Inaug.-diss.--Göttingen.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1984. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 281-292).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1957. / Typescript. Abstracted in Dissertation abstracts, v. 18 (1958) no. 5, p. 1670-1671. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 193-197).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1981. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 212-217).

Thesis (M.B.A.)--Boston University

Thesis (M.B.A.)--Boston University

Three economic issues in property/casualty insurance are examined in this thesis. Chapter 2 explores the impact of supply side heterogeneity on the market equilibrium. Multiple period contracting and informational issues are examined in Chapters 3 and 4. Property/casualty insurance is marketed in two manners: through agency writers and direct writers. Direct writers can sell insurance at a lower cost than agency writers. By exploiting demand side characteristics, Chapter 2 extends the traditional literature by examining the behaviour of heterogeneous insurers within a framework that admits both direct and agency writers in equilibrium. Heterogeneous travel costs are used to support this equilibrium. A second model is developed in which claim frequency heterogeneity is introduced on the demand side. It is assumed that agency writers can better discern a consumer's risk type. Characteristics of equilibria under which direct and agency writers exist are derived. In Chapter 3, Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) single period insurance model is extended to multiple periods. In a multiple period framework, insurers offer a sequence of single period contracts in which future contracts are conditioned on past contract choices. For dynamic consistency, once low risks have revealed their type, future contracts must be contingent on this event. This contract structure is compared to both a sequence of one period pooling contracts and a sequence of one period separating contracts. Numerical examples illustrate the results. In Chapter 4, learning by insurers is examined in a model in which consumers possess search costs. The presence of search costs allows inefficient insurers to remain in the market, and allows lower cost firms to earn higher profit loadings each period. Insurers, who possess differing initial valuations of a consumer's loss propensity, update the contract offered each period based on a consumer's past accident history. In a multiple period setting, consumers search for new coverage and switch insurers when the price charged by their contracting insurer exceeds the price that they are willing to pay. / Business, Sauder School of / Finance, Division of / Graduate

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