Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2006. / Ernest R. Larkins, committee chair; Fred A. Jacobs, Detmar W. Straub , Sally Wallace, committee members. Electronic text (100 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Aug. 9, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 78-85).

My dissertation consists of two essays on CFOs' promotion-based tournament incentives and performance-based equity incentives. The first essay examines the joint implications of CFOs' tournament incentives and equity incentives for firms' risk-taking. With the pay gap between the CEO and the CFO as the proxy for the CFO's tournament incentives, I find that the relationship between a firm's risk taking and the CFO's tournament incentives is non-monotonic. In particular, I show that below a certain level, increase in pay gap is associated with increase in firm risk taking (e.g., higher leverage, lower cash holding balance and higher R&D intensity). However, after reaching a certain level, the CEO-CFO pay gap negatively impacts risk-taking, as increase in pay gap is associated with lower leverage, higher cash holding balance and lower R&D intensity. With the CFO's pay-performance sensitivity as the proxy for the CFO's equity incentives, I find that the CFO's equity incentives negatively impact firm's R&D intensity, but have no significant impact on broader financial decisions such as capital structure and cash policy. Collectively, my findings indicate that CFO incentives play an important role in firm's risk-taking behaviors, and the effect of the CFO's tournament incentives is more pronounced. The second essay studies the impact of tournament incentives and equity incentives for CFOs on firms' earnings management, including accrual-based earnings management (e.g., total accruals, abnormal accruals) and real activities manipulation (e.g., abnormal discretionary expenditures, abnormal production costs). Measuring the CFO's tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and the CFO, I show that the CFO's tournament incentives positively influence total accruals and abnormal accruals. Meanwhile, the CFO's equity incentives, measured as the CFO's pay-performance sensitivity, are found positively related to real activities manipulation proxies and total accruals. My findings show a consistent pattern before and after the passage of SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), but the incentives' effects on earnings management have become less significant in the post-SOX period. Overall, the CFOs' tournament and equity incentives both play an important role in earnings management, but their relative importance lies in different earnings management techniques.

published_or_final_version / Business Administration / Master / Master of Business Administration

No description available.

"Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Program Management from the Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009." / Advisor(s): Petross, Diana ; Naegle, Brad. "December 2009." "Joint applied project"--Cover. Description based on title screen as viewed on January 28, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: N/a Includes bibliographical references (p. 43-47). Also available in print.

Policymakers need a wide array of information for multiple purposes. Acquiring information often is costly, so it is assumed that incentives must be provided to overcome these costs and stimulate information gathering. It is further assumed that increasing the number of actors engaged in acquiring information creates free-rider problems. In 2007 the U.S. House of Representatives created a select committee to address energy and environment issues, but did not give that committee legislative authority. The new committee could not compete with others for the ability to write or amend legislation, so its presence should not have changed the standing committee’s information gathering patterns. In fact, committees did alter their hearing patterns in response to the select committee’s work. Information has jurisdictional and reputational value to policymakers in addition to the incentives it can help them obtain, and policymakers will act to acquire information even without explicit incentives to do so. / text

published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration

Thesis (M.Com.(Taxation)) -- University of Pretoria, 2009. / Summary in English and Afrikaans. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1970. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record.

This study, utilizing Preston and Karahanna’s framework for shared vision development and Agency Theory, explores the impact of vision development factors and factors associated with incentive plans on shared vision and alignment. Results of the study confirm the strong relationship between shared vision and alignment, and indicate that having an effective management team is important with respect to developing and maintaining shared vision and alignment within the organization. Several vision development factors such as using the language of the business, participation on the top management team (TMT), and having knowledge of the business impact shared vision through their influence on teamwork. Also, results of this study suggest that participation on the TMT by the CIO/IT leader is more important than the individual’s position in the organizational hierarchy. In addition, attributes associated with incentive plans such as achievable and clear measures, measures linked to organizational goals, measures that align the interests of the individual with those of the organization, regular plan reviews, and using a balanced scorecard approach with respect to incentive plan design positively impact teamwork and shared vision. For practitioners, this highlights the importance of incentive plans as powerful tools that can be used to reinforce shared vision, effective teamwork, and alignment within the organization. Also, the CIO/IT leader needs to be knowledgeable of the business and must fill the role of both a technologist as well as an enterprise leader. This person must be an evangelist communicating the value and benefits of IT to the rest of the organization.