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Why do governments restrict religious freedom? As more and more governments have adopted restrictive policies over the past thirty years, scholars have traditionally examined internal domestic factors—such as the role of democratic governance, economic growth, or internal competition—that may influence government choices. I build on this literature by extending the discussion to external factors, arguing that some policies may also spread from one government to another. This process, identified by scholars as the idea of policy diffusion, may occur in several ways. While previous research has focused on the spread of policies that are generally considered positive (i.e. the spread of democracy), I extend the literature by specifically focusing on the spread of restrictive policies. I argue that these policies may spread across countries through several specific mechanisms: geographic neighbors may observe each other, policymakers may learn generally from the adoption of policies throughout the world, countries may imitate the examples of others they consider powerful, or the merits of a policy may be socially constructed within groups of countries that have similar cultures. To examine these theoretical assumptions, I first compile a dataset that captures years of policy adoption for twenty types of restrictive government religion policy based on the information available from the Religion and State (RAS) Project for 175 countries between 1990 and 2008. I then test the data with several statistical models that allow me to compare the extent to which the proposed mechanisms change the likelihood that a government will adopt a restrictive policy. Through these tests, I find moderate statistical support for the assumption that all four of the policy mechanisms examined increase the odds of restrictive policy adoption.

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The present study offers an analysis of the concept of non-national identity in application to the Republic of Kazakhstan as the most likely case. The primary hypothesis is that newly independent states, which are undergoing a rapid transition to market economy and actively pursue integration in the world economy and foreign direct investment, will experience fragmentation of their national identity, defined as non-national identity. / Three sites in Kazakhstan, Almaty, Astana and Aktau, were chosen for the study as representative of the market reforms in the republic as well as the best examples of the country's pursuit of foreign direct investment and integration into the global economy. The data collected indicates that while Kazakhstan does demonstrate fragmentation of its national identity, it is not necessarily caused by the market reforms and the participation in the global trade. Alternative causal variables such as the Soviet and Russian colonial legacy, intra-ethnic cleavages among the Kazakhs and the prevalence of multi-vector foreign policy were found to contribute to the development of non-national identity of Kazakhstan. The study's results also suggest that in the last few years, Kazakh identity is experiencing a rather strong revival as well, which may yet counteract the existing factors leading to the emergence of the non-national identity of Kazakhstan.

This dissertation examines an unexplored issue in the international relations literature: how do leading global powers respond to changes in the distribution of capabilities between minor powers in peripheral regions? In particular, do they accommodate or oppose rising regional powers? Historically, leading powers have adopted a variety of responses when local power shifts have occurred, accepting changes to the status quo in some instances and resisting them in others, intervening in certain regional conflicts while foregoing direct involvement in others, and accommodating some rising powers while opposing others. I argue that the interaction between two factors provides an answer to these questions and explains this considerable variation: the type of local order that a leading power prefers and the type of power shift that it believes is taking place. / Depending on its overriding interests in a particular area---which can include containing an expansionist major power rival, ensuring unfettered access to a region and its resources, or avoiding conflicts that fuel local instability---a leading power may choose to either support a preponderant regional power or preserve a regional balance of power. Alternatively, in some cases it may be ambivalent between these two options. When a local power shift occurs, a leading power must therefore determine whether the changes that are under way appear likely to reinforce, establish, or undermine its preferred local order, and thus whether they will ultimately help or harm its local interests. Toward this end, policymakers will assess two distinct aspects of the changing distribution of capabilities to determine whether they should accommodate or oppose a rising regional power: the scope of the power shift, the direction of the power shift, or both. / I assess this theory by employing a wide range of plausibility probes and qualitative case studies, including English and Dutch policy toward Sweden from 1655 until 1660, British policy toward Egypt from 1831 until 1841, British policy toward the Confederacy from 1861 until 1862, British policy toward Japan from 1894 until 1902, American policy toward India from 1962 until 1965 and again in 1971, and American policy toward Iraq from 1980 until 1991.

Expansion of the author's thesis (Ph. D.--Shandong da xue, 2003) / Includes bibliographical references (p. 244-258).