This thesis explores the impacts of the Partnership for Incentive-Based Budgeting (PIBB) model at Virginia Tech (VT), a land-grant institution. By conducting a mixed-methods approach including semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and a review of political theory, this research examines the differences in perceptions of employees across employee classifications, academic area, and financial experience at VT on the PIBB model, unhealthy internal competition, communications, fiscal policy, and political influence. The PIBB model was adopted at VT as a strategic response to reduced state funding and aims to encourage budget management improvements and collaborative planning across the university. Findings indicate that while the PIBB model is designed to align financial incentives with the university's academic and operational goals, it may also foster unhealthy, internal competition among faculty, staff, and administrative units. This competition arises from the pressure to meet specific performance metrics linked to budgetary allocations, potentially leading to conflicts and misalignment with the university's broader educational objectives –underscoring the need for a balanced approach to budgeting that supports both financial sustainability and academic integrity. Complexities of implementing market-driven budgeting models within academic settings suggests that while such models can drive efficiency, they must be managed carefully to avoid undermining the core mission of educational institutions. This thesis contributes to ongoing discussions about the optimization of resource allocation in public higher education. / Master of Arts / This thesis looks at how the Partnership for Incentive-Based Budgeting (PIBB) model, implemented at Virginia Tech (VT), impacts various aspects of the university. Using a combination of interviews, document analysis, and a look into political theory, the research investigates how different employees at VT perceive the PIBB model, its effects on internal dynamics like competition, communication, financial policies, and political influences. The PIBB model was implemented as a result in the decline in state money going to VT and to help manage the budget better and collaboration across the university. This thesis research found that while the PIBB model tries to link money incentives with university goals, it also creates unhealthy competition among faculty, staff, and units within the university. This competition happens as everyone wants to meet certain goals to get more money, which can take away from the main goal of the university, which is education. The study shows that it is important to find a balance between the university's goals being at the forefront but also managing the money appropriately. It also shows that using budgeting methods based on business ideas in a public university is tricky and needs careful management to keep the university's values intact. Overall, this research adds to the conversation about how we can best use money in public colleges to make them better for everyone.