Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / Why and how did Saddam Hussein and the Ba'th Party maintain their authority in Iraq for so long in contrast to their predecessors? Based on an archival study of recently opened internal Ba'th Party documents, this study argues that Hussein and the Ba'th used a strategic policy of Ba'thification to trap Iraqis within an environment created by a series of controls that channeled their behavior into avenues supportive of the regime. With a monopoly over state power, Hussein and the Ba'th Party used violence and surveillance to eliminate enemies, monitor state and society, and engender fear. Equally important, the Ba'thist State doled out benefits connected to a system of awards and official statuses bestowed upon Iraqis who exhibited allegiance. This combination of terror and enticement offered Iraqis a stark choice between opposing and supporting the regime, and the consequences of an individual's behavior extended to his family, providing a further incentive for loyalty. Additionally, Hussein and the Ba'th "organized" state and society by recruiting individuals into the party and its proxies and co-opting or replacing the leaderships of government and social institutions with loyalists. Simultaneously, Hussein used the Ba'th Party to take over the Iraqi state--to transform it into the Ba'thist State. He then utilized the Ba'thist State's resources to either obliterate and build anew existing civil and social institutions or reform and incorporate them into the government's legal and administrative frameworks. In the process, Hussein transformed these institutions' raisons d'être into support for himself, the party, and the Iraqi nation: the three primary symbols of his regime. Finally, Hussein infused classical Ba'thist ideology with his personality cult to rationalize his emergence as "the Leader." Through propaganda, indoctrination, ritual, mass ceremonies, and myth the Ba'thist State applied the political ideas of this Husseini Ba'thism to all aspects of public and private life in an attempt to reorient Iraqis' conceptions of what constituted a just and "natural" society to conform to the Ba'thist reality. Combined, the boundaries these controls placed on permissible action and thought forced Iraqis to subordinate their traditional loyalties to the regime, making them complicit in it.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2002. / AD-A405 987. Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-65). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Glenn F. Robinson, Harold D. Blanton. Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-65). Also available online.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Glasgow, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 698-731). Print version also available. Mode of access : World Wide Web. System requirements : Adobe Acrobat reader required to view PDF document.

No description available.

Thesis (B.A.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 173-205). Also available via the World Wide Web. http://www.pol.uiuc.edu/news/largio%5Fthesis.pdf

xiv, 162 p. / In my dissertation I argue that the invasion of Iraq was a part of a larger project by Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to reestablish the unconstrained use of U.S. military power after the defeat of Vietnam. The study presents the best evidence against the alternative explanations that the invasion of Iraq was the result of an overreaction to 9/11, the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction, a plan to spread democracy in the Middle East, a desire to protect Israel or a plan to profit from Iraqi oil. The study also challenges the leading explanation among academics that emphasizes the role of the neoconservatives in the decision to invade. These academics argue that neoconservatives, such as Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, successfully persuaded the American President, George W. Bush, and his Vice President, Dick Cheney, of the necessity to eliminate Saddam Hussein by winning an internal policy battle over realists, such as Secretary of State Colin Powell. With their narrow focus on neoconservatives and realists, scholars have largely overlooked a third group of hawkish policy makers, the primacists. This latter group, centered on Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney, had a long standing goal of strengthening the U.S. military and presidential powers in order to pursue U.S. primacy. This goal manifests itself in the invasion of Iraq, a country in the heart of the geopolitically important, oil-rich region of the Persian Gulf. I demonstrate that it was the primacists, not the neoconservatives, who persuaded the President to go to war with Iraq. Through historical process tracing, especially through a close look at the careers of the major policy actors involved and their public statements as well as declassified documents, I provide strong evidence that these leaders wanted to pursue regime change in Iraq upon taking office. The invasion of Iraq would extend the War on Terror, providing an opportunity to pursue their long-held policy of strengthening the power of the presidency and transforming the military into a high-tech and well-funded force. / Committee in charge: Jane Kellet Cramer, Chairperson/Advisor; Lars S. Skålnes, Member; Daniel J. Tichenor, Member; Val Burris, Outside Member