The purpose of this dissertation is to show a yet undiscovered link between identity claims and the survival of political leaders. Diversionary theory posits that starting foreign conflicts during domestic hardship may increase the popular approval ratings of the leader and maintain him in power. I suggest that leaders may resort to initiating identity claims as a diversionary action to stay in power. Indeed, using survival analysis, this study finds a connection between the desire of leaders to protect their ethnic kin in neighboring countries and the leaders' own popularity and survival at home. Yet, identity claim initiation and escalation significantly decrease the chances of leaders to remain in office. At first sight, this is in sharp contrast with the diversionary theory literature, which suggests that leaders may employ foreign wars as a means to distract from domestic problems and increase their survival in office. Yet, the realization that the escalation of conflict may backfire does not necessarily deter leaders from diverting. Therefore, this analysis offers a new perspective in the field of rationalist explanations for war.