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Investment and Tax Incentive Uncertainty: Evidence from the R&D Tax CreditCowx, Mary January 2021 (has links)
No description available.
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Three Essays on Hedge Fund Fee Contracts, Managerial Incentives and Risk Taking BehaviorsZhan, Gong 01 September 2011 (has links)
Essay One
Under the principal-agent framework, we study and compare different compensation schemes commonly adopted by hedge fund and mutual fund managers. We find that the option-like performance fee structure prevalent among hedge funds is suboptimal to the symmetric performance fee structure. However, the use of high water mark (HWM) mitigates the suboptimality, though to a very limited extent. Bothour theoretical models and simulation results show that HWM will induce more managerial efforts only when a fund is slightly under the water but it will unfavorably dampen incentives when a fund is too deep under the water and when the manager's skill is poor. Allowing managers to invest personal wealth in their own funds, however, helps align interests and provides positive managerial incentives.
Essay Two
Existing literature has detected a "tournament behavior" among mutual fund managers that mid-year underperformers tend to take relatively higher risk than peers in the second half-year. We reexamine this issue and provide empirical evidence that such behavior does not exist among hedge fund managers, either at fund level or risk style level. Instead, hedge fund managers shift risk at mid-year in response to the moneyness of their incentive contracts. Also, risk shifting decisions are more driven by underperformance than by outperformance. HighWater Mark can strongly rein in excess risk-taking and therefore better aligns interests. Last, risk shifting on average does not improve either performance, moneyness of incentive contracts, or cash inflows.
Essay Three
We use factor models and optimal change point regression models to capture the intra-year risk dynamics of hedge fund managers. Those risk shifting managers are further divided into 'Informed', 'Uninformed' and 'Misinformed' groups, according to their post-shifting risk adjusted performance. We find evidence that supports the existence of an Adverse Selection' problem of managers compensation schemes. Namely, incentive contracts, designed to share risks and align interests, induce the strongest risk taking from the least informed or skilled hedge fund managers, whose risk-shifting decisions result in undesired or even deteriorated risk-adjusted returns for investors. We also find that the High Water Mark has only limited influence on mitigating excessive risk shifting.
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IDENTIFYING INCENTIVES TO MOTIVATE MIDDLE SCHOOL READERSKronberg, Lisa Christine 31 March 2006 (has links)
No description available.
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THE EFFECT OF TRAINING, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, AND INCENTIVES ON JOB SATISFACTION AND COMMITMENT IN PART-TIME HOTEL EMPLOYEESJaworski, Caitlin D. 11 December 2012 (has links)
No description available.
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Foreign Direct Investment in America's Automotive IndustryMacCleary, Jared 14 December 2006 (has links)
No description available.
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THE EFFECTS OF STORY MAPPING AND INCENTIVES ON MULTIPLE MEASURES OF WRITING PROFICIENCYBrunner, Melissa A. 06 August 2010 (has links)
No description available.
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THE RELATIONSHIP OF PERFORMANCE BASED, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO PRODUCTIVITY AND QUALITY OF WORK LIFEFITZSIMMONS, VERNA MARIE 16 September 2002 (has links)
No description available.
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ANCHORING THE CITY? RETAIL LOCATION AND THE POLITICS OF DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENTDE SOCIO, MARK 27 May 2005 (has links)
No description available.
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Community-based sustainable forest managment: A case study of Rutland Township, OhioHoffman, Deborah L. 26 April 2006 (has links)
No description available.
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Essays on Regulatory Takings Compensation and Formal and Informal Incentives in ContractsSchieffer, John Kenneth 27 August 2009 (has links)
No description available.
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