aristotle “the crown of the virtues,” since to be great-souled is to be great in every virtue and to think oneself worthy of great honor. By contrast, both al-Ghazālī and Aquinas describe shame not only as a praiseworthy emotion but also as a religious virtue. That is, as an emotion felt before God, shame is a good disposition of the soul that results in good actions. Furthermore, they described pride as a sinful emotion and trait of the vicious.   I argue that the dissimilarities between al-Ghazālī and Aquinas’s views and those of Aristotle on these self-assessing emotions result from their different metaphysical frameworks. More specifically, I argue that the three main metaphysical frameworks sustaining their respective views of shame as a virtue and pride as a vice are 1) a Big God Theory; 2) a deflationary account of the self; and 3) acknowledgement of Theistic causal moral luck. By showing the link between metaphysical/religious frameworks and the valence of self-assessing emotions such as shame and pride, this dissertation contributes to contemporary discussions on the influence of religion on moral commitments in general and on views on moral emotions, more specifically. It also points to ways of understanding shame as a virtue within a Western secular society. Properly defined, the virtue of shame speaks to a widely held intuition that accurate moral self-assessment, in both positive and negative senses, contributes significantly to a life of moral integrity. / 2024-11-07T00:00:00Z