We present three distinct works on the subject of incentive design. The first focuses on a fundamental aspect of all principal-agent models, the participation constraint. We endogenise the constraint, allowing the agent to influence his outside option, albeit at some detriment to the project he is contracted to work upon. We compare the optimal contract to the literature on the supposed trade-off between risk and incentives. We find support for the Prendergast (2002) observation of a positive relationship between the two variables and ofer an explanation through the use of said influence activities. The second contribution introduces another principal-agent framework for models with both adverse selection and moral hazard, with the novel inclusion of limited liability. Described in a target-setting environment, the findings are related to and support the use of tenure contracts in academia. This is justified by the fact that pooling equilibria maximise the value to the principal and fully separating equilibria are implemented with non-monotonic wage structures. Finally, in opposition to conventional literature, those of low type make rent gains over and above their reservation utility, while the high types break even. The final chapter studies organisational design and allocation of control. We offer conditions whereby firms would wish to integrate, or profit-share, with another, given varying degrees of control allocation. We show that integration comes at a lower cost for the decision-making firm when control is contractible as opposed to transferable. Also we show that the level of incompatibility between firms, unrelated to financial gain, can affect the integration decision.

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(情報学) / 甲第19120号 / 情博第566号 / 新制||情||99(附属図書館) / 32071 / 京都大学大学院情報学研究科社会情報学専攻 / (主査)准教授 松原 繁夫, 教授 田島 敬史, 教授 鹿島 久嗣 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Informatics / Kyoto University / DFAM

abstract: This study investigates the impact of a specific organizational form – partnership – on employees’ awareness of risk control and job engagement in securities companies. Given that their organizational performance relies heavily on the performance of individual employees, it is critical for securities companies in China to adopt appropriate organizational forms so that they can better captalize on their employees’ human capital to cope with the increasingly intense market competition. Partnership, as one of the few organizational forms, has been widely adopted in industries that rely on the performance of individuals, such as law, auditing, consulting, and investment banking, around the world. In the context of China’s emerging economy, it has also been adopted as an incentive system by market leaders across several industries, including Alibaba in online shopping, Vanke in real estate, and Fosun in investments. In contrast, partnership has not been adopted or implemented by securities companies in China as most of them are still state-owned enterprises. Based on my review of the corporate governance literature and qualitative analysis of partnership adoption in China, I propose that partnership can help better alighn the interests of employees with owners in securities companies as well. Specifically, the prospect of becoming a partner in the future can improve employees’ awareness of risk control and increase their job engagement. Taking advantage of partnership adoption at a Chinese securities company as a natural field experienment, I surveyed its employees about their awareness of risk contrl and job dedication before and after the adoption. The results from 505 matched surveys showed an increase in the average scores of both awareness of risk control and job dedication after the company adopted partnership as a new organizational form. Findings of this study have important implications for organizational and incentive design for securities companies in China. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Business Administration 2018

abstract: 近20年,中国品牌零售业的快速发展使其成为全球第三大零售市场。消费者的需求量在大幅增长，对于本土企业来说，机遇与挑战并存。 对于连锁型品牌零售企业，员工是其产品和服务的载体。而如何做好不同层次的人员的激励体系，并得以踏实的落实和执行，是企业经营中非常关键的环节，也是品牌零售企业在竞争中获取优势的根本保证。另外，由于连锁零售企业基层员工流动性大、总体素质较低，如何对这部分员工实施有效的绩效考核,成为很多连锁零售企业管理人员面临的一个难题。 本文将长期和短期激励作为主要的研究内容。从整体国内企业来看，运转良好的绩效考评体系并不多，大部分企业的绩效考评体系只注重短期激励而忽视了长期激励的作用，绩效考评关注的是目标的实现，与员工的发展相脱节。因此，如何做好品牌企业的激励体系，如何在人才竞争中取得先机，并最大化企业利润，是本文研究的重心。 目前的研究空白在于对连锁型店铺的激励绩效。而考虑到品牌零售中的连锁经营往往涉及到成百上千家门店，涉及到的从业人数较多，因而对门店的激励绩效的成败是关系到企业整体激励绩效好坏的关键。 本文对激励绩效方案的相关理论进行回顾、分析与总结，从委托代理理论、激励理论、交易成本理论和产权理论入手，分析连锁型品牌零售企业的激励绩效特点。连锁型品牌零售企业合伙制本质上与特许经营精神及设计理念一致，而想要改进的正是特许经营中加盟店与总部的博弈与消耗，形成利益共同体，达到企业价值最大化的目标。 通过连锁型品牌零售企业绩效激励的真实案例（永辉超市合伙人制度、拉夏贝尔店铺合伙人制度、康奈零投入型与交股金型两种店铺合伙人制度）分析得出风险共担、超额利润分成的合伙人制度在连锁型品牌零售企业激励绩效方案设计中的可行性及意义，并从中发现了已有实践存在的问题，并提出建议。 店铺合伙人制度激励店长、提高单店销售业绩、减少交易成本、提高管理效率的正向作用毋庸置疑，建议在实践中积极推行与完善。 / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Business Administration 2019