This thesis challenges the conventional wisdom that tends to conflate Arab foreign fighters with Islamist terrorists, and ‘martyrdom operations' with ‘suicide attacks.' Overlaps notwithstanding, it aims to draw distinctions between Arab foreign fighters engaged in defensive jihad defending co-religionists against a military foe, and Islamist terrorists engaged in terrorism that indiscriminately targets civilians and non-combatants. Critically, while disaggregating the two transnational cohorts, this thesis also illuminates the nexus between them. It draws on a thesis dataset of 3,010 Arab foreign fighters compiled using biographies, martyrdom eulogies, and postings on ‘jihadi' websites, in both English and Arabic. This dataset is then used to support three case studies involving the defensive jihads in 1980s Afghanistan, Iraq (post 2003), and Syria (post 2011). It leverages a theoretical framework based on the concept of radicalisation and the language of political Islam, whilst concurrently drawing on theories from psychology and historical military examples of combat, germane to defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism. The thesis concludes that Arab foreign fighters involved in defensive jihad employ martyrdom operations against military targets, through tactical necessity. Conversely, Islamist terrorists employ suicide attacks against civilians and non-combatants, through ideological necessity. The trajectory between the two transnational mobilisations appears to be broadly underpinned by facets of the Lucifer Effect – the situational factors encountered whilst participating in defensive jihad, including but not limited to, the experience of close combat in a war zone; being subjected to ideological indoctrination; and being exposed to charismatic authority and obedience to it. This suggests that subsequent involvement in Islamist terrorism by some Arab foreign fighters is primarily forged in the crucible of defensive jihad. Such findings should result in the crafting of more individualised de-radicalisation and rehabilitation programmes for returning foreign fighters, in both the West and the Arab world.

This thesis examines the National Socialists' ultimate designs for Germany's youth, conveniently organized within the Hitlerjugend. Prevailing scholarship portrays the Hitler Youth as a place for ideological indoctrination and activities akin to the modern Boy Scouts. Furthermore, it often implies that the Hitler Youth was paramilitary but always lacks support for this claim. These claims are not incorrect, but in regard to the paramilitary nature of the organization, they do not delve nearly deeply enough. The National Socialists ultimately desired to consolidate their control over the nation and to prepare the nation for a future war. Therefore, they needed to simultaneously indoctrinate German youth, securing the future existence of National Socialism but also ensuring that German youth carry out their orders and defend Germany, and train the youth in premilitary skills, deliberately attempting to increase the quality of the Wehrmacht and furnish it with a massive, trained reserve in case of war. This paper relies on published training manuals, translated propaganda, memoirs of former Hitler Youth members and secondary literature to examine the form and extent of the ideological indoctrination and premilitary training--which included the general Hitler Youth, special Hitler Youth subdivisions, military preparedness camps akin to boot camp, and elaborate war games which tested the youths' military knowledge. This thesis clearly demonstrates that the National Socialists desired to train the youth in skills that assisted them later in the Wehrmacht and reveals the process implemented by the National Socialists to instill these abilities in Germany's impressionable youth.