Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1983 / Bibliography: leaves [185]-188. / Microfiche. / vii, 188 leaves, bound 29 cm

Bibliography: leaves 336-344 / 344 leaves ; 31 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, 1985

Theater of Enigma in Shakespeare’s England demonstrates the cognitive, affective, and social import of enigmatic theatrical moments. While the presence of other playgoers obviously shapes the experience of attending a play, I argue that deliberately induced moments of audience ignorance are occasions for audience members to be especially aware of their relations to others who may or may not share their bafflement. I explore the character of states of knowing and not-knowing among audience members and the relations that obtain among playgoers who inhabit these states. Further, I trace the range of performance techniques whereby playgoers are positioned in a cognitive no-man's land, lying somewhere between full understanding and utter ignorance—techniques that I collectively term “enigmatic theater.” I argue that moments of enigmatic theater were a dynamic agent in the formation of collectives in early modern playhouses. I use here the term “collective” to denote the temporary, occasional, and fleeting quality of these groupings, which occur during performance but are dissipated afterwards. Sometimes, this collective resembles what Victor Turner terms communitas, in which the normal societal divisions are suspended and the playgoers become a unified collectivity. At other times, however, plays solicit the formation of multiple collectives defined by their differing degrees of knowledge about a seeming enigma. In either case, I show that a core achievement of early modern theater of enigma was to link issues of knowledge with issues of belonging—even when that pleasurable sense of belonging is as transient as the occasion of performance.

In this dissertation I take exception with a widely held philosophical doctrine, according to which agents are only blameworthy for the bad actions they have chosen to bring about. My argument strategy is to present cases in which agents are blamed for involuntary actions that are not in any way connected to their culpable and voluntary choices. These failures correspond, I suggest, to occasions of culpable ignorance where agents have been negligent or careless. More specifically, I claim that violations of natural duties of respect and consideration, and certain acquired role-type duties, are blamed without any voluntary consent. If my examples are persuasive, then the point is reached where a normative principle of 'voluntary consent' does not in fact coincide with people's actual practices and 'considered judgements'. In the final sections of the dissertation, I argue against the plausibility of keeping the principle and revising our judgements. / KMBT_363 / Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in

This study examines the role of not-knowing, particularly ignorance and irony, in our project of becoming persons. First, I draw upon Jean-Jacques Rousseau to articulate the concept of becoming a person. Considering Emile’s education as well as Sophie’s in Emile, I interpret becoming a person as cultivating the masculine (autonomy) and feminine (relationality), which enable us to live for ourselves and for others in a society. I then argue that ignorance and irony play a key role in our continuous project of becoming persons in childhood and adulthood, respectively. I draw upon Rousseau to discuss ignorance. Ignorance refers to the complete ignorance of things that do not originate from the child’s immediate experience. I focus on Rousseau’s notion that ignorance secures an open mind, which enables a child to begin a relationship with nature, things, and others. I draw upon Jonathan Lear to discuss irony. Irony refers to the loss of one’s routine understanding of her practical identity (social role), which inspires her aspirational understanding of the identity. I focus on Lear’s idea that irony allows an adult to keep an open mind, which enables her to be a subject in a social role, who continues to constitute herself via the role. Thus, I propose a model of becoming a person, in which ignorance and irony play the key role in forming and transforming a person, respectively, by securing an open mind as a person in childhood and adulthood, respectively. Lastly, I explore the application of this model to higher education today. I argue that ignorance and irony can be discussed not only as the two stages of life (childhood and adulthood) but also as the two phases of growth (formation and transformation) which can be concurrent in (young) adulthood. I then propose a pedagogy centered around ignorance and irony, which allows students to learn to become persons in formative and transformative ways. I suggest that this can be a model of moral education in higher education, which not only responds to the current mental health crisis but also revives the tradition of liberal education.